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Introduction
While there has been a steady movement toward disarmament, and for limitation in this and other lands, with peace
pacts to prevent war, naval agreements, treaties and similar
moves, there is still a definite need for consideration of
our naval defenses.

In this discusston, a compilation of

public opinions and tendencies, as found in publications, I
will

te~1d

to show there is considerable interest in our

navy.
This material is not projected as an argument against
reasonable limitations, nor an attack: on those advocating;
but to reproduce a part of the attitudes of public writing
and speaking of our people.

It must be granted that there

is a tenable argument on either si(e of the naval question,
and no brief is held for either.
In order to bring this up to the title, there must be
a broader presentation of one side than the other.

No con-

clusions shall be made in definite form for the reader, nor
can there by such done here.

The reader, may if he chooses,

draw conclusions as to which side he prefers.

I

,

1

CHAPTER I
UNITED STATES NAVAL HISTORY
Following the history of this nation we see that the
Navy first came into existence with a fleet of privateers in
the Revolution.

Just before this time came the 'first naval

engagement', under direction of Benedict Arnold on Lake
Champlain.

The privateers, operating as individuals,

collectively did much damage to Englrtnd' s sea power, and undoubtedly did much to win an independent status for the
American colonies.

With the establishment of· the new nation,

plans were made for a naval force, but nothing was done concerning this until 1794.
When Washington was inaugurated as President, there was,
no Navy.

The American commerce and shipping, however, were

well under way.

They met with continual attaclcs of pirates

in the Mediterranean, es)ecially from the Barbary states.
The situation on this point so aroused President Washington,
that he sent the following message to Congress:
To an active external commerce, the protection of a
naval force is indispensable. This is manifest with regard
to wars· in which a State itself is a party. But beside this,
it is our own experience that the most sincere neutrality is
not a sufficient guard against the depredations of nations
at war.
To secure respect to a neutral flag requires a naval
force organized and ready to vindicate it from insult or
aggression. This may even prevent the necessity of going
to war, by discouraging a belligerent nation from committing
such violations of the rights of neutrals, as may, first or
last, leave no other option.

2

From the best information that I have been able to obtain, it would seem as if our trade in the Mediterranean
without a protecting force will always be insecure, and our
citizens exposed to the calami ties from Wbich' numbers of them
have been relieved.
~
These considerations invite the United States to look to
the means and set about the gradual creation of a Navy. The
increasing progress of their navigation promises them, at no
distant period, the requisite supply of seamen, and their
means in other respects favor the undertaking. It is an encouragement likewise, that their particular situation will
give weight and influence to a moderate naval force in their
hands. Will it not, then, be advisable to begin, without delay, to provide an.d lay up materials for the building and
equipping ships of war, and to proceed in the work by degrees, in proportion as our resources shall render it practical without inconvenience, so that a future war with Europe
may not find ou~ commerce in the rame unprotected state in
which it is fom1d by the present.
The Congress received the message, and the United States
Senate, on December 10, 1796, replied to the President's
message, stating in part:
We perfectly coincide with you in the opinion that the
importance of our commerce demands a naval force for its
protection against foreign insult and depredation, and our
solicitude to attain that object shall always be proportionate to its magnitude,2
Following the orders for the first ships to be built,
General Knox, Secretary of War and Navy under President
Washing"ton, made up his own specifications for the start of
the American navy as follows:
These ships should combine qualities of strength,
durability, swiftness and force as to make them equal, if
not superior to any European frigate.3
'
1
2

Richardson, Messages and Pauers of the Presidents, I, 201.
Ibid, 205.

3 United States Haval Institute Proceedings, 296t 37.

For the period of the War of 1812, the United States
Navy was in deplorable c ortdi tion, compared with the sea
forces of other lru1ds.

When the second English war was de-

clared in June of that year, there had been no preparation
in this country.

On sea and land the contest was made up of

a succession of petty individual actions.

British writers

said that the American Navy should be swept from the sea.
During the sweeping process the Havy increased four fold.
When Great Britain turned seriously upon the American force,
and sent 14,000 men to Canada to settle the conquest, this
force was met at Lake Champlain by a small band, and the sea
fights on the Lake, under command of Macdonough, an epic in
the naval history of this nation, saved the United States.l
When war was declared England had 1, 000 ships -- and
America had 6 frigates and 8 sloops and brigs.

As England

ruled the maritime world, she had relaxed her training.

She

had no reason to remain prepared as no one would bother her.

I

I

I
t

Americans were training continually, and carried 1t to the
highest possible 90int.
Roosevelt, in his nnaval War of 1812", cites this fact
as an illustration of the value of naval preparedness in
peace time. 2
At the opening of the war, according to statistics in
the writing just quoted, the American personnel numbered 12

1 Roosevelt, Theodore, Naval War of 1812, ch. I.
2 Ibid, chs. II, III.

~

4

captains, 10 commanders, 73 lieutenants, 53 masters, 300
midshipmen, 42 marine officers

&~d

4,000 seamen.

war the enlistments rose very rapidly.
Secretary of the Navy, B.

w.

The report

During the

or

the

Crowninshield, April 18, 1816,

stated that at the close of the conflict 14,960 men were enlisted in the ·naval service and 3,715 marines.
The ships of the American navy rated from 148 tons to
1576, the displacement of the Constitution.

ship rated 44 guns.

This frunous old

Many others carried only 12 guns.l

Following this struggle little was done in the Navy.
Periods of construction and neglect followed, bringing our
story down to the Civil War period.

We are familiar with the

type of wooden ship used in the struggle, many steam propelled, but all armed with smooth bore guns. ,
Up to the time of the historic Merrimac and Monitor
encounter the Constitution was the only ship of note in our
Navy.

She stands out as the embodiment of our effective sea

power.

Approximately 150 other ships made :up the United

States Navy at the opening of the Civil War, many being
destroyed by fire during the conflict, and others were being
built during the war.
When the Federals abandoned Norfolk the Merrimac was
sunk.

Confederates raised her and covered her sides with

iron plates.
1

The Untted States Navy knew this and dreaded

Roosevelt, Theodore, War of 1812, chs. II, III.
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her completion.

Meanwhile the Monitor was being constructed

on Long Island.

This ship introduced the revolving turret

to our Navy.l

The Monitor was armed with two 11 inch ~ns.

Armor on its turret was 8 inches thick.

The ship cost

$275,000 to build, and was completed in 100 days.
March 8, 1862 these two new naval craft met, and that
meeting revolutionized naval construction.

Before the end

of the war 60 vessels were built on plans of these ships,
all in the United States.2
The United States Havy consisted of 148 wooden ships,
mostly left from the Oi vil War and of which only 48 were
actually ready for immediate· service fifty-six years ago.
The Monitor and Merrimac engagement, and twenty years of
neglect had put this country out of the ·story as a. naval
power.
Rejuvenation of our Navy now took place in earnest when
Congress passed an act on August 5, 1882.

From this beginning

our department developed plans for successive steps of growth.
This growth finally culminated in the find battle cruisers on
the shipways at the time of the Washington conference of 1921,
and which were not completed.

One feature of this new activ-

ity was the provision of the Congress rule that steel used
should be of 'domestic manufacture' •

This was a wonderful

1 Standard Reference Works, V, Monitor and Merrimac.
2

Ibid.

6

boost to American steel manufacture.
An interesting feature in this connection, was the re-

port of the Secretary of the Navy, in 1882, that delay and
great difficulty were being experienced by him in finding
even two persons in civil life, with the established standing and reputation, as experts in naval or marine construction.
This, of course, had been due to the change from an art to a
science in the mruting of ships of steel instead of wood.
The l!avy had no officers trained in theoretical architecture at this period.

In 1879, however, the Secretary had

sent two young officers to the Royal Naval College in Greenwich, England, and the plan of sending two officers each year
for twenty years was carried out.

In 1901 a course of in-

struction for naval construction was started at Massachusetts
Institute of Technology.

This service had its advantages for

industrial life as well.

In 1891 the first officer resigned

from the service to take charge of construction work with .the
William Cramp and Sons yard in building two battleships for
the Uavy.
In the Naval Appropriation Act of June 10, 1896, authorizati.on was made for construction of a model basin at the
Washington Navy Yard.

It was constructed and is one of the

finest in the world.

In it models of ships projected, both

for government use and private, may be given various tests
for efficiency of design.
As above mentioned, the steel for the new ships had been
designated to be of domestic manufacture. At first no

?

manufacturer would undertake the job of making the special
metals to the Navy specifications.

Finally John Roach, of

the John Roach Company of Chester, Pennsylvania, himself
built a new mill and accepted the responsibility.

Of course

he was given the contract for four of the first ships •. His
new mill soon supplied specification steel to five firms for
naval shipbuilding.
Great difficulties were met by his mill and later ones
to meet the rigid specifications, and pressure was brought
to bear to get the requirements lowered.

They remained, ru1d

finally satisfactory material was produced.

From that time

forward, the United States could produce as good steel as was
found elsewhere in the world.l
In 1885 the Dolphin was completed, the first of the new
program.

The vessel was put into commission, served 35 years,

was decommissioned in 1921 and sold to private buyers in
1922.

Just before the ship was finished the Secretary of the
Navy, Whitney, visited the yard and was told by Mr. Roach
about the difficulty of forging satisfactory stern frames
for the Chicago and other ships.
huge frames.

He suggested casting the

However, no foundry in the country had anneal-

ing oven large enough.

In 1886 specifications were made for

a cast steel stern framework for the Charleston.

Great

oppoei tion went up, but in 1886 the Midvale Steel Works
1

How the United States Navy Aids

Indust~,

Gov•t. Pub.

8

delivered a satisfactory steel casting weighing 6, 720 pounds,
and this other epoch in sh4.pbuild.1. ng was opene'd.l
About thi.s time the greater need for armor plate became
apparent.

Many novel experiments were made by the Havy

ordnance department in using iron with nickel, chrome,
vanadium, and other metal combinations to start out further
steel improvements, until our national steel industry today
leads the world, due to Navy needs.
The first armor plant in this country was started by the
Bethlehem Iron \Vorks at Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, as a result
of a contract agreement between Lieutenant William Jacques
of the United States Navy and Sir Joseph \Vhi tworth of the
Whitworth Fmmdry of England.

This plant got its first con-

tract from the American government for naval armor on June 1,
1887.

Shortly after this event, the Ohief of Ordnance

visited the plant and induced them to try to make gun forgings
for the Navy.2

To this time, gun forgings for those larger

than six inch were purchased in England.

In 1890 the work

was undertaken, as experimental, and the guns of the Oregon
and Massachusetts, used in the Spanish American war, were
American products.

As basic steel developed acid, open

hearth steel was better, but insufficient ores in this
country necessitated developing mines in Sout.h America.
Ouban ores also met the requirements.
1 How the United States Navy Aids Industrz., Gov' t.Pub. 40-50.
2 The Navy in Peace Times, Gov• t. Publication, 53-54.

9

To handle these new guns in their mountings, the
Waterbury hydraulic speed gear was developed. 'This type
of gear toda.y, used commercially, keeps automobiles on the
highways.

Commercial springs were found inadequate to

handle heavier recoils, so special alloyed springs were
designed.

Today many phases of the commerclal life of our

nation are benefitted by these researches.l
In 1881 President Hayes started this new era by a request to Congress for a new Uavy.

Cleveland went into office

on a platform o-::>posed t c the 'pro British' plan which had
surrendered our control of sea power, and he started a program of five new steel ships.

Under Harrison the Navy grew

rapidly, and in 1891 the famous White Squadron was sent to
Europe to show the rising naval power of the United States.
In 1888 the trouble in Samoa, whi.ch almost made a vrar
with Germany, helped to create a desire for a 1-Tavy.

The

Venezuela affair, in 1895, again directed critical attention
to our Navy.

Admiral A. T. Mah:m, naval writer, probably

did more to bring the lravy to the consciousness of the
American people than any other individual, with possible
exception of President Theodore Roosevelt.
Following these incidents, the Havy was reorganized,
under direction of Roosevelt, then in the Department, so
that by the time of the Spanish American War, an effie tent
Navy was provided for this country.
1 Op. Oit., 57.

Its activity in that

10

short encounter needs no elaboration at this point.

Suffice

it to say that its accomplishments brought the United States
into prominence as a world sea power.
Shortly after Roosevelt's connection ·with the Navy Department, be made an address· at the Naval College, in which
he said:

To build up the fighting qualities, the lack of which
no nation can exist, '111e ask for a great Uavy. We feel,
partly, that no great nattonal life is worth li.ving if the
nation is not willing to stake everything on the arbitration
of wa1·, rather than to submit to the loss of honor and renown •.1
By 1916 the United States had changed its ideas and,
under direction of the Wilson administration, had launched
upon the road of construction, leading to the building of
the greatest naval force that any country had hoped to own.
This activity was further motivated by difficulties experienced with Lloyd George's refusal to accept American interpretation of "freedom of the seas" in the famous Fourteen
Points, at the Peace Conference.
According to official tables, given to the World Publ:tshing Company for use in its World A_:tmanaq_, in 1916 the
United States Navy had a fleet of the following ships: 2
First line battleships
Second line battlesh\ps
Armored crui sere
First class cruisers
Second class cruisers
Third class cruisers
1

2

11

25
10

5
4
16

Mission and Needs of the United
'

World Almanac, 1919, 760.

Stat.~s

Navy, 30-50.

ll

Monitors
Destroyers
Torpedo boats
Submarines
Gunboats
Transports
Supply ships
Hospital shlps
Fuel sh~.ps
Converted yachts
Unserviceable ships

7
63
18
38
28
4
4
1
20

14
21

When the construction program of 1916 was introduced
into Oongress, there were under construction in this
country for the United States Navy the following ships: 1
Second line battleships
Destroyers
Submarines
Transports
Supply shlps
Fuel shtps

6
11

35
1
1

2

When the U:.ti ted States actu.a.lly entered the World War
in 1917, the lifavy had been greatly augmented, and its personnel increased, but principally by new recruits.

At the

close of the War the United Sta tea was a naval power in the
strongest position, for the first time in :Lts history.

For

instance, on November 1, 1918 the United S ta tee Uavy had, in
full commission, a total of 1, BOO vessels -- nearly six
ttmes the number on the lists in 1916.
The regular navy lists for 1917-18 showed a total of

778 vessels, of which 58 were armored ships, 562 unarmored
fighting ships (presumed for submarine control) 158 nonfighting ships.

In addition 36 interaed German ships had

been repaired and fitted fo1· service, and about 1,000
1

World Almanac, 1922, 762.

_,l

12
privately owned ships (including 83 Dutch shi9s) purchased
or chartered were either fitted or were fitting for naval
service.

About 740 of these latter were actually put into

servioe.l
While the country was increasinr; its naval strength
greatly, most of this constructi:)ll had been on what is known
as auxiliary surface craft.
constructed.

Many submarines had also been

War stocks had been accumulating and the na-

val personnel composed 32,000 officers and 550,000 enlisted
men.2
Official figures show that on November 1, 1922 the Navy
had in commission the following:3
Single caliber battleships4 16
Mixed caliber battleships
23
Battle crui sera
•••
Armored cruisers
8
Monitors
7
First class cruisers
4
Second class cruisers
4
Third class cruisers
15
Destroyers
93
Torpedo boats
17
Torpedo vessels
15
Submarines
79
•renders
17
1

403,450 tons
308,146
• •• ••••
111,900
24,964
36,765
25,065
47,820
94,583
3,147
6,275
29,886
98,860

Standard Reference Work, VI, 100-101.

2 Knox, Dudley W.,"Defense of Unlted States Naval Policy 1l
Ourrent History, June 1925, XXII, 339-344.
3 World Almanac, 1923, 686.
4 Single caliber battleships use only one cnlib er gun in
all turret mountings, while upper turrets on mixed
caliber ships use smaller sizes.

13
37
300
14
5
12
5

Gunboats
Submarine chasers
Mine sweepers
Transports
Converted yachts
Sup-ply ships
Hospital ships
Fuel ships
Special service ships
Unserviceable for war

6

21
13
15

34,710
23,100
13,300
57,295
8,711
33,900
34,097
248,989
83,891
43,336

In addition, there were under construction or author-

ized, the followine; naval unit s:l
Types
Single caliber battleships
Mixed caliber battleships
Battle cruisers
Second class cruisers
Submarines
Destroyers
Gunboats
Patrol boats
Submarine chasers,
Mine sweepers
Hospital stlip
Fuel shi}.Js·
Special service ships
Transports
Tenders

Authorized

11
••

2
••

6

••
••

10
77
232
2
58
36

9
12
••

••
••

35
1
3
2
••

..
••
••

1
3

••
The relative strength of the naval pow.ers in 1921 before the Washington conference:2
Type
Battleshtps
Battle cruisers
Cruisers
Light cruisers
Aircraft carriere
Submarines

u.s.

G. B.

France

Japan

Italy

33

46
10
21
67

17

11
4
9

9
••
4

19

..
..
107

6
185

..9
..
..
55

8

..

l
17

••
74

1 World Almanac, composite tables, 1920, 1921, 1922, 1930.
2 Ibid.
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The main it ems under construe tion were: 1
Type
Battleships
Battle cruisers
Light cruisers
Destroyers
Submarines

u.s.

G.B.

France

....

10
6
10
115
59

Japan

.46.
.9.

••
••

••

8

8

21
56
46

Italy
4
••
••
10
7

. Allowing a year and a half to have these completed,
added to the preceding tables, and the reader can easily
see what the neet of the United States could have been by
June, 1923 and by July 1924.

A few of the ships in the

above tables were finished and put into commission prior to
the Washington conference.
When Roosevelt came into the Presidency, he stated in a
message to Congress that .II ship for ship, the Ame ric an Navy
must be better than any other in the world".
career, he stated that

II

the Navy offers

1).8

Later in his

the only means of

malcing the Monroe Doctrine anything but a derision".
When Germany was suing for peace, and was willing to
accept the fourteen poin·ts, the European allies did not agree
with the United States because they claimed so many of the
points were vague and meantngless.

American interpretations

of them were made with Wilson's consent.

The point of free-

dom of the seas was explained at length and flatly refused by
Lloyd George for England.
Wilson replied that if the British would not accept it,
they could c oun t upon the certain fact tha. t the United States
1

Op. Cit.

15
had materials a.nd equipment to buil.d up the strongest naval
force that the world had ever seen--

11

as strong as our re-

sources will :permit and the lcind tbe people desire to seen.
As ably stated by Mr.

o.

A. Tinker:

11

We were no longer

a nation open to easy burglary, nor were we de:iant, but convinced that we were our own b0st friends" .1
Following the conference the United Sta tee actually to ole
the treaty into serious consj.deration, and began destroying
the potential naval power.

There were seventeen ships sold,

scrapped or sunk; seven of those that were practio.ally completed were sold a.s junk.

These were to have been 43,000 tons

each, and would have been the stro;:1gest of this class afloat.
Also there were six battle cruisers contemplated to back up
this formidable first line -- plans

Wel~e

now changed, four

were sold a :.d two converted into aircraft carriers.
In all the building, there bas been nothing partisan in
development of the Navy.

During a tour of the Middle West,

in 1910, Theodore Roosevelt said:
The Navy is not an affair of the sea coast. There is
not a man who lives in the grass country, or along the Great
Lakes, or the Missouri that is not as keenly interested in
the navy as if he dwelt on the New England coast, or the
Gulf Ooast or Puget Sound. The Navy belongs to all of us.
The following table shows the comparative sizes of
main categories of the five powers November 15, 1931.

1

Tinker, C. A., 11 Navy the Right Arm et! the State Department", Current History, October, 1926.
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Types
Battleships
Aircraft carriers
Large cru. i sere
Small cruisers
Destroyers
Submarines

Great Britain
18
6
19
30
26
48

15
3
8
10
71
65

Japan

Types
Battleshius
Aircraft carriers
Large cruisers
Small crui.sers
Destroyers
Submarines

555,050
115,350
183,686
139,140
33,745
49,919

United States

10
3
8
17
77
67

298,400
61,370
68,400
81,455
92,285
70,973

453,900
77,500
72,900
70,500
83,700
58,220

France
6
1

5

4

38
35

133,134
22,050
50,000
27' 011
61,903
29,002

At the time of this table's compilation, the tons
being built by the main powers were as follows·:
Types
Aircraft carriers
Large cruisers
Small cruisers
Destroyers
Submarines

Great Britain
••

4

21
2

28,000
28,756
2,400

1
7
••

5
3

1
4
1
9
5

13,800
70,000

......

contracted
3,800

France

Japan

Types
Aircraft carriers
Large cruisers
Small cruisers
Destroyers
Submarines

•••••••
•••••••

United States ·

7' 600
40,000
8, 500 '
14,987
8, 269

Tables from World Almanac, 1932, 369.

••

2
3

19
53

• • • •• •
20,000
17,326
46,071
54,028

17
A noticeable feature of the recent years has been 'the
marked increase in the costs of the Arnerican N·avy.

The

following table shows the general upward trend of our peace
time

~Tavy.

Of course there must be placed with this table

the understanding of the increased cost of materials, labor,
rates of pay and other conditions which, no doubt, are reflected to some extent.
The cost of new constructions can be referred to in a
later chapter, with criticisms af' the IIBig Navy Pa1·ty 11 that
there is not enough attention being given to our fleet.

Per

capita coste however w1.11 be very low.
Cost of the United States Navy, 1885 to 1931.
~Tew

Maintenance
operations

Shore station
improvements

1,591,500
1885
4,842,140
1890
10,459,211
1895
10,659,155
1900
1901
10,644,217
1902
14,392,921
21,807,999
1903
31,403,948
1904
36,894,266
1905
31,764,556
1906
1910
24,736,599
1911
19,532' 806
1912
24,930,490
1913
24,630,999
1914
26,135,389
1915
31,990,664
1916
28,677,332
1917
44,858,781
259,904,940
19l8
1919 366,215,760
1920 171,210,758
1921 155,896,585
88,420,186
1922
38,102,059
1923
40,384,841
1924
27,371,834
1925

5,561,431
6,296,735
7,681,676
15,880,268
19,287,285
20,204,704
24,987,293
27,870,477
29, 378, 7:39
29,306,259
46,490,042
48,781,692
49,242,628
49,154,008
53,416,710
55,324,768
56,533,425
77,024,242
242,619,389
421,909,851
242,282,188
222,451,492
201,925,028
151,557,316
148,957,769
139,474,276

301,000
1' 646,106
964,706
5,252,054
8,221,092
7,756,334
9,230,294
11,461,733
13,615,147
9,389,183
8, 614,768
10,504,405
9,862,719
7,443,132
7,918,746
7,191,804
6,117,922
8, 608,971
136,292,028
116,316,452
87,310,649
42,571,978
35,701,269
19,725,519
16,546,726
17,410,626

Year

construction

Marines

565,143
611,4:23
801,873
1,589,992
2,364,903
2,393,830
2,552,038
2,996,679
3,289,515
3,635,697
5, 920,0275,270,777
6,663,814
5,758,531
6,811,465
6,417,980
6,699,327
14, 6:39,787
46,325,393
75,870,495
37,863,408
33,863,408
27,406,140
25,187,998
24,598,999
23,353,508
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Cost of the United States Navy, 1885 to 1931, Continued.
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
.1931

16,852,119
19,238,789
24,737,522
34,250,641
32,205,085
29,727,504

146,370,977
145,605,391
194, 799, 215
201,806,051
160,702,434
128,635,792

9,012,324
8,945,688
6,577,269
8,440,922
10,389,171
12,146,185

23,630,488
21,512 '149
27,275,124
45,398,930
24,302,950
22,527,076

The above tables are reproduced from similar tables
given in the World Almanac, 1932 edition, page 370.

These

figures are obtained from the United States Navy Department
and, barring typographical error, must be assumed to be
correct expenditures by our government.
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OHAP"1'ER II

OUR HEED OF A NAVY

The highest duty of a State is self-preservation.
Self-preservation is for the State an at·solute moral obligation. Therefore, it must be made clear that of all
moral sirls, that of weakness is the most heinous and des'9lcable. ·The sin of weakness is a sin against the Holy
Ghost.
-- Treitschke
Briefly in the foregoing chapter we have reviewed some
of the history of the growth of the Navy of the United

States.

In th ts chapter it i.e ·olanned to give reasons why

there is a need for a

l~avy

now, in the ::)ast, and the probable

continuance of suqh necessity in the future.

As a reason for

the existence of a Navy, allow us to divert your attention to
the quotation heading this page.
-- that of defense.

Briefly, this is one reason

Others that will be treated here are

freedom of the seas, sea power, adequate merchant marine
facil1 ties, prestige of the nat ion, value to the diploma tic
service, and foreign pol icy of the nat ion, training for
citizenship, and lastly, for use under conditions brought on
by war.
Sea Power and Freedom of the Seas
Since the davm of this nation, we have been contending
with other nat inns, particularly Great Britain, in regard to
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the freedom of the seas.l

The questi.on started in colonial

days, continued durL1g the Revolution, as was to be expected,
was carried on by Great Britain after the nation was set up,
and in 1812 an inconclusive war was carried on 1'\Ti th Engla:.1d
over such a question.

In the Civil War the same questi.on

popped up again, and again in the World Yvnr.

In this last

conflict there was a grave possibili. ty of this nation entering the struggle against Great Britain, but Germany stupidly
diverted the wrath to herself, and the United States entered
with the Allies in their "iVar to end Vfar 11 , to make the world
11

safe for democ:+acy 11

--

and a

thousa~1d

other selling slogal!s

used for the time.
This nation has never been strongly inclined tow·ard
building a 1 Arge navy; it turned 1 ts interests more to
commercial and shipping programs.

The people have asserted

their rights to trade as they wish, and have resisted e'fery
effort of nations to unjustly curb that right, even though
those nations be involved in a war.2

However, Lieutenant

Frost contends, it has never been held t:na t the rights of
neutrals are unrestrtcted.
Referring to a discussi(m of the subject by James T.
Gerould·, 3 I would sumnarize the early history of the struggle
of the nations interested in the question in this manner:

1

Gerould, James T., "Freedom of the seas-- the Crux of
Disarmament", Current History, February 1929, 729.

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid ..
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In the Fourteenth century the Consolato del Mare was issued.

Then came the Mare Liberum of Grotius to combat English claims
to rights on the North Sea.

This was answered soon by John

Seldon's Mare Clausum, followed by a statement of Catherine
II of Russia that free ships made free goods.
with "enemy ships, enemy goods".

France answered

Later the British Admiralty

claimed that enemy goods, contraband or not, found in neutral
ships, constituted lawful prize.

Contraband has never been

fully determined.
During the Crimean 1.,ar, President Pierce asked that the
powers of Euroue agree on the point of
goods".

11

free ships, free

In 1856 the powers intereeted met at Paris and de-

cided (1) to end privateering, (2) to eliminate "paper'1
blockades, (3) to except from captu.re enemy goode in neutral
ships, or neutral goods, if not contraband, in enemy shi·oa.
The United States, having

asl~ed

for such action, \Vas not

asked to attend, and refused to accept the decisions, but
two years later did agree, with the proviso that there be
included

a

statement to the effect that "private property,

of subjects or cittzens of belligerent

nati()~1s,

on the high

seas, shall be exempt from seizure by an armed public vessel
of any belligerent nation, exce'Pt they be contraband. 11

There

was nothing done about the request.
Later, when the Uorth maintained its blockade of the
Southern ports, in the Civil War, the policy of continuous
voyage was introduced into the question of freedom of the
seas.

Precedents of such a policy came back to the United
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States fifty years 1 ater to put our government to considerable trouble to save American ships from capture by the
Brit :teh.l
When the Hague Conference met in 19d7, the United States
tried to get an adoption of a policy of freedom of the seas,
except in cases of effective blockades.

The British favored

doing away with contraband.s, and both failed.

However, con-

traband was defined at a meeting in London two years later,
but the decision never came

in~o

full force in internntionaJ.

law.2
Sea power is linked with freedom of the seas.

W'e have

numerous examples of such a condition in the past history of
the world.

Freedom of the seas to Germany would have changed

the complexion of the World Ylar.

Freedom of the seas allm"i'ed

the British empire to rise to the heights that it has
attained.

England rules the sea lanes.

Napoleon and other

continental Euro,ean leaders never put foot on English soil
because of the fact that the balance of sea power was against
them.

The Engli eh Navy did not ne·ed to bombard seacoast

towns, nor stage raids on the continental countries, and it
did not, but the presence of power existed and acted as a
deterring factor in any plans for conQues "i·S of the Brit ish
Isles.

1

Sea power has always been a factor in the greatness

Gerould, J. T., "Freedom of the Seas -- the Crux of
Disarmament" , Cur rent History, Febru:.:U:y 1929, 730.

2 Ibid.
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of a nat 1. on. 1
Sea power may be com}Jared to a chain of three gigantic
lines; commerce, merchant marine, and navy. The strength is
no greater than the weakest link. In the history of the past,
nations have pushed their way to comma!H.Ung positions in two
WR.ys; by mili ta:uy power or by sea power.
To Americans the development of overwhelming military
power is reuulsi.ve; while our boundaries have been pushed
across the continent partially by employment of troops, the
use has been so slight that to most Americans the conquest
of the West has not had a military a.spect. The use of sea
power as a means of increasing aatioJ:1al strength has not met
with the same objections.
While we do not believe in taking property by force, we
do not see why we should not compete for trade in every market of the world. In cases of emergency, our traders do not
hesitate to call for protection of their leg:i. timate interests
by force, and our gover.!j\ment has repeatedly used the Navy to
afford such protection.
tj

Let us briefly summarize the importance of sea power.
Discovery eras were led by Spain and Portugal.

These 1.1.c'1.ti.ons

had sea power, but their interests were dominated by the
military angle only.

They were more interested in capturing

terri tory and enslaving the inh.a.bi tants than to make commercial contacts and build up trade with them.

.The Dutch, however,

did build up sea power and carried on commercial enterprises
with newly discovered lands.

Following the divisi.on of the

world by the Pope, there was left no
Dutch.

They had to be able to

11

defe~1d

open door" la·1d for the
their tr['.ding ex-

peditions so their trips were both commercial and nava1.
1

2

Knox, Oapt. Dudley W., Our Stake in Sea Power, U.
Naval Institute Proceedings, no. 256, 29-41.

s.

Frost, Lieut. Oomm. H. H., Sea Power, U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, no. 256, 54.

f
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I
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Sea power built the Hetherlands in to one of the great powers
of Europe.

Later the Dutch became very wealthy and forgot

that sea power presupposed a navy to protect the commerce,
and the English power rose in place of the Dutch.
Once England had gained ascendancy, the DUtch descent
from a greo.t power poe it ion was rapid a'l.d inevitable.
land became the great commercial power.

Eng-

It is true that

much of the early rise to power was due to semi-piratical
attacks on ships and posseesi.ons of other lands.

With the

Dutch power gone, English Navigation Laws practically ruined
her merchant marine.

During the following years the British

Navy became the main factor in her power.

Bri t~dn early

learned the lesson that a Navy was vi tal to sea power and
security, while commerce made only for prosperity.
sea power acquisition helped build the American nation.
From the date of their founding, the American colonies took
to sea commerce.

In 1698 a colonial governor wrote to a

friend in England:
I believe that there are more good vessels belonging
to the town of Boston than there are in all Scotland or
Ireland, unless one reckon herring boats.
The American colonists early learned the a.rt of ship-building (in wooden ships it was art), and by 1702 one-third of
the ships flying the British flag were American made.

This

early start and training in seamanship stood the colonies

r

(

f

r

I

in good stead durtng the Revoluti on.l
1

It
Frost, H. H., Naval Institute Reprints. no. 256, 54-62.

'
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Sea power has taught lessons down through the years of
history.

We have already mentioned the loss of American land

to a rising sea power.

Fr;;mce learned the lesson of inade-

quate sea power in the loss of her

colonia~

empire.

Evm

England learned that decisions can be forced in sea actions;
for example, the two actions now pointed to be historians as
decisive in our early history -- Lr:1~ce Champlain and Yorktown.l
Benedict Arnold led the first naval engagement of the
future United States in the combat on Lr;_ke Champlain.

The

defeat to the English here paved the way for Burgoyne's defeat 1 ater and the subsequent alliance vri th France.

The use

of the French fleet, under De Grasse, who outwitted the
English at Y0rktovm, brought the end of the Revolution.

Th:i.s

was our nation born with the aid of sea power, contends
Captain Gatewood.
In the war of 1812 victories on the Great Lakes, a
second vi.ctory on Lake Cro.mplain, and numerous conquests on
the high seas were practically the only outstanding fert.ures
in anything toward a dec:i.sion for the United States.

With-

out these two lake victories, it is doubtful if the United
States could have even obtained a draw out of the war.
Blockading of the South won the war for the Union in
1865.

In the Spanish American War, troops were delayed in

getting into and out of Cuba because we had inaclequa te
merchant marine facilities.

Troops were brought baclc from

1 Gatewood, R. D., Sea Power a.nd DestinY-_.

Proceedings, 291:5, 28-32.

Naval Institute
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the Philippines and Cuba in Spanish ships chartered for the
purpose by our government.l
In the World War we learned, in addition to the rest of
the world, the value of sea power.
1 earnlng, or shall it be applied?
art, which it doubtless became.

Shall we throw a·way our
Real shipbuilding was an

With the adoption of iron

and steel to hulls, tP.e art became submerged by science.
Within the last year scientific tests on a •bulbous• hull and
bow have been made, and found to uphold that style of design
as cutting down resistance and allowing greater speed
effictency.
As mentioned in the preceding chapter, architectural
officers were sent to Europe to gain information concerning
naval architecture.

'.rhey gradually built up designing in

this country until today our marine designers can hold their
places with any natlon in efficient designing.

It might be

interesting to note here that the old 'fexas was built from
plans purchased fl•om an Englishman .. 2
The reason. for maintaining sea power is a simple one.
1 Overstreet, Capt. L. :M., Merchant Marine, Naval Institute
Proceedings, no. 296, 46.
2

Gatewood, R. D., Sea Power and American Destiny.
Richard Gatewood, father of the quoted wri. ter, was the
first Cadet Engineer sent to the Royal Haval College in
Greenwich. Two officers were sent each year for 20
years, studying in Glasgow, Paris, or Greenwich. (See
Navy as Leader in Sh·i.p Construction, U. B. Gov' t Pub.)
UavaJ. Institute Reprint., 29(-3, 28-32.
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As a neutral in time of war, our commerce should be continued
\Vi th

those nations which are our customers.

If' this movement

is defin.i tely checlced, such a halting might bring disaster to
many of our industries.
a necessity.

To carry on this trade, shipping is

If '\Ve depend upon others to do this for us, and

one of these carrying nati one be at war, 1 t is highly probable
that our transportation problems would be neglected in favor
of their own.l
We cannot depend upon belligerent nations, or interested
ones, to car1·y our goods sati.sfaotorily in time of \var.

If

this is necessary, we might be forced to submit to onerous
terms, if we got serv4.ce at all.

For an example of this we

can refer back to several occasions of the last war.
We know how the belligerents withdrew the:i.:r shipping
during the early stages of the World War, leaving our shipping terminals blocked with merchandise that could not even
be unloaded from the :railroad cars in which it had been
shipped to the docks.

Then, as the powers concerned in the

confl i.ot began to lose merchant shipping, the necessity of
sea power became of greater impo1•tance.

When a war exists,

no mere law will protect commerce that is sea-borne.

Since

trade with neutrals is a vi tal necessity to belligerent nations, each will feel the necessity of preventing the
neutrals from supplying the enemies.

Then, mere law must be

supported by a very r eal and adequate force that we call the
1

Frost, H. H., Naval Institute Reprints. no. 296, 54-02.
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Navy.

neutral rights under international law must be pre-

served.l
The League of Nations provides that any member nation
that starts an aggressive crunpaign shall be penalized through
infliction of a boycott.

The United States is not a member

of that orga-d.zation, and in such an event might hesitate to
submit to such orders.

Without adequate sea power of the

three categories, it might be forced to acquiece, but diplomatic stands would be mai·\tained through naval prowess.2
Ohief amqng our -policies is the one based on "freedom of
the s eas 11

•

This is a point in which the need of a Navy is

apparent to defend this policy; also to defend American
commercial rights in both peace and war.

Our f;reign commerce

exceeds that of Great Britain, which leads, however, in amount
of shipping under her own flag.

We fell into a disastrous war

in 1812 because we could not defend our rights on the sea, and
our shipping.

Since the participation in the World War, this

nation has a large merchant marine, al t:aough not large enough,
and this means that such an arm of our sea power cannot be
allowed to go undefended. 3
In the Oiv n War the United Sta tee developed and promulgated the doctrine of "continuous voyage" whereby goods
1

Lansing, Robert, "Outlawing War", Independent, OXIII,
95-96.

2 McLaren, W. A., "Navy as Effective Agency in Diplomacy",
Our rent History, XXI, 570-57 4.
3 Knox, D. W., "Defense of Haval Pol icy", Current His torz,
XXV, June 1925, 339-344.
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on the high seas, intended for enemy consumption, could be
held as lawful prize.

In the recent war, Great Britain ex-

tended this doctrine.

In the future, in case of war, we may

expect the enemy to strike at our seaborne commerce wherever
found, and \Ve will probably wish to do the same to him, is
the opinion of Steed aad Gerould.
In this regard the function of the Navy is to deny the
use of the sea for civil or military traffic to the enemy or
his friends, the while it is kept open for our own use.

For

this reason battleships are necessary to secure free fields
for cruiser operation.

The mere nresence of the great fleet

of Engla;1d in the North Sea prevented the German fleet from
at t;acking English commerce.
was kept in or near home

The powerful Austrian fleet

~;Jorts

for the same reason, and did

not strike a d.eci.sive blow of any kind during the conflict.l
It must be remembered that combatant shi-f)S fight, nor
for the lone reason of overcoming each other, which is but a
small purpose, but for the more ulterior puroose of commanding sea lanes and wrecking the commerce of the opponents. 2
In the Washington conference, Bs.lfour spoke with emphasis on the needs of the Bri ttsh, in response to maritime
communications, and declared that cruisers, otner than
battleships, were matters of cons ·1.deration of experts.
According to his later writings in the London Times,
1

Steed, W., "Freedom of the Seas--t··e Crux of Disarmament",
curre~1t History, XXIX, 720-727.

2 Ibid., 727.
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December 1928, he said:
The quest ion between the United s·t-atee and Britain was
not one of ton:1age so much as it was one of the freedom of
the seas, whether it v.ras legitimate to blockade, because 1 t
stood to reason that the United s~ates Navy was in a position
to be able to break a blockade against any nation with which
she had extensive commerce. The Bri tisb are an island
people and remember the Spantsh Armada, the threats of the
Napoleonic wars and the German blockade, but have forgot ten
the War of 1812. The average American child knows more
about that war than the educated Englishman. We do not see
why the United States needs much of a Navy, but we cannot
see why anyone would question the British right to have a
very adequate Navy.l
In answer to such arguments several American writers
brought out the point of the need of freedom of the seas.
According to one writer, this nation bas, since its beginning, contended With Great Britain on this point.

James

Gerou1d stated:
We have been primarily interested in commercial interests, and we demand that those interests be unmolested.
We have asserted our rights to trade as we wish~ and will
resist efforts of nat:i.ons to curb those rights.
Wickham Steed, English writer, said in substance, in his
article, that freedom of the seas has been a useful slogan
in history for some time.

The control of world trade,

comme roe, colonies, and the like have all been British
because of her control of sea power and freedom of the seas.
In the war the Germans made use of the slogan, the
British took it up, and the Americans incorporated it into
1

2

Steed, W., "Freedom of the Seas", Ourre:·lt Hi sto :g_,
February 1929, 721.
Geroul d, J. T., 11 Freedom of the Seas -- the Orux of
Disarmament", Current Historz, Feb., 1929, 727-730.
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a point for peace negotiations as follows:
Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas outside
territorial waters, alike in peace and in war, except as
the seas may be closed in whole, or in part, by international action for the enforcements of international covenants.~
What is a Navy for? Fundamentally to build up sea
power, and to exist p arti.ally for the support of land 1Jower.
It is nat true that the Untt ed S :a tes could be self supporting. Serious interruption of our oversea transportation,
by the infringement on our freedom of the seas, could soon
bring about a complete disruption of our complex economic
l1.fe, privation and suffering for many of our people as to
be comparable in gravity to hostile invasion. In the World
War, Russia, whose natural resources exceed those of the
United States, collapsed because her access to the sea had
been cut off. Sea power ts undoubtedly an alloy of many
forces,. and not the least of these is access to the sea and
the ability to maintain, at least to a certain extent, some
control of the sea.2
Sea power of Britain beat France in the Napoleonic wars,
when Napoleon waged nwa.r to end warn. Sea power influenced
Germany in the period of 1893 to 1914, and has influenced
Japan since 1917. England built up a navy because her people
were sea-minded and of the sea history of the nation. It
also gave protection to the commerce of the nation. 3
Sea power is merely the expressed ability of a people to
conduct a mercantile and martial transportat:ton, by sea, or
overseas, of ideas, persons, and materials, more or less extensively both in war and in peace. It aria es from the desires of the people to have products from diverse lands interchanged. Sa:·eguarding these interests, policiug the seas
in peace, and controlling them in Vtar, calls for naval power.
Maritime trade is the parent of shipping power; shipping
power is the parent of naval power, and these two are the
principal constituents of sea p~rer.

-- W. H. Gardiner,
Pres. U. s. Navy League
1

Xnox, D. W., "Defense of U. S. Naval Poltcy", Current
His to 1':{. June 1926, 339-344.

2 Ibid.

3 Gardiner, W. H., "Atlantic and. Pacific Sea Power",
Our rent Hi story, October 192 2, 11-16.

Navy Aide national Prestige
The prestige of this nation rose tremendously with the
visit of the 'White Squadron• to E'l.l.::ope wllen the !Tavy was
rejuvenated.

Then with decisive defeat to Spain, our stand-

ing rose higher.

With the round-the-world trip of 1907 the

United States assumed a world pow.er standing in the eyes of
every nat ton where the ships "showed the flag".

As long as

the feeling exists that there is something to the idea that
migbt is right, the grim combatant ship carries the

~_;restigc

of the nation it represents.!

In the Orient the people looked to see something come
from the Washington conference as an aid to the prestige of
the whites, as they (the whites) had always embodied that
feeling.

Prestige is a-oparently bu.il t upon sure power and

on decisive action, in Oriental minds.

They had looked in

vain to the Peace Conference, so hope lay on Washington.
With the cutting down of the United States Uavy, the
prestige of this nation dropped in the East.

This was an

unfortunate occurrence for us.2
This reasonable feeling of prestige upholds every

consul' e land in every land.
to have its effect.
1

Often action must be decisive

If the consul has no national prestige

Wilbur, C. D., U. S. Government Reprint 296, 1-5.

2 Peffer, Nathaniel, "Aftermath in the Far East'l Century,
May 1922, 83-85.
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behind him, many of his actions might be seriously handicapped.l
The United States Navy is but a potential agency in the
execution of American foreign policic s, and it is only
natural that a great nation like ours will have many
policies that will dtrectly affect the business man.2
Serious students of history attribute the integrity of
territory in Ohina to the nopen doorn policy maintained by
the United Sta tee.

It is interesting to note here that not

only has the Uavy been the chief instrument in the perpetuation of this policy, but that a naval officer was primarily
responsible for the establishment of the principle over
three-quarters of a century ago.3

American people can, by

these occurrences, realize that the mission of the Havy is
being continually fulfilled without bloodshed.
Repeatedly since the war, in turbulent regions of
this hemisphere, and on oooasions in the other, the appearance of the American flag from the masthead of a cruiser., or
the truck of a destroyer, has given those troubled with the
spirit of unrest cause for reflection, with consequent stopping of hostilities and restoration of order.

The Hear East

was unhealthy in many ways following the World War.
1

Wilbur, 0. D., Oommerce and the Flag, U.
Reprint, no. 296, 1-3.

2 Ibid.

3

Kearney, Oommodore.

s.

Gov•t.

The
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condition was aggravated by a war betw·een Greece and Turkey.
American interests in the region were sertGu.sly jeopardized.
The United Ste.tes Navy came to the rescue with several
destroyers, basing at Constantinople, and operating in the
region until fa.ir play and justice were the regular order of
the day.

The appearance of the American ship, with the

prestige of the nation represented by it, always had a most
stabilizing influence in allowi:ig our diplomatic representatives in the localities to handle conditions and our business people to c·mtinue in l-egitimate commerci.al tra;·1sactions.1
The doctrine of a supreme iJavy, not to make war but to
preserve peace, not to be predatory bu.t to shield free de\relopment of commerce, not to u:·;set the world, but to stabilize
it through the T'romotion of law and order, has been demonstrated as sound.

For years Britain has given us demonstra-

tions thr:t n:val armaments are not necessarily provoc::;.tive of
war.

During the past hundred years the mere· presence of the

Royal Navy has been sufficient to deter other nations from
interfering with her home life.2
Use For Defense
Another function of our Navy, hinted at in the above

1 United States N~in Peace Time, U. S. Gov 1 t. Pub., 1-6.
2

Ibid.
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paragraph, is that of defense, both of our coast and our
commerce.

A function also is the defense of the United

States' policies and ideals, as well as the preservation of
our sovereignty, and the prohibition of necessity of accepting dictation from other nations having other ideals and
morals.

The Uavy protects the consci.ence of the nat;on, up-

holding its right to do right as it sees the right, not as
some other nntion might see it.

We can cite the immigration

laws as one example of this right.l
The Navy is a

~art

of our sea power, and a by-product

of sea power must be coast defense.

A treaty-sized }Tavy,

operating from Hawaii, would protect the entire coast
against in vas ion; if operating from Cape Cod or the Virgin
Islands it would be able to protect the entire eastern coast.
However, for such sea power battleships, airplanes, cruisers,
,..,

submarines and other auxiliaries must combine to make it • .: :.
Here it may be well worth a moment's reflection on the
fact that every grt>nt center of population in our nation is
located on, or close,to, easy water transportation, with the
controlling centers on sea coasts.

At such pointe we have

concentrated half the total population of the country, and
more than half the aggregate wealth.

The British very

properly <ivell upon their peculiar geographical condi t tons
and the economic strtJcture of thei.r empire, which calls for
1 McLaren, W. A. ,"Navy As An Effective Agency In DiplomacY",
Current History, Jan. 1925, XXII, 570-574.
2 Salisbury, W., "American Haval Efficiency", Current
History, April 1922, XVI, 33.

maintenance and protection of coast defense and sea routes
for transportation.

Substantially the same arguments hold

good in the United States, yet it is very seldom that they
are advanced, probably because they are not felt difficulties, or probably not well understood.l
The distance from England to Canada is about that from
New England to Texas, while the trip from Boston to Oregon,

via Panama Canal, is about that from England to India or
South Africa.

From Maine to Alaska, through the canal, is

equal to that from Australia to England.

Australia to

India is less than Los Angeles to Boston.

With these

comparisons, is it not easy to see the point of England's
particular necessity of greater protection to more commerce.
Did you ever compare the size of our ocean-going internal
commerce?

Excluding the trade with the Philippines and on

the Great Lakes, our aggregate domestic sea-borne commerce
is considerably over 100,000,000 cargo tons per year.""?.
This figure is substantially equal to our total imports and exports under all flags, to foreign countries by
sea.

In addition, if this coast-wise traffic is to be

properly evaluated, we should include the frui ters from the
Caribbean and Central America, and oil tankers from Mexi.co.
These two items will. increase the volume nearly twenty-five

1 Knox, D. W., Our Stake In Sea Power, Naval Institu!~
Proce!dings, No. 296, 38-40.
2 Ibid., 40.
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percent.

Here is a point of commerce defense that cannot and

must not be overlooked,l
Most of our Americans have little true co•\ception of the
extraordinary volume of our domestic seaboard commerce, or
its potent influence on most of our gr<::at industries, and a:re
therefore quite unable to appreciate the consequences of its
serious interruption. Successful blocking of this traffic
would greatly dislocate business, and bring about hard times
on a scale beyond anything the nation has ever experienced.2
Therefore, we maintain that security of this coastwise
shipping is a cardinal point for the maintenance of our
adequate Navy.

Within the last ten years we have seen

columns of printed material as to why Bri te.in needs numerous swift cruisers to protect sea lanes, sea trades and sea
communications, yet scarcely a word have we read about the
points just mentioned in connection with American trade,
with greater internal ocean commerce.

We have one less

vital point, in that we are the better able to provide the
bulk of foodstuffs in necessities, than

Engla~ld

can possibly

do.
By virtue of the British system of nava.l bases, a
British man-of-war built for defense purposP.s only,
operating from a base in the Western Atlantic could
havoc with our coastwise trade.

~lay

On the other hand, complete

absence of American· bases in the Eastern Atlantic denies to
our trade any defense, or retaliatory measures, that would
1 Op. 01 t., ·4o.
2 Ibid.
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aid in distracting attention.

This is the attitude held by

Captain Knox.
It is, or should be, easily manj_fest to the average
person, that the rarely mentioned, seldom considered, little
appreciated, but nevertheless very important coastwise trade,
not to mention the valuable foreign trade of no mean propor,·
tiona, c rmsti tute a coge 'lt reason and a c01upelling argument
for a vi tal • stake' in sea power, and defense, superior to
that of any other na.tion.l
The Un:tted States is the most conservative great nation
of the present time.

It has the most to eain from peace and

the most to lose from war.

Umler these conditions, a func-

tion of the American Navy is to stabilize the Kellogg Peace
Pact by making it inadvisable for other nations to resort to
war as an instrument of national policy.

Here again we

build up a defense for our nation and its ideals.
Defense and national safety are, and should be, rather
synonymous in their conveyed meaning.

Article VIII of the

League of Nations Covenant recognizes nat i.onnl safety in
the following statement:
The maintenance of peace requires the reduction of
national armaments to the lowest point c,-;nsistent with
nattonal safety, and the enforcement of ,international
obligations.
This document, therefore, puts emphasis upon defense through
its reference to "national eafetytt.
1

Gatewood, R. D., Naval Ineti tute. Proceedings, no. 296,
28-32.
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It is said that the United States has no naval policy.
To some extent this is true. However, we have had some
sort of naval policy since the time of Washington. Every
Prest dent has felt the need of a proper Navy, and yet none
has given us a policy applicable to our ~ituation. We have
always had need and reasons for defense.

To sum up the arguments of this section, allow the inclusion of a few statements concerning the foregoing contentions.

Admiral Roger~ says that:

the only reliable defense of our country is the armed might
to sustain our rights and su.pport the sanctions of international law against evil-disposed na tiona who wish to wrench
the law and thrust upon us the obligations of their devisement ''i thout our consent.
International Law and Defense
In international law moral sanctions prevail, since
there is no.supernational power to exert physical sanction.
The effectiveness of any law is the moral or physical
sanction that underlies it.

Physical sanction is the most

common, and is the prevailing means of law enforceme·1t.
1\1oral sanctions are those imposed by an individual upon himself, and they depend upon his sense of justice and duty to
do what is right.3
It is the good faith of nations and their sense of
obligations and standards of interne.tional morality that

1 Niblack, A. P., "New Naval Fronts", Current Historx.,
Nov. 1925, 234-237, XXIII:
2 Rodgers, W. L., "Shall America Arm?", Forum, LXXIII, 636.
3 Lansing, R., "Faliacy of Outlawing War 11
CXIII, 95-97.

,
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give vitality to the laws of nations, and in any way justify
the application of the word "lnw 11 to the princ'iples and precepts which have come to be recognized as those which should
regulate intercourse between civilized states.

However, it'

a nation does not respond to moral obligations, if its government is inspired by immoral purposes, what remedy is
there 1 eft except an
fense?

a:p~)eD.l

to arms for protection and de-

Will the morality of the issue help the unarmed and

defenseless state?

It is the only me:ms in which a nation

may act to prevent an unscrupulous or ambitious neighbor from
taking away its independence or sovereignty, or perhaps only
its possessions.

All the declarations of the world will not

prevent the use of f'orce.l

Submission and passive resistance

will not solve the problem.

They \vill not save the life of

a nation that has been invaded by armies or navies of an
enemy that is bent upon its destruction.

It is unfortunate

that in this day and age of civilization, after the years
of the preaching of Christian pract:ices and Christian virtues that such commentary should be made, but it is feared
that such statements are all too true.
According to Robert Lansing, Secretary of State in
Wilson's cabinet, war cannot be outlawed, because under
certain condi tiona it is the only me ana of preserving
national life; and may often be the only means of protecting the rights of the nation to which it may be entitled.
1 Op. Cit., Aug. 16, 1924.

~l

This law then is the supreme law of self-preservation.

If

all nations· were or could become, moral and responsible to
moral sensibilities, there would be something to the eta tement -- outlaw war.

But unfortunately for the peace of the

world civilization has not attained so high a plane, nor
does the condition seem imminent.l
When a government is controlled by a determination to
acquire territory and power, and seeks to accomplish this
aim by might, war is often the only means that offended nations can protect their independence from destruction with,
or by which they can attempt to keep from destruction.

The

nation against which the aggression is used first is the
one that has the weakest defenses, or is grossly unprepared.
The prepared nation, ready to hurl back the invaders at a
moment's notice, is usually the one that is left out of such
schemes.

If our Navy were cut down to half its present

size, it is doubtful if the time would be far distant before
some aggressive nation would not move to take an advantage
of such a condition.2
Society is interested in staying the aggressor.

If we

can prevent aggression, there will be no need of the plea
of self-defense.

We must bear in mind that ware come seldom

from mass movements, but generally as results of political
1

Op. Oit.

2 Ibid.
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schemings.l
President Wilson said,

11

Peoples do not malte war".

peoples of the nations did not make the W'orld War.

The

Had they

been consul ted., or even informed of some of the facts, there
might have been no war.

It was forced upon them by a few

men.2
Land armaments are costing the taxpayers more by far
than navtes.

They are also much more perilous to peace, and

afford no better protection, in general condi tiona by and
large, if they offer as much.

The readers of

for~ign

dis-

patches, during the past few years, cannot help noting the
facts that all wars, in all parts of the world, in progress
or threatening are land wars.3
We hep.r a great deal about the cost of an adequate Navy.
This is a good argument, because the costs, in the aggregate:,
seem very high.

In the terms of the salesman, placing the

cost of the article down in terms of daily expenditure, let
us see how it would work out.

For adequate protection --

that is a Navy that is effie ient, and one that is 'almost
big enough', it is maintained by some of the naval lvriters
that this difference would cost the N:1r th Dakota wheat
farmer four cents, yet his per capita grain export is worth
1 Borah, W. E., Answer to Fallacy of Outlawing War,
Independent, September 13, 1924, 147-149.

2 Ibid.
3 iMorse, S. B., Eagle Or Ostrich, Inde-oen\~ent, Feb. 14,
1925, OXIV, 1-8.

fifty dollars.

The average Iovra. farmer pays seventy-five

cents per y~ar for naval protection, and an average of
thirty-one dollars for life insurance.

The people of the

United States paid out in a recent year about two ru1d a
half billion dollars for premiums on all kinds of insurance.
We can hardly justify a nation's spen.ding $100,000,000

on inadequate given
be tested.

valu~~s,

even though those values may not

If our Navy is not adequate, as often challenged

by experts and others, it could not fulfill its mission in
time of war.

In 1902 Germany decided that she would have a

real navy for protection to her growing outside interests,
and a building program started.
building program under way.

When the war came, Germany's

navy was "al rrost big enough".
is just about worthless.

Great Britain also had a

However,

11

almost big enough"

Germany lost control of the sea

at the start, then her colonies, then commerce, and then
the war.
In looking back at Germany's pre-war experience in
building a fleet many German editors think they see weaknesses in the American navnl policies and issue friendly
warnings.

They admit that

~nerica

must equip herself

with adequate naval protection because of her business interests, "but everywhere you go you will run into England,
who rules the sea with her fleetu.
Another German editor states that England and America
might make a naval combinRtion for their own protection.
He says:

,~4

Surely, but England does not make combinations with
second great powers. American prosperity Will J!.Ot last
forever. Indeed, it.may now seem to be faced with a
crisis. Economic competition is hopeless for them as long
as England rules the sea. A little war anywhere, and England wo~ld wipe out the cornrnerc ial fleet of the United
States.
Merchant Mc:;.rine
Now for the last link in this chain of sea power -merchant marine.

We are all aware that the American colo-

nies early developed into wonderful shipping centers.
Their ships were better destgned, were faster, and handled
their cargoes better than many others, and soon captured a
large share of the business of the world.

In the period of

the War of 1812, most of American shipping disappeared from
the seas, coming back again shortly afterward.

This con-

tinued until the period of the Civil War when our merchant
marine again went down.

From this low level it revived

very slowly, getting its great impetus only during the
\Vorld War.
It is true that tn 1900 no American ship sailed from
any of our ports fc)r Russia, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, the
Hetherlands, Italy, Hungary, Greece or Turkey, although we
had considerable business with these nations.

In that same

year only two vessels left our shores for France, and then
returned in ballast.
1

11

One ship sailed for Belgium in that

German Discovery of America's Naval Peril", Literary
Digest, J1me 8, 1929, 14.

2 Gatewood, R. D., Sea Power and Destiny, Naval Institute
Proceedings, no. 296, 28-32.

4-5

year and likewise returned in ballast.l
The \Vorld War gave us a $3,500,000,000 lesson.

We know

how our export trade was paralyzed for lack of ships, how
the South Was crucified on a cross of

11

no boats 11 with its

cotton piled high on docks, its business men in the hands o:f'
the banks.

The Germans saw clearly and felt the menace of

the allied sea power.

They certainly accomplished prodigious

feats of r-trms on land, but that was not enough.

As they

could not have free access to the sea, they soon began to
feel the sure, slow strangulation of death settling upon
them that our South felt in. the Civil War.2

They were driven

to desperation, finally forcing the United States into the
. war against them.

\Ve built ships; built them as ships had

never before been built.

Th:l.s nation performed a. miracle

with shi.ps, and incidentally with thetr cost.

It is a known

fact that comparatively few of our men were sent overseas in
our own sh i.ps.

They went over in allied ships and paid well

for the transportation.
balance of sea power.

We were on the side that bad the
What would have been the result had

the power been reversed?

Germany saw that her ruthless

submarine campaign could not win; that sea power had cast
the deciding vote in the conflict.3

Our merchant marine must provide vessels that every
1 Gatewood, R. D., Sea Power and Destiny, Naval Institute
Proceedings, no. 296, 28-32.
2 Ibid.

3 Ibid,
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modern navy is lost without; it must provide a seafaring
personnel, .with training, upon which the 1-Tavy may draw in
time of emergency; it must also provide a means of bringing
in and taking out our products.
our most precious possessions.

Our sea power is one of
Are we going to protect it?

Developing a merchant n:arine naval reserve personnel
is perhaps one of the most important th:tngs -- a vital necessity, and a valuable asset -- to tl1ia country in generru,
to defense in particular, and for the advance of an adequate

~Tavy.

This is one endeavor that the American people,

regardless of ideas toward a big Navy, should conscientiously
support.l
We are fully aware that national security, in peace as
in war, depends upon prosperity.

The government that nev•=t

fosters security is not conducive to a prosperous populace.
History can clearly indicate the nations that have risen or
declined in world affairs influence in direct proportion to
the manner in '7hich they have maintained not, '-)nly navies, but
have held the commanding places in world trade, accomplished
mainly through the medium of a merchant mari (le.

Nations that

enjoy today a real outstanding position are those that have
acquired a commanding place on the s•"a.

We cannot hope for

a great national development as an exception to this general
condition.

If this is

ne~lected

we can neither hope to

escape the fate of other nations who have lost rightful .
1 Leigh, R. H., Plea for Merchant Marine Reserves, Naval
Institute Proceedings, no. 296, 20-23-.
·
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places on the sea.

Without an efficient merchant marine no

. nation can maintain an effici.ent Navy.l
Such a thought must have been in the minds of the men
who created the Shipping Act of 1916 providing for the creation of a naval auxiliary, a naval reserve, and an American
merchant marine. In 1923 the President said to Congress,
11 we must have a merchant mRrine which meets our requirements,
and we must pay the c·Jst of its service." In 1925 he again
made this clear in his statement, "The maintenance of a merchant marine is of the utmost im-oortance for national defense and s e.rvice of our corrunerce 11 •
The total cost of the me.rchant marine's oueration in

1927-28 was estimated at $16,000,000, which is .. one-half of

one percent of the total appropriations of the Federal
government, while $94,000,000 was contributed at the same
time for federal aid to highways. One cont.ribution of
th:ts service can be cited here; that during three months of
the British coat strike in 1926, ships of the U.S. Merchant
Fleet Oorp. carried abroad 1,700,000 bales of cotton out of
a total ex'l')ort of 3, 600,000. A nat tonal merchant marine is
vital to our national security. If it is to be effective it
must be an accomnlished fact. It must be a builder of. trade
in times of peace an influence for peace in times of danger,
and an effective and direct aid in time of war. 2
Navy and Foreign Policy
It is maintained by Secretary Wilbur that the United
States consists of more than just the land areas; that to
estimate its worth we must consider its ocean-borne assortment of goods, it fabrics of international friendship and
goodwill, the merchant ships on the seas, the milroads on
the land, all the visible and invisible network of international trade whlch is a vi tal part of the nat ion.

He claims

that this is not only necessary for the nation, but
1

2

Dalton, A. 0., Merchant Marine Vt tal to Security, U. S.
Naval Institute Proceedings, no. 206, 17-19.
Ibid.

<:.8

protection is necessary for this part of our prosperity.
He goes further and states that this defense 1m.st be
prepared at all times to be ef:fecti ve in any part of the
world.

He said, in

par~:

We cannot depend upon a third party to look after our
interests. We may often wonder why some services are rendered by the Navy. Some little outburst somewhere, American
lives or property are jeopardized, with Euro9ean interests
included. Hardly before the general public may be aware of
such an occurrence, the message comes home that "the Marines
have landed and have the situation well in hand". Gunboats
protect by patrol a thousand miles of river in Ohina,
watching for bandits.
Our Navy knocks with a friendly hand upon the door of
every natton. Its potential power upholds the hand of every
oonsul, minister or other diplomatic representative of this
nation. 1
This last quotation brings the reader another factor for
.maintaining a Navy-- that of assisting in the. foreign policy
of this nation.

:Ho relations may be entertained on an equal

b2.sis unless the parttes have res:pect for each other.
pect must be a basis for policy.

Res-

Res:JeCt for our flag and

the nat: on for which 1 t stands must be real.

Lack of that

has caused unfriendly rel ati :ms and sea fights on the seven
seas of the world.
being carried into

Through our
s~a

hj_st~)ry

we can see the flag

battles to win respect for it.

It is often true that.our neople, as well as the naval
officers, forget that the Navy is a political force as well
as a military one.2
1

The men of the N:.vy are roving

Wilbur, 0. D., Commerce and the Flag, Naval Institute
Proceedings,
no. 296, 1-5.
,

2 Schofield, F., Heart of the N~, Naval Institute Proceedings, no. 296, 9.

diplomats, may create very friendly relations with nations,
or may create potent causes of war in some small country,
without knowledge of those in authority back home.

:t:ravy

officers sometimes act as governors for possessions,

The

Virgin Islands have been under a Na.vy officer since their
purchase in 1916.
In 1823 we served notice on the world that a new
definite foreign policy had been established in this
country and adopted by Co 1gress.

It may be summarized in

its present day effectiveness to the point that we are
opposed to encroachment of any foreign power upon the independence of any American state under any guise, or to the
acquisition or control of any additional territory in this
hemisphere.

In order to maintain this policy Congress

increased the number of steam vessels for the Navy, with
longer cruising radius.
policy, our

Na~ry

Thus, in support of a foreign

was increased.

The explicit acceptance

of this policy by the maritime powers of Europe and later
amicable adjustments of negotiations on claims against
countries in this hemisphere, was probably a forerunner to
England's friendly qo-operation in the Washington conference.1
Today our foreign policy of :mrsuing commercial expansion is taking us into delicate paths.
1

We are the

Sherrill, C. H., "Monroe Interpreted", Forum, Dec.,
1923, 2166.
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richest nation of the world.

Our foreign trade and credits

have grown to enormous proportions.
where our interests do not go.

There is ~rdly a spot

The creditor nation is,

however, not the popular nation, and. in this expansion we
are facing politico-economical alliances made to hinder the
advance of our commerce.
We need not be reminded that this· nation occupies a
place in the political organization of the world which
mands tact and firmness in oru diplomacy.
prosperityl depends upon our foreign trade.

de~

Our present
If that

prosperi-ty is to be maintained, then the trade must be
continued, our policy must be one of friendly trade, and
it must have protectim.

The Navy is one of the instru-

ments that the government keeps which exists for the promotion of the general welfare of the land. 2
It is maintained by Mr. Tinker, 3 that since the
Washington Conference in 1921, the powers signing the
treaties have projected large programs for ships not
limited by the treaty, which we all concede the truth.
This nation alone, in strict observance of the spirit of
the treaty, has been left far behind in naval security.
So that, if, in our desire to secure prosperous peace, and
in the observance of large and increasing naval armaments
1 The time referred to is the year 1926.

2 Tinker, 0. A., nnavy the Right Arm of the State Department",
Ot~rent History, October, 1926, 53.
3 Ibid., 52-60.

bl
abroad, we wish to be successful, it will be necessary for
us to chan;;>:e our policies.
\'ii th our widening horizons the main purpose of the
Navy is to keep peace, insure against war, and be an emissary

for the spread of American ideals.

Naval officers have been

sent to the embassies and legations over the world since

1882 as naval attaches.

Often they have performed meritor-

ious services in gaining information or in making friendships.l
Commerce and Policy
Our first case of this was when John Paul Jones was
sent as a special diplomatic agent to France and Denmark
when this country first became a republic.

The first rights

for intercourse in China were secured by a treaty demanded
by Commodore Kearney.

He had found, at the end of the

"Opium War", that England was forcing a treaty upon China,
making tariffs against all other nat ions.

He demanded, and

received, treatment for the United States as:a "most
favored nat1.on 11 •
in 1844.

This paved the way for a oom!1lercial treaty

Perry visited Japan in 1854, and Commodore

Schufeldt in 1882 made a similar visit to Korea.2

Naval

officera as a class are well fitted for diplomatic missions.
The tasks assigned to the above men, in addition to Decatur,
1

"Navy's Achievements in Diplomacy", U. S. Navy in Peace
Time, 161-165.

2 McLaren, W. A., "Navy as an Effective Agency in Diplomacy",
Ourrent History, Jan., 1925, 570-573.
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Wilkes, and hosts of others, ma.J.tes a glorious chapter in
one hundred and fifty years of spotless naval records, and
one 'vhich is the best amplified in the present century. 1
Navies are not advocated simply because of their use
in war.

It is true that they are built with that idea pri-

marily in mind, but it is only one factor.

Admiral W. D.

Rodgers stated:
We cannot 'be sure that we will need such instruments again,
but the Kellogg Pact which renounced 11 war as an instrument
of national policy" has yet to prove its efficacy, since it
would seem that no nation could pledge future generations
any more than a man could pledge his children.2
If the propagandists against sea power are sincere,
what would they propose in the interest of world enlir.:htenment, as an alternative in the matter of adjusting our foreign polio i es in a. world of competing nat tons, maintaining
large armaments, and envious of our economic wealth?
Inasmuch as we have become a nation. that is dependent upon
commerce from overseas for much of our prosperity, the
abandonment of protective armaments or a disarmmnent by
example -- two

plt=:~as

of pacifists -- could only result in

loss of sea power that very likely would bring political
trouble and material privat i.on, according to statements of

O.;. A. Tinker, who has been mentioned before in this chapter.
Nations with sea frontages and sea interests must

1 "navy Achievements in Diplomacy", U.S. Navy in Peace
Time, 161-170.
2 Rodgers, W. D., "Functions of the ~Tavyn, American Year-

book, 1930, 284.
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protect them.

The necessity for a naval force of course

brings up questions of pur,ose, size, resources, and maintenance.

The answers to the questions, according to

Graser Schornstheimer,l constituted the naval policy.of
the nations.

Others go further and say that the navy should

be like the ideal of it proposed by Theodore Roosevelt -My object is to keep America in trim so that fighting her
shall be too expensive and dangerous a task to be lightly
undertaken by anybody.
The Navy is a great laboratory of ci tizm ship, of discovery, of aid to industry.

The Navy puts its dependence

for the average job upon youth.
hereditary classes.
Na.~ry

It does not depend upon

Most of the young men who enter the

have not had the chance to find a place in business or

indu.stry.2

Yet it is said that few of them that leave the

service do not carry with them knowledge and proficiency
that will be of benefit in everyday life.

Every year,

thousands of untrained boys enter the Navy, finish.up their
enlistment, and retmre as skilled
lines.

~nd

experienced in many

The officer personnel is more permanent, but many

do retire to private life, and make the best of our ci tizens.

The lJaval Academy is one of the finest educational

institutions in the country, and turns out fine, upstanding
and outsta!J.ding, disciplined young men.
As the great majority of the officers remain in the
1 Navy in Peace Times, U. S. Gov•t. Pub., 136-140.
2

Ibid., 135-140.
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service, let ns see a few of those who have retired, and are
well knmvn.

They are:

John W. \'leeks, forme.r Secretary of

War, Curtis D. Wilbur, former Secretary of the Navy, R. B.
Howell, Senator from Michigan, 0. E. Weller, Senator from
Maryland, Robert Thompson, Lawyer and philanthropist, shipbuilders such as H. L. Ferg1•son, Lewis B. Nixon, Joseph W.
Powell, Henry G. $mith, men prominent in the economic side
of life such as Walter M. McFarland, Edward J. Berwind,
Part Benjamin,

W~

B. Duncan, men connected with science, such

as Prof. A. A. Michelson, Matthew F. Maury, George W. Littlehales, William L. Emmett, Stuart W. Cramer, Frank J. Sprague,
W. H. G. Bullard, W. F. Durend.

Even in literature we can

cite two well known men -- Cyrus Townsend Brady and Winston
Churchill. 1
Health Service
Before leaving this chapter, allow a few references to
another service of the Navy -- that of health and sanitatton.
The main function of the Medical Department of the United
States Navy is, of course, to keep its 1)ersonnel in good
health.

Small-pox and typhoid fever have been practically

eradicated from the Navy.
Safety in aviation in the World Vla.r and in the Navy
service since is due to a large extent to "aviation medicine".

Altitudes undreamed of a few years ago are now

1 "Education of Officers", U. S. Navy in Peace Times,
135-140.
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reached in apparent comfort due to tremendous advances in
preventative medical examination and care.
Following the Spanish American War, this nation took
over great responsibility in the tropics.

In this con-

nectir)n we find the battles against yellow and other
fevers.

The work of Major Reed, General Gorgas and Doctor

Carter, in eradication of yellow fever, is outstanding.
In hie dispensary at Cavite, Admiral Stitt laid the
foundations for his authori tattve work on tropical medicines.
At the time of the interference of the United States
in Haiti, very poor sanitary conditions were prevalent.
The residents of Port au Prince had forgotten that the
city had ever been clean.

They had apparently lost all

conception of personal hygiene.

...

Epidemics ran rife.

Visitors to the island now, who can
. compare the work of the
"

Navy medical men with what existed, are forcibly aware of
the changed conditions. 1
In Samoa the medical effie ere of the
charge since 1899.

~Tn.vy

have been in

The PO"[.)Ula:bion there is nm"¥ incrf'asing,

in contrast to many native populutione in Pacific islands
because of contact with the whites.

It is said that twenty

years ago every nattve had hookworm.

Tutuila was the lo-

cation of the discovery of the parasite Necator Americanus,
found to cause the New W'orld hookworm.

Now the hookworm

1 Navyts Contribution to Citizenship, U. S. Uavy in
Peace Times, 145-150.

.......

.

I.·.
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disease is under complete control.

Yaws, at one time very

prevalent, has been practically eradicated.

In probably no

other tropical. region has the work of eliminating elephantiasis been so well handled and so successful.l

Guam, when coming into American control, apparently
had no ideas of the meaning of san:l.tntion.

Practically the

entire population was infested with some sort of intestinal
parasite.

Yaws were common.

Gangosa was very prevalent.

Tetanus was killing half the babies before they were many
months of age.

The mortality rate was exceeding the birth

rate; the po-pulation was slowly drifting toward extinction.
Within one-half a year of birth-rate protection, tetanus
neonatorum has ceased to be an important factor in infant
mortality.

Yaws is now completely controlled, gangosa has

practically disappeared.

Guam is one of the few places in

the world where veneral diseases do not exist.
these diseases is absolute.

Control of

lJo member of a ship's crew,

coming into port, who cannot pass an examination is allowed
ashore, unless he stays in the jail during the visit of his
ship.2
The Virgin Islands, apparently presenting a olean
appearance, were found to be flourishing locations for
intestinal troubles.

No country in the world could boast

1 Navy's Contribution to Citizenship, U.
Times, 146-159.
2 Ibid.

s.

Navy In Peace
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of better laws on veners.l diseases, still they were common.
Three hospi tale in the islands, at time of tra:1:sfer to the
Untted States, were found to be mainly old people's homes.
Sufferers of pell.agra were common sights.

Today there are

three modern, up-to-date hospitals, with corps of native
nurses, trained under local supervision, in attendance.
Pellagra has been practically removed as a cause of death.
Typhoid f·ever has not been reported since 1918.

In St.

Thomas the death rate from gastro-intestinal infections
dropped 85 percent in two years.

Malaria has dropped al-

most to extinction.l
A report of the Danish health authorities of the Virgin

Islands, some years before the group became American
possessions stated:
The America:1s have had wonderful success in fighting
small-pox in Porto Rico, but still more credit is due them
on account of the excellent manner in which they are fighting yellow fever there as well as in Cuba. During the
reign of Spain over these islands, by the neglect of it,
they were a continual source of danger to the whole West
Indtes; yellow fever was always present, and every so often
1-t appeared in epidemic form in Havana. The United States
has done a Herculean job in clea:-ling out thi.s Augean stable,
but it has been done and the United Sta 'Lee c~m refer with
pride to the results.

The Amerieane have succeeded in a few years in practically stamping out yellow fever in both Porto Rico and
Cuba. This has also been a great help to the Danish Islands, and St. Thomas has learned a lot from this work.
There is probably no thing that strikes home to such an
extent as a marked decrease in death rates.

The spirit of

1 Navy's Contribution to Citizenship, U. S. Navy In

Peace Times, 149-152.
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good will as a c·:msequence is put into the hearts of the
people, and slowly spreads to n eif:hboring lands, and the
ultimate effnct is incalculable.l
The combination of this part with the summary on the
Navy is -perhaps entirely without justification.

However, it

may not be so far amiss, in all ways with linking up with the
statement of Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., who said:

"For the

sake of our children, and their children, we must build up
and ':n-operly maintain our treaty Navy.n 2
Navy Aids
The Chicago

Trt..£_~

stated:

The Federal government can be trimmed down. Its expenses can be reduced. Excessive taxation can be brought
within reason, but to impair defenses when its diplomacy
goes loco is such folly as sometimes is not survived by
nations exposed to such actions.3
Oaltr.in Coolidge in a remark, while President, said
that "the country can never be relieved of the responsibil i ty of national defense."

Our Navy has always been

more than an arm of wartime defense, as has already been
stated.

The assertion of President Coolidge, on October

19, 1924, is still potent with truth.

In part he said:

All the money ever ex-oended on tbe Navy has been
1

United States

~Tavy

in Peace Times, U.

s.

Navy Dep 1 t.,

145-152.
2 Building Our Treaty Navy, Nnvy League Pamphlet, 3.

3 Is Our Navy Headed For the Rocks, Literary Di_gest, May
17, 1924, LXXXI, 8-9.
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returned to the community several times over in direct stimulus to industrial development. We may be sure that in the
future the Navy's services to industry, and the' arts of
peace and science, will corpletr::ly justify its maintenance
in the highest efficiency.
It is maintained by F. D. McHugh2 that idealists overlook, or are ignorant of, the fact that for every dollar
spent on this servtce nati :.,nal dividends are enormous.
The Navy, in this regard, as the perspect tve would certainly
be lost, certainly needs no war to justify its existence,
for its activities are far greater in value to commerce and
industry in times of peace than. during any period of hoetil i ty.

Mr. McHugh says:

It is a fact that American naval progress a<1d American
industrial progresc are so closely linked that, in many
fields, the. latter has actually been an outgrow-th of the
former. Our Uavy is a vast marine laboratory, stimulating
research and fostering scientific progress a:1d industrial
achievement.
Beca.use of our well recognized commerc :tal rights, we
are entitled to and should have a Navy second to none .other
in the world, and since we are not an aggressor nation,
Americans can feel confident its power would not be misused.
The Literary _Digest claims a warship a peace laboratory,Z using the Colorado as example.

From its designing,

it claimed, much progress would be made in new ships for
merchant shipping.

An interesting feature of the ship

cited was the fact that from a forward sneed of twenty-one
1

Op. Cit.

2 U. S. Navy In Peace Times, 62-68.

3

"Warship a Peace Laboratory", Li.terary Digest, Sept. 15,
1923, 15.
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knots the ship can be brought to a full stop in three minutes -- almost as good as "four wheel" bralces.

buraluminum,

now one of the most imuortant metals in industry, has become an industrial product because of research in the Navy
for airship use.

Rad:totelephone was another industrial in-

strument developed, and teletypes, now in police use, were
devised by the Navy for receiv-ing messages from airplanes
and putting them on typewriters for transcription.l
If we could be convinced that the nations of Europe
will refratn from attacking a defenseless America, or if
we believe that nations will recognize the justice and piety
of our foreign policic::s, and that internati.onal jealousies
and avarice have been abolished, avers Hr::rbert

c.

then we would be able to dispense with the Navy.

Pell,2
He claims

the Navy is being attacked on all sides by insidious propaganda.

It tells us that the Navy is a challenge for war,

an unbearable expense, and that wars are improbable.

\Ve

should therefore forget the dead past and the living future.
We might be reminded that dominance in commercial and
political lines for centuries lay with England, and international law was ultimately founded on British ideas of
justice.

The position was taken because of the superior

foroe of the British fleets,
1 How the Navy Pays its Way, Literarr Digest, Feb. 3,

1923, LXXIV, 66.
2 Pell, Herbert 0., Why A Navy, North American Review,
coxxx, 425.
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not just conceded by other nations because of its beaux
yeux, or because of any general recognition of .superior
virtue.
Mr. Pell argues further that if the President of the
United States is of the opinion that England is better able
to hold this ultimate power, ra tber than the United States,
then he is justified in pushing the Navy down to lower
levels.

If we have the idea that the 'mother country' is

going to rush to aid its errant daughter, then we have no
feason to waste money to provide agai.nst possible danger.
If we believe that this country is not fit to conduct its
own foreign affairs, then we can build a.n excellent argument to destroy the Navy, and to abolish consular and diplomatic services.

He says:

Then we could maintain a few gentlemen in London who
could appear, from time to time, at the British foreign
office and humbly request that England look after ~ome
American interests, if we could conceive of any nation being so wicked as to oppose them.
I believe that war is a possibility. The most expensive victory costs less than a cheap defeat.· This is axiomatic. Although not always dispensing heavenly justice,
the United States is, I believe, as fit as any other
country to ascent to the control in affairs of interest
that England enjoyed in all parts of the world undisputed
in the Nineteenth century. It is impossible for any nation,
a.s commercially great as the United States, with connections
abroad, to continue to exist unenvied in a calm and distant
sphere. If we take our place in the world, we will have
enemies, and if we have enemies we are very likely to have
quarrels.
Do not imagine that English politicians are any more
virtuous than Americans, that they are more noble or considerate of the public good. Both countries are governed
by men whose main anxiety is to stay in office, and who can
remain in office because of the1.r appeal to the community
at large. Can you imagine a politician like Lloyd George
suggesting to the British manufacturer than a few pence
per pound could be taken off his income tax if he would
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consent to sacri.:f'ice the British Uavy and British dominion
o:f' the e ea?
Allow me to emote from a speech by myself, delivered
in the House of Re-presentatives on :february 10, 1921.
11 We will never again have the opportunity that we now have.
Thts is a fact we cannot avoid. Our choice is whether it
'.:rill be the United States or some other country. The
chance of becoming, without a struggle, the most powerful
nation of the world has never been given before to any nation. I know of no people who can be so safely trusted
with this power than my own, and we must not forget that
this power must lie somewhere and be the possession of some
people. If the people fear this responsibil1 ty, 1:£' they
mistrust their own character, or if the governing group is
right in believing that one percent of our income tax
means more than C0 1.1trol of the world, then it is proper
that the Navy be scrapped and we resign ourselves to becoming a workshop and a center of production with no
thoughts of real importance.l
If must be remembered that from the Battle o:f' Trafalgar to the German challenge of 1914, the British had no
major engagements in naval lines, unless the war of 1812
could be so classed.

Wooden ships gave way to ironclads,

and they in turn to steel.

Boys in England grew old

enough to join the Navy as midshi.pmen, grew up in the service, became Admirals perhans, and their so 1s followed
them in the servi.ce, and no nation dared challenge their
might.

In spi.te of this fact the British Eirpire has had

very little peace, for taking the Empire as a whole, there
have been hundreds o:f' small fights.

Yet mighty hosts of

France or Germany did llOt cross the English Channel at any
time, because there was great likelihood of a British
squadron arriving on the scene before men could land.2
1

Pell, Herbert C., Why A Navy?, North American Review,
CCCXXXIII, 427-428.

2 Ibid.
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In the opinion of several writers the United States
must adopt a policy either like Britain or Chiria.

Great

Britain has been operating on the principle that no combination of international conditions could. justify her to
trust combinations of nations to handle the maritime control of the world.

She has always given her gold to her

allies on demand, but never to build up navi.es.

The re-

snlt is that for a. thousnnd years, England has had only
one hostile invasion.

Because of the strength of her Navy,

Great Britain has afforded her people at home security and
comfortable living probably more successfully than any other
nation.
Previously to the start of ·the World War, British spokesmen were claiming that they had no interest in a war with
Germany.

When the independence of Belgium, guaranteed by

the British Foreign Minlster twenty-five years earlier, was
threatened, England saw that the value of her signature must
be upheld at any cost.

About ten yea.ra ago England, with

others, guaranteed tne independence and integrity of China,
yet there is not a single -person who has the slightest
idea that this faith will be upheld, according to Mr. Fell's
argument.

The United Sta:es, through treaties composed by

0. E. Hughes, also guaranteed China's independence.

These

treaties may not have given the country much power in the
world, but they did aid a lot in giving the Republican
party power at home.

64

The United States pledged its solemn word in them to
uphold integrity in Ohi.na, but there will be found very fe\v
people who were recently in favor of going into China to
protect that pledge,
fingers at Japan.

All have made gestures and shaken

Japan, being courteous, refrained from

thumbing noses at the protesting ambassadors, and politely
explained that they were not even thinking of waging war on
China, but just trying to maintain order.l
Our pacifists clamor for this country to rely on
treaties, and then ask that we violate our own.

Ho nation

will keep a treaty longer than its intrrests are served or
clemand.

Treaties are stat-ements of policy.

English people

could not understand how we could sleep in America when
Belgium• s neutrality 1vas being violated, but we have not
heard of any reports of suffering from insomnia over China's
recent troubles, and it is highly doubtful that sleepless
nlghts would exist in other nations, should the United
States also follow the easy path of China, and rely on
treaties of Christian nations, instead of armed ships.

Is

it any wonder that China is now looking to Russia?2
We admit and agree that it would be fine to see rules
of international justice, que_rrels settled in international
courts, and differences settled peacefully on pri::1ciples,
and by courts able to enforce decis1.ons.· Until such a time
1 Op. Oi t.

2 Ibid.
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is possible, we must realize that involved nations will
settle disputes, and the ultimate argument is force.
ma.y be

regr~~ttable,

This

bnt it ap:)arently is true,

Peace is desirable, and at preseat must be maintained
by power, with justice enforced by strength.

This is true

in our own cities or nation, a11d must be true interilat:l..on-

ally.

If inter:1ational power or civic power and strength

do not lie in any hands, and are ready to be seized by any
irrespons:t bl e, selfish or reckless combi :1a t ion set up for
the purpose, does it not breed envy, fear, hatred, and war?
Is there any phase of human relationships in which rivals
who recognize no superior have not produced contests?

Use

sports, love, bus1:1 ess as examples.
I have tried to state this clearly. Whether I am
right or wrong in my decision to support the U,]ited Sta~;(:·s
ac,·ainst any other nation, I Am ri r~ht in demanding th[:~t our
people realize the nature of the quest·\on, a.nd. under8tand
that they are voting for sometbirig more import::::at than just
the lowering of a tax, employing men or putting them out of
work; they are voti.ng on the momentous question, yes or no:
Do you believe that your country rather than some other
should be first in the world?!

If Oongress is intelligently interested in national
defense, a present defi.ciency can be regarded without
terror, because for the present, at any re.te, there is no
prospect of an at tack. 'l'he nat ion' s re;8l danger has alwayE; been the lack of a policy as much as the lack of
armament. 2
While the League of Nations is taking up the peaceful
settlement of differences, and outlawry of war, and the
1

Op. Cit., 431.

2 "Airplane Rumpus", Literary Digest, March 7, 1925.
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economic ax is cutting down our national defenses, remember
the statements of the French General and historian, De
Segur: "Universal Pf.ace is a dream of the wise, war is the
history of mankind". ·

1 Niblack, Albert P., New Ne.val Fronts of the World Powers,
November, 192 5, XXIII, 234-23~ •

....

~~

...
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CHAPTER III
OBJECTIVES

m" THE NAVY

In Secretary of the Navy Denby 1 s report to Congress in
1922, he said in part:
The Navy of the United States should be maintained in
. sufficient strength to support the policies of this nation.
guard its commerce and protect its co:1tinenta1 and overseas
possessj_ons. It is believed that this policy is sound and
not subject to question. It should be tru.e fox all time and
under all condi tiona. We had to ado-pt a general policy,
under the treaty, which is -11 To create, maintain and ouerate a Navy second to none,
and in conformity wtth ratios for capital shi.ps established
by the tx~aty".
·
This policy can still be quoted and used as a basis of
operations.

There are apparently no results of propaganda

of a destructive nature evidenced, nor is there any tendency
to overbuild.

Following this statement of our policy, we

mtght look at a stateme·,-lt of policy of one of our Senators,
given in a speech in the United States Senate.

He refers

to the attitude on cruisers in this light:
The protection of our commerce devolves naturally,
in a large part, on cruisers. For that reason it would
seem that they must have a large cruising radius, so that
while they spend mo.st of thetr time on their stations,
they would still have enough fuel in reserve to get to a
home port. The bigger the cruiser, naturally the greater
capacity for carJ~ying fuel.
The eight inch gun cruiser has nothing to fear from
any surface craft, except a battleship, or perhaps an aircraft carrier. With her speed, she can keep out of way of
these more uowerful vessels. The fact that we have not
appropriated for them does not indicate that thei·r
necessity is not fully appreciated. It is due to the
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fact that the people believed that building these necessary
ships WotJ.ld be in viola tinn of our treaty obl i.ga tions,l
Senator F. H. Gillett, of Hassachusetts, a pacifist,
stated in a Senate discussion:
While it is disgraceful to contemplate war, yet so
long as other nations prepare, we cGnnot be a helpless, unresisting booty to the first well-armed aggressor. We cannot forget that nations have grieveances ag::.>.inst us. Many
will be our debtor for generations, and our wealth will make
attractive prey,2
·
In answer to several qut"'3st ions as to ships needed,
Admiral Pratt, chief of the Bureau of Oper:-tions of the
Uavy Departme:1t, stated:
Nobody expects to have all the ships in times of peace
that might be needed in time of war, but what we need i..s a
nucleus of a fleet so that it could be adequately used to
train a number of men to ue rform all the tact i.cal exercises
required to keep our fleet in shape.
·
On July 30,

19~~9,

President Hoover answered a letter

from Commander Po.ul V. McNutt, of the Amertcan Legion, who
had protested lost partty'could only be regained by

eith~r

building cr·uisers ourselves, or getting Britain to scrap
some of hers.

Hoover stated that

11

The policy of parity as

enunciated by our naval authorities as a com'?lete defense of
the United Statc;s in any contingency, and that defense is all
that we ask".

1

2

Senator Heflin, of Alabama, Congressional Record, LXX,
part I, pages 1057-1058.
Menace of Anglo-American Rivalry, Literary Digest,
January 5, 1929, C, 5-7.
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General Objectives

Under general objectives of the navy, we must consider
them under the limits placed upon signatory powers by the
naval treaties now in force.

The London trc•aty of 1930

placed a reachable limit, a point to be reached by 1936.

The

Washington treaty put a limit to cut down to and not exceed.
Powers agreeing to the limits of both must be presumed to be
following the spitit of the treaties and other agreements.
As a basis of this chapter on objectives, I will list
here the following things for consideration, and we will
n.nd that most of them have suffered from neglect of some

chara.cter.
Naval
stress for
rea.sonable
craft, and

bases strong enough to maintain themselves under
a short time, and large enourrh to accomodate a
portion of the fleets of war shi.ps, auxiliary
to render service to merchant ships.

A fleet of battle cruisers commensurate to a
balanced Navy.

Auxiliary craft sufficient to render necessary services
for our Navy.
Development of the weak portions of the operations to
maintain naval efficiency.
Modernization of capital ships still in need of such
service.
Skeleton organizations of naval reserves, and officers
trained and capable to handle emergency fleets that may be
needed in time of war; this list to be made up of graduates
of the Naval Academy who ha·H~ gone into civilian activities
but still young enough for call; also men who have been
trained in merchant marine service, partially or entirely
under governmental supervision.
Replacements as needed or nECessary.
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Building up the merchant mnr:tne, for commerc·ial purposes and also as uotential auxiliaries in time of
necessity.
Adequate personnel needed to keep the Uavy at the highest point of efficiency.
Placing of navy yards, bases and sup·Jly stations lVhere
they can give service to the Uavy that needs it, rather than
as uol 1 tical expenditures for Congressmen seeking to gain
reeiection.
General Policy
The general policy of the Navy, as it has been stated
by Sworetary Denby, came into being with the adoption of
the Washington treaty.

This policy came into its own when

our claim for f1 Havy second to none in number of ships, and
one and two-thirds stronger than the nearest naval power
was recognized,

This ··policy Wfl.s

adopted~

and because of its

nature as a treaty became a part of our goV':)rnmental pol'lcy,
accepted by other nations, and given standing in international law.

Application of this policy, in direct language, then
would mean that our Navy would be as strong as Great
Britain 1 s in numbers and tonnage, and one .iand two-thirds
stronger than Japan's.

However, we cannot hope to have

equality ·'"1 th Gro ~·t Britain, nor t i1e presumed advantage
over Japan, becru1se both are insular countries, while our
main seacoasts are \1idely separated by continental areas.
The Panama Canal now changes this to some extent.
has several naval bases near home waters.

Japan

Britain has a

neoltlace of naval bases around the world, within easy

?1
steaming distance from points where hostilities might develop.

(See map in Appendix for such locations~)

Formerly it was possible to maintain one fleet, when
no power menaced our Paclfic interests.

We now maintain

only one fleet, but it is made up of all our ships, for
easier administration, but this one ·f:'leet must be practically on a two power standard.

The tren.ties say that we

should maintain our capital shi•;s for certain periods, as
must the other nations.

It is possible that when these

neriods e:>..rpire the desire for replacem·'::lt may turn to large
· cruisers instead.

The present ships, in measures of dis-

placements, maintain our ratio of power.l

Displacement in

any sense, can .ot be an exact measure of efficiency.

No

capital ship in the British navy maintains a gun smaller
than 13.5 inch, while some of ours mount only 12 inch guns.
Japan's capital ships carry 14 inch guns.

It is true that

a few of our ships carry 16 inch guns, largest allowed,
but they are only a limited numb·:::r.
outgunned and are slower.

Our ships then are

Many therefore could not stand

up in battle lines within range of their enemy without
serious chances of dangerous results, and they could not
well retreat, as they could be overtaken and shot down.2
1

2

Oapital ships are designated as those ships carrying
guns larger than 8 inch, or a displacement over 10,
600 tons. The Washington treaty applied only to them.
Speed of the ships discussed is 20 and 21 knots,
British capital ships all have 22 c.md 23.
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Therefore, a tenable point can be raised -- what good are our
capital shL;s in present conditions?

Yet these· ships repre-

sent 20 percent of our ratio in capital ships.

{Remember

reference is made only to the ships that are almost obsolete
and still must be maintained.)
According to our 'Big Navy Party' therefore, our
ratio is 4 to 5 to Great Britain and 4 to 3 to Japan,
instead of the 5-5-3 ratio that we are told exists.l
possible solution is the elevation of the
range.

b~ns

One

to increase

This will be discussed a bit later,

Construction of cruisers of 10,000 tons or less,
mounting guns of not over eight inch bore is not prohibited
by

the treaties.

Lacking these ships, we cannot give our

merchant marine the adequate.protection it needs.

The

cruiser, due to increased speeds, is the beet type for commerce protection or raiding.

In this connection take the

record of the German raider "Emden" of only 3,000 tons, 23
knots speed and mounting only four inch guns.

This one

boat destroyed more allied commerce than any fifteen German

submarines.
At the present time we have no quantities of cruisers

like either Great Britain or Japan, and only a few have
been constructed, all of them under dimensions of British
ships.

For a period of seven years, 1916 to 1923, Congress

did not authorize nor appropriate for a single cruiser, and
none were in existence in our Navy that were of modern
1 Sho:rne:~heimer, Glaser, Our Nay;y tArready For War, Curre:1t
Hlat·.'rz, Jan. 923, XVII, 6c,lJ:-o31.
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oonstruot:\.on.l
Senator Hale, 2 in a speech in the Senate :tn February

1929, stated that not a single cruiser had been authorized
by Congress since Hny 1928, although at the time it was
aclcnowledged thnt this country needed f·Jrty of these naval
units to reach parity.

Since that time six have been con-

structed.3
Cruisers are offensive and defensive.

They are ca-

pable of making a smashing defensive campaign, which is what
an offense needs.

Passive defense can be obtained from

submarines.

Here again we are weak, as we have no fleet

submarines.

Gunboats are vulnerable, so cannot be classed

as defensive weapons.

They are peace-time ships.

They

help maintain the Monroe Doctrine in the Caribbean ports
~nd

keep down bandit raids in Chinese waters.
Naval Bases
A naval base is actually a protection for ships from

natural and other causes, a place where shi.:ps can be refitted, provl stoned, repaired or built.

One of the big

factors in this work is adeauate drydocking facilities.
The base facilities of this nation are few in number and
under present conditions partially inadequate to handle
1 Senator Heflin.
2 Senator Hale, Congressional Record, LXX, part 1, 1060.
3 F:i.rst one launched in 1929.
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many of the ships.
We can list Guanta.namo, in Cuba, which is unfortified,
no drydocks, few fa.ctli ties and not large enough to shelter
many ships; Balboa, Canal Zone, has one drydock and only a
few facilities. for repair or maL1.tennnce; San Diego,
California, has a harbor large enou::rh for submarines and
desgroyers fleets.

The channel is not large enough for the

largest vessels to enter, and the p.ort is not fortifies;
San Franci.sco, California, has one ·of the best hnrbors in the
world, large enoup;h to p}:·otect the entire fleet.

It has,

however, only one commercial drydock large Enough for the
large ships.

Mare Island, Cal if :rnia, has extensive

facilities in every way, but the channel is very narrow and
for the largest vessels may be dangerous.

I

Bremerton, Washington, has two large docks and all

~

r

other exte:r1si ve repair and maL1t enance fac il i ties, but
extensive fogs and the currents of Puget Sound are handicaps.

This base can hru1dle all the ships at once in peace

times, but might be unable to do so under war condi tiona.
Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, has one drydock, one submarine
slip, the most extensive fueling faciiitiee on the Pacific,
but not much repair materials.

The water area is not ex-

tensive enough, but the fortifications are in good condition.

Honolulu, Hawaii, has only a small harbor and the

only fleet

anchol~age

is at Lahaina Roads, which is not

fortified, protection being possible only by use of mines.
One cruiser dock exists at Cavite, Philipnines, but

.f
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Manila Bay could shelter the entire fleet.

By the conditions

of the Washington treaty no work C1'.J.n be done in· the Philippines
to better conditions.

Th·:·re is a dock and basing facilities

at a point forty miles north of Corregidor Island, but all
materials must be transported from 1··1anila by boat.
On our eastern coast are sever<:u yards and repair stations, the largest and best that we have, but for all our
discussions, our ,,veaknesses f')r t:,(:; future lie in the
Caribbean and Pacific areas.

Preventing our building up

of naval bases in the Pacific, the Washington treaty cuts
down the efficiency' of our fleet operations. I
The non-fortification provisions of the treaty render
the Philippines and other WestPrn Pacific islands useless
for bases at Dresent.

This point is, strangely, contended

by Viscount Curzon of England.2

Potential supply bases

are seen in the Virgin Islands, the islands directly off
the coast of Central Amer lea, leased by this n Rt :i.on.

It

is, of course, problematlc if any of these aTe developed.
In answer to a statement on e(luali t.y by Elihu Root,
Vice Admiral Harry S. Knapp said:
There is no trace of eoui ty in Article Nineteen. We
are the losers in respect to posttion and resources. The
treaty marks decreased influence in the Far East, and impairs international prestige of the United States.3
1

Goes, Capt. 1-T. H. , Naval Adequ.~·cy, Scientific American,
Sept. 1928, CXXXIX, 220-224.

2 Scammel, J. C. , British l'Ja~ral Base at Sin2;anore, Current
History, October 1923, XIX, 114-118.
-· ·
3 Schornatb.eimer, Graser, Janan' 's Naval Mastery of Asia
Current Eis~, August 1922, XVI, 744-752.
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Naval bases have been an important factor in all conferences.

Importance of these bases is recogni-zed, and has

been, since the time that the f:i.rst great power made distant terri tory its posseesi.on.

M:.ny of these bases are de-

fended, and it is maintained thn.t because of their im"9ortance, more defenses should be allowed.

The Japanese intro-

duced the subject of naval bases at the Washington conference, and argued that naval bases were as importa ;t as ships
in

e~raluB.ting

navies.

In discussion of parities, e:xruninati ~m of the bases of
Gree.t Britain and the United States will show that these two
·navies can never reach parity because of the differex1ces in
these ent<-lblishml'mte.

Of course, this nation has never had

need for naval bases in such locations and numbers, so there
can be no oversight laid on our Navy Department for such
condition.l

The bases represent a real policy of the British.

If the United States develops a naval policy, it cannot do so
without recognizing -oolic ies of .:Sri tain and :J'a.pan.

The

British naval pol i.cy has never been affected by that of the
United States.

She has always maintained a two-standard.

fleet, and bases were counted as great factors in such
pl8ns.

Even with such a powerful fleet and provisions, no

continental power has ever suffered unlawful interference
1

Goes, Capt. N. H., Naval Adequacy, Scientific American,
September 1928, OXXXIX, 220.
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from the British fleet. 1
Cruisers
Talk of strength of navies must be in relative terms
only.

We cannot try these organizations out in any manner,

except a war, to prove our claims, or to disprove others.
The relative strength must also depend upon what part of
the world the comparisons are to be made.

In Europef.l.n wa-

ters the British fleet is more powerful, in our own waters
the Amerioa.n fleet will surpass either British or Japanese,
while in the Far East the Japanese' will be_ outstanding.
This is as tt should be. 2

In direct cornparisons, we can .

match up ship for ship, talk of displacements, guns, weights
of main or secondary bro8dsides, personnel, speeds, ages
of units, and so on to other details.

The folloviing table

.'7111 demonstrate what I mean in this regard.

1

Considerat:l.ons

must be made for the intangible factors that cannot be set
down on paper.
Other factors enter into this comparison thA.t cannot
be given, such as seamindedness of the crews, rates of pay
and promotions, terms of enlistments, reenlisted members of
the crews, service of the officers, and like factors that
would probably have a great effect on the effi.ciency of
handling the individual units.
1

Bywater, Hector C., Dismal. Prospects of Limiting Armaments, Atlantic Monthly, Nov. 1924, CXXXIV, 672.

2 Soammel, J. 0., British Base At Singapore, Current
Histo~, October 1923, XIX, 114-118.
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I use in this table the Northampton

o+

the United

States fleet, built in 1930; the London of the ·British
fleet, built in 1928; Haguro of J;ypan built in 1929; Dunuesne of France built in 1929; •rrento of the Italian fleet,
built in 1929.

These ships are as near the same age as

poeetble, eo that fa.ctor cannot militate against any.

Du-

Trento

10,000

10,000

10,000

633'

630 1

626'

640'

67 1

66 1

57 1

63'

67'

19. 5'

20'

16.5 1

20. 5'

19'

11.05

9.94

London

Haguro

10,000

10,000

600'

Beam
Draft

1Torth
Hampton
Displacement
Length

Ratio of length
to beam
Guns-Main battery
Mounted
Secondary battery
Torpedo tubes
arranged
kind

8.96
9--8•

9.74
B--8"

3 Trip.

4 twin

turrets

turret

4--5 11

4--411

6

8

10--8"

2 trip.
2 twin

quesne

8--8"

4 twin

9.48
8--8 11

4 twin

turret

turret

4--4. 7" 8--3 11

16--4"

12

twin
train.

8

6

triple
tra.in.

twin
fixed

triple

quad.
train.

Airplanes

4

1

4

2

2

Catapults

2

1

2

1

1

32.7k

32.25

33

33-36

35

107,000

96,000

130,000

120,000

150,000

10,000

11,000

14,000

5,000

620

650

592

650

45

40

30

42

Sp~ed

Horsepower
Cruising radius
Men
Officers

Table made up from information in Scientiftc American.
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Cruisers Summarized
The table just presented shows the fairly equal comparison of one crnlser of each of the five powers.

The

idea must not be drawn, however, that nll the cruisers of
these powers are of 1 ike sizes.

As mentL,ned they are simp-

ly illustrations of the newer of the 10,000 ton cruisers of
the big gun class under tbe treaty lind tations.

Remember,

also, that the United States has only six of these ships.
Deficiencies tn the cruiser strength of the United
States were planned to be overcome at Geneva in 1927.

On

the contrary, we had no trading nressure to offer, so
nothing was acconnl i shed.

One of the

a(~ vantages

of the

conference was the eudcatio·,1 of our people on the values
of sea power.

Our people did learn that cr 1.1isers are not

always constructed for the
combat.

~mr?OBe

of oversea conauest, or

They found out nlso that navies are not just

coll ectl o:1s of sh i.ps, a•1d that they canr10t be separated
from naval bases, fuel stations, repo.ir facilities, armed
auxiliaries or merchant marines.
Our nr!t ton emerged from the meet with its principles
intact,· nothing gained except just
paragraph.

n~ted

in the preceding

We are not build1.ng a naval organization with

the idea of it being a challenge to others.
We desire to build a Navy to meet the demands of the
treaties laid doi'm for us.

Our Uavy is entirely at the

mercy of politics and politicians.

Four or five Congresses

!I'.,.
j·
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may do various things to a nc.tvc:;.l progr<=.cm before it is
actually put into o-perati.,n.

Thi.s natt-.n found· that it

cannot forever bask in the sun, under the nrotection of
the guns of the British fleet.

Even China accuses the

United States of crawling behind the p,:uns of the British
fleet.l
We want a well-balanced -program put into operation.
Snch a program will depend upon a well defined program, which
will take into account our lack of cruisers.
duce some definite action.
our fleet.

It should pro-

Politics must be eliminated from

If they are not n:-.:w placed, naval yards and

bases should be lee ated where they will be of most value
to our fleet.2
"N;:Val policy is based on, and designed to support,
national polic:\.ee and interests," said Commanders. P.
Fulin:wider. 3

After examining condi t L:m of bases, essen-

tis.l ships, fleets,

rele.tive strengths and posi tiona, we

nP.tu.rally must have questions arise as to the remedies to
correct things tha.t are not as they should be.
Treaty Conditions
The Washington treaty left considerable latitudes in
1 Carter, John, Where Do We go From Geneva, In<ipendent,
August 27, 1927, CXIX, 199.
2

Ibid., 200.

3 Fulinwider, Comm. A. P., U. S. N., American Yearbook,
1931, 292.

r····
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most of the naval construction.

Japan, for example, turned

the mrmey that was to have been used for battleships into
the following -- 2 aircraft carriers, 16 light cruisers, 24
destroyers leaders, 27 destroyers, 33 submarines.

Thi.s

seems to give her the strongest submarine fleet afloat.
Great Britain completed the two battleships that were allowed,
and in addition, 2 aircraft carriers, 24 light cruisers, 1
destroyers leader, 10 destroyers and 15 submarines.

The

Un:t ted States, in the same period, constru.cted 6 o:rttisere
and 6 submarines.

There was no attempt to replace obsolete

materials, or to modernize the aging capital ships.l
It might be well to keep

i~

mind

th~t

since the

Washington conference, Great Britain and Japan saw it desirable to plan· for the largest possible cruisers, although
they were not always built to plans.

It is asserted that the

United States plan for the first Geneva conference was sound,
because it led better to balanced fleets, and provided for
replacing of old ships.

The failure of this conference

turned more attention on our Navy, eo that the Departme::1t
submitted a building progrmn to Congress in December 1927,
recommending 5 aircraft carriers, 25'light cruisers, 9 destroyers leaders, 31 ,submarines, all to be built by 1935.
This makes a comparatively small program, when viewed beaide those of the other nowers, and also taking into consideration the ,.-,beence of building during the years
1

Goes, Capt. N. H. , Na,ral Adequacy, Scientific Ameri_<?l!:!!:.•
CXXXIX, 519.
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following the Washington conference.

The leader's were the

Only new shtns going into the Navy, as the submarines and
cruisers were rep lac erne11t s.
As this introduction mat'ked the new drive toward a
'treaty Navy', I will give here the estimated si.zes that
would have resulted from such a program going to its completion, pr·oviding

Gre~'t

Britain and Japan di.d no building

before our program was completed.l
Japan

Gr. Britain United States
Aircraft carriers
Light cruisers
Destroyer leaders
Submarines

5 93,100t.
63 406,810
18 31,500
87,000

7

43
9

135,000
405,000
18,000
84,000

2

27
24

53,850
196,205
40,800
78,156

In the conference Great Britain desired 650,000 tons of
cruisers to the United States 400,000.2

Our trade routes are

nearly as important as the British, and as we have not the
bases, our tonnage should equal hers, to offset the difference.

A solid basis for peace is a force, limited but

adequate to national needs.

If it is not lim.ited, it will

soon lead back to competitio·n..

A fleet is an instrument of

policy, but to be effective it must be adeQuate.

Moderniza-

tion and balance are the ways that we can plan to build our
Navy to prevdnt war or aggression. 3
1

Op. Oi t., 522.

2 Carter, John, Where Do We Go From Geneva, Indeuendent,
August 27, 1927, CXIX, 199-204.
3

Is Our Navy Headed For the Rocks, Literary Digest,
May 17, 1924, LXXXI, 8.
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In comnarison to the tables given on page 101, which
were based on estimated programs tlmt were severely cut, we

can look at the following table which is the maximum ton:1age
limits laid down by the London. tre2.ty of 1930, which will be
taken up in a later chapter.

Capital sh i·C)s
Aircraft carriers
Cruisers, with guns
larger than 6"
Cruisers, with guns
smaller than 6"
Destroyers
Submarines

Gr. Brit.

Unit. St.

Japan:l

474-,750
150,000

462,400
150,000

26':3., 750

146,800

180,000

108,400

192,200
150,000
52,700

143,500
150,000
52,700

100,450
105,000
52,700

1,138,600

714,300

Total fleet tclnnage 1,166,450

81,000

In 1931, tbe five leading nations had the following
total tonnages:2
Great Britain
United States
Japan
France
Italy

1,250,247
1,251,840
850,328
628, 603
403,905

These figures include every kind of' craft, from
largest to smallest, while the treaty figures given on
preceding page from London treaty, are for the named
categories only.
1

2

In the list just above, as far as the

J'oreign Pol fey Aeeooiation Reports,· VII, No. 20,·
:366.
Ibid.
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United States is concerned, lists a number of ships past the
period of commission, that have not been decommissioned.
According to the Foreign Policy Associ.ntion this includes
some 77,850 tons, while Britain's llst includes only· 3,920
tone :past com:dssioned 1 if e •
. If the present ton:1age is comoared with the tonnages of
1914, it will be seen that the American o.nd Japanese fleets
have been incfeased, while those of Greet Britain, France and
Italy will show decreases.l
To bea_r this statement out, the Association, in its
Foreign PolicY: Reports, based on figures gi.ven to the League
of Nations, shows the following construction of naval units
during the im:c-ecliate past:
Ships built

18
Oapi tal shi.ns
Aircraft ca.rr iers
6
Cruisers, over 6 11
16
Cruisers, under 6" 36
Destroyers
143
Submarines
57

..

lt'tt

X

v

vv
a

b

c
d

e
f

u. s.

Gr. Brit.
555, 05QU..
115,350
155,296
170, ()t_;5vv
155,550
55,30le

17
3
8
11
256
107

523,800......
77,500
79,400x
75,900a
273, 360c
76,880f

Japan
10
3

10
20
99
57

298.400
61,270
84, 120v
93,375b
111,885d
70,973

three listed for disposal
One listed for a training ship
three are over 20 years of age
two are over 20 years of age
four are being built
one is over 20 years of age
one is over 20 years of age
includes 23 coast guard. boats, ::9 that o.re over
16 years of age and 11 others for disposal
two are over 16 years of age
one lost at sea since table cmr,piled
forty listed for disposal

Now in contrast, there are being built in these three
countries the following shins, according to the same
1 Foreign Policy Association Reports, VII, no. 20.

-----.>:.~'
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references:
Aircraft carriere
611 gun cruisers
Lees than 6" gun
Destroyers
Submarines
x
v

Un. States

Gr. Britain

......
..1. 8,400
.....
•• •
28,820
21
7

1
13

13,800
127,400x

.
.
. . . ..
.3. 3,800v
••

•••••••

5, 825

Japan
1
4
4
20
13

7,600
40,000
34,000
30,136
18,569

4 appropriated for but not etal·ted
2 appropriated for but not started

The Foreign Policy Association Reports, of July 24, 1929
states that there were 33 cruisers built, building or
appropriated for in the United States.

The authority for

the figure is given in a compilation of their own for the
United States Senate Naval Committee use in 1929.

The Senate

paper compiled quotes a total of 22 light cruisers, with guns
smaller than six inch, yet the figure in the table on page
103. taken from the same source reports only 11, yet the 22
were all reported as built.

The United States should have,

according to the 1929 report, 112 submarines built and 2
under construction, but the 19q0

fig~res

show only 107 built

and 3 building, and 2 of these were not started.

The same

figures show 262 destroyers, while the 1930 figures show only
256 and credit 23 of these as Coast Guard boats.
This comparison seems badly out of place, but if every
person writing on the Navy uses a different method of evaluating the figures used, and it seems many do, we can hardly
place dependable confidence in any.

Some sort of a measur-

ing device for these classes of ships should be adopted, with
a universal tise, eo that there may be reliable information
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obtained.

Perhaps a score card rating could be used.

Upon such a rating card a. definite number o·f points
could be allowed for each cruiser built and commissioned,
for instance 100 points for each unit built within a year of
rating.

As 20 years is agreed as the age limit then 5 pointe

deduction would be made for each year of service.

There

should then be set up a total of allowable points as the
ratio basis.

Further allowance should be made for displace-

ments, main batteries, secondary battery, speed, complement,
cruising radius, and a factoring number alloted for ratio
under the treaty

allowances~.

The scoring could perhaps be

done by a small neutral commission of experts,· with access
to government records and lists.

This could be accomplished

in a short time and definitely pin down all discussions and
unsound information, the same time it would provide a sound
basis from which to plan ru1y programs desired and if ratios
are to be maintained, each nation would be accurately guided.
It is said that the 10,000 ton cruiser came into being
in this manner:

The British had only four large cruisers

built, none of which met the specifications announced by
0. E. Hughes at the Washington conference.

They had oaly

7.5 inch guns and displacement around 9,000 tons.

The pro-

posal then was to make a limit of 10,000 tons and an 8 inch
gun limit.

This proposal was

ado~Jted.

Now shortly afterward Germany produced her •vest- ·
pocket' battleships, really cruisers of 9, 000 tons, according to the Washington definition of a standard displacement

. ·.i
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ton, heavily armored, powered by Diesal engines making 26·
knots, with six 11 inch guns, mounted in two triple turrets. ,
Four of these were contemplated, and if built and commissioned, they would be the start of a fleet that would
soon dominate the Baltic.

The power would soon be felt;

no cruiser of any nation could stand against their fire, nor
in turn do them much harm.l
As mentioned, there was a new treaty made in 1930.
obanged
force.

It

to some extent the operation of the others, then in
Under the new treaty, a few

salient facts were

disclosed: 2
Japan obtained better ratios because she attended a conference
called by Great Britain and the United States.
Japan had outbuilt both these countries in submarines -and
was able to do some dickering of her own.
Japan had outbuilt the United States in cruisers, had a
9-6 ratio with Great Britain in destroyers and nearly a
5-3 ratio with the United States.
Japan's program is only equalled by that of Germany in the
last few years before the World War.
After the 1921 conference the United ~tates scrapped valuable ships, agreed not to build naval' base.s, and had the
idea that the ratio would extend through the entire program.
Instead of holding out for a 5-3 ratio, we were barely
holding out from a 10-7 ratio. We built 66,000 tone of
aircraft carriers to 61,700 tone for Japan. If the United
States program is not accelerated before 1936, Japan will.
be equal in, and perhaps superior, many lines.
By 1936 we should have, according to treaty analysis,
1 .Foreign Policy Associ~tion Reports, VII, no. 20.
2

Analyzing the 1930 Naval Treaty, Scientific American,
July 1930, OXXXXIII, 16.
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a 5-3 ratio in eight inch gun cruisers, at present it is
8-1 in favor of Japan, and it is a prospect that in 1932
it will be 12-10 at the best, with the United States on the

short end.

In six inch gun cruisers, Japan has 20 to 10 for

the United States.

By the terms of the treaty, if the

United States built to proper ratio on the eight inch gun
ships, then we can build the six inch gun ships only on a
ratio of 10-7.

We are inferior in submarines, but Japan

will grant us parity.

By carrying out the program, with

slight modifications, started before the Washington conf'erence, Japan went to the London conference able to insist
on her demands.

No group of pacifists weakened Japanese

arguments.1
In face of such a condition, Congress should start a
building program, now to extend only less than four years
to attempt to gain a part of the treaty strength allotted
to us to reach by December 31, 1936.

On February 2, 1931 the New York

~erald-Tribune

pub-

lished an editorial on the Navy, in which was stated that
the "United States Navy is 13.7% below treaty strength,
the British Navy is 1.6% below treaty strength and the
Japanese Navy is only about • 8% b.elow • 11

In connection with

this statement, the J..Tavy League stated on April 7, 1932,
1
~

Op. Oit.

As this material was printed in the Scientific American
in 1930, allowance must be made by the reader.
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that the United States Uavy was only

69~~

of its treaty quota

strength, the British Navy 85% and the Japanese

ioo%.

As

these quotas do not become binding until 1936, a nation may
now be over the limit.
In 1926 our Navy had less than one-half the number of
men for proper manning of its aircraft, and had only 50% of
its equipment.

Since then progress has been made rapidly,

and with additions of dirigibles, it is well up on the list.
It is still short of what it should
authorities.

be~

according to naval

It is planned that aircraft be handled by

cruisers.
Personnel
According to our ratio, there should be 121,957 men in
~he

service.

Actually we have less than 90,000.

To mod-

ernize our capital ships and keep them in operation will
require more men.
listments.

To build new ships means to increase en-

It is useless to_ talk ships unless they can be

operated after they are built.

The day a ship is commia-

sioned is about two years too late to start training its
crew.
Archibald Turnbull, retire.d,l says that the United
States now has a naval policy, that of surrendering naval
bases, giving up ships, operating only one-third of its
destroyers, and skeletonizing its personnel.

After lift-

ing its voice to avert war, it is now content to destroy
1

Turnbull, Commander A. D., Battleship versus Airship,
OUrrent History, April 1925, XXII, 10-17.
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the force that gave the voice carrying power.
In order to keep its ships operating, the'Navy must
have efficient and trained men.

The general impression is

that every man in the service is on a ship.
the case.

It is necessary

~o

for every 1000 men on ships.

have

neal~ly

Such is not

500 men on shore

In the British and Japanese

Navy service there are from 600 to 700 men on shore for
every 1000 on ships.

We operate with less shore service,

because more men, in our reduced state, are needed to try
and keep as many ships in operation as possible.
no Naval Reserve from which to draw.

We ha.ve

Keeping within a

treaty is all right in peace times, but a war puts an end
to treaty obligations.l
Senator W. S. King recently stated that this nation
had no real naval policy, and that until one could be
developed, no sound constructive program could be made.
This sentiment was also seen in the reports of Secretary
Wilbur, while he was head of the depaTtment.
After one of his reports along this line, the

~

ramento Bee stated:
Our battle fleet is in poor condition, due to long-deferred maintenance. Five of our battleships only are fit
for full service, they are not fully manned.
The Tacoma Ledger also remarked that it was not the
numbef' of ships on the naval lists, but the condition
1

Lansing, Robert, Fallacy of Outlawing War,
August 16, 1924, CXIII, 95-97.

Independen~,
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those ships were in, their fighting and defensive power,
and their crewe.

"A Navy is not good," it stated, "un-

less it is at its beet, and good as the best."
A statement of the Raleigh News end Observer, at this

point reminded,

"Oux government goes about reducing i te/ ability for
defense without reducUng the causes of wax. Until a way
is·found to prevent war, no nation can, nor will, rendex
itself impotent to defend itaelf. 11 l
Gun Elevations

A step of modernizing the ships can be taken in the
elevation of guns.

We can quote here fxom a discussion

on this subject by Hector C. Bywater, Brit,sh naval expert and writer.

We must be awn.re of the fac.t that the

main battexies of the ships axe those mounted in tuxrets,
mounted fore and aft, movable and with elevating devices
to handle the great guns.

The general elevation of these

guns is about fifteen percent.

The demand is now fox a

new elevation from 20 to 30 percent.

Demand: for this ex-

tension of vertical mobility has been based on the statements that the British ships have higher angles of gun
fire, with resulting longer range.
Extreme limit of elevation has been reached at 42 percent, but this is not practical or is it advantageous.
Let us review a bit of the history attached to gun elevations.
The first guns mounted on ships had no elevation.
1

Is Our Navy Headed For the Rocke, Literary Digest,
May 17, 1924, LXXXI, 8-10.
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The whole carriage was immobile.

The elevation was se-

cured by the listing of the ship, and moving the whole
ship was necessary to bring guns to bear on the enemy.
Roll of ships also aided elevations.
arrangements for elevation.
of rope hawsers.

Then came some slight

Recoil was taken up by slings

Later slide carl'iages came irito use, and

with this an elevating ratchet arrangement, allowing the
dangerous rise of ten to fifteen degrees.
In the rejuvenation period, following the Civil War,
when naval ideas were upset, hydraulic recoil buffers
were put into use

o~

the larger guns.

Yet in 1878, the

British attack on the Dardanelles was not successful, for
one reason, that no guns could be brought to bear on the
Turkish forts above the water.
decided turns.

Then elevation plans took

Between this time and shortly before the

World War many experiments were made with turret guns,
using as much as 40 percent angles.

But the less of time

in reloading, downward crash of the recoil, and the greater
areas in the turret walls that were left unprotected were
factors working against this extreme elevation.

Germany

was the only nation trying to use 30 degrees or more, and
just before the war she cut down to 18 degrees.
In the British fleet the

1

St. Vincent' class used

12 inch guns on a 15 degree elevation and capable of an
extreme range of 20,000 yards.

In the 'Orion' class the

13.5 inch guns needed 20 degrees to make the same range.
In the later 'Queen Elizabeth' class the 15 inch guns used

~··
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20 degrees and reached 24,000 yards.

The first major engag:ement of ti:1e World War, the
Dogger banks, the firing started at 19,000 yards.

In the

Falkland engagement, German gunners tried for hits at
21,000 yards.

The new 'Hood' class of British ships bad

designs for 30 degree elevation, with carrying range of
30,000 yards.

It was found, however, that the downcrash

was too great, longer gun parts were necessary and it was
highly problematic if the extra angle was actually worth
its net gain in range.
The Ordnance Department of the United States Navy
is now experimenting in getting extra ranges and elevations by using stream-lined shells, like those used by
the German long-range bombardment guns.

Longer ranges

could be obtained by reducing the factors of safety by
using heavier charges of propellants, and may also be obtained by use of flooding tanks to list the ships.
In ·theory hits can be obtained up to the limit of gun
ranges, but in actual practice the percentage of hits drops
very rapidly after the distances reach 75% of possible
range, dropping to practically nothing at the extreme range,
unless they be chance hits.l
The following tables show the ranges of the capital
ships of the United States Navy and the British
1

N~vy.

Bywa.ter, Hector c., Elevation of British Guns,
Scientific American, July 1923, CXXIX, 26-28.
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United States Navy
Gun
Caliber
sizes
length
Ships
3 battleships
1611
45
2 battleship·s
14
50
2 battleships
14
50
6 battleships
14
45
2 battleships
12
50
2 battleships
12
45

Degrees
elevation
30
30
15
15
15
15

Range
in yards
32,000
34,000
22,000
20,000
22,000
20,000

It will be noted that increased caliber length will
increase range.
(Caliber length is a ratio of measurement between the
length of the gun barrel and the bore of the gun.)
British Navy
Ships

Gun
sizes
2 battleships
16"
10 battleships 15
4 battleships 13.5
e battleships 15
1 battleship
15
1 battleship
13.5

Caliber
lengths
42
42
42
42
42
42

Degrees
elevation
30
20
20
20
30
20

Range
in yards
32,000
24,300
23,800
24,300
30,000
23,8001

Gun sizes were limited by the Washington treaty to
16 inch sizes.

These guns are capable of handling shells

at a fair rate of speed, but are expensive to build and
to install.

They do not have the range of a 50 caiiber

15 inch gun, nor even a 14 inch gun.

The only advantage is

that the shell is larger, 1040 pounds, so that it can handle
a larger explosive charge and have greater piercing ability-.
The question of increasing gun elevation bas been
brought up several times in Congress, but has been blocked
by Presidential action.

Coolidge alWRys was opposed be-

cause of protest by Great Britain, although the British
1

.

Op. Cit •.
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guns had the elevations that were desired for American
ships.

Secretary Hughes did not consider the 'change of

elevation as reconstruction.

The Richmond Dispatch

commented on this item,
~Tothing stands in the way of elevation except President
Coolidge and his policy."

11

It ma.y be stated in leaving this discussion that
this modernization step of gun elevation has not been
done as yet, even though it is pointed out it will in-crease the range of our ships' guns.
In connection with this modernization, it was planned
to armor the decks against high-angle fire or aerial bombs.
"Blistering" the hulls then would be necessary to maintain
proper bouyanoy.

These bulges would also protect against

mines or torpedo attacks.

.Oil burning boilers are needed

in six of the battleships that are still coal burners.
Submarines.
At the Washington conference there was·a strong fight
made on the use of submarines.

America held out for

90,000 tons, so it must be probable that our delegates
looked upon this

typ~

as a defensive unit.

In 1804, when Fulton laid his plans for the submer•
sible before the British Admiralty, Earl St. Vincent stated
that it was an instrument that the British, as rulers of the
sea did not want.

"If it is successful," he said,

deprive us of it. (control)"
proved this prophesy.

11

it will

Events of the World War almost

Ho type of warship now existing can

do what the submarine can do.

It is possible for them to

be built of large enough cruising radius to cross the
Pacific.

It is no secret that Japan has constructed some

larger than those built by Germany--a regret from the
British point of view.

It may create a precedent.

If in

some future date Germany may assert her right to build
this type again it may not be easy to see where her claims
could be easily denied.l·
Replacement Program
There may be a few fa.cts of a replacement program
that might not be entirely clear.

The Navy League, and

other organizations, look at these facta rather dubiously.
For example, between the close of the Washington conference
and the London conference, the United States laid down
86,120 standard tone of seagoing combatant vessels.
laid down 271,125 tone and Japan 249,903 tone.
247,000 tone and Italy 129,997 tone.

Britain

France laid

In other words, each

of the four main naval powers averrtged nearly three times
as much as the United States.

Spain has risen in naval

circles, and has been building as fastfas either Italy or
France. 2
Excluding all vessels listed for disposal, but including all else built, basing the tonnage totals on the
1

Bywater, Hector 0., Limitation of Armaments, Atlantic
Monthll, February 1922, OXXIX, 259-269.

2

Army and }Tavy Journal, editorial notes, 1930.
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London treaty the United States is, according to estimates
of the Navy Leagu.e, between 13 and 20 percent below quota
allowances, rather a high estimate.

It has been usually

conceded that the United States Navy was around 80 percent
of quota strength.
This problem can. be classed under one of two heads-building out to treaty quotas and then maintaining that
quota by replacements,

The following table, compiled by

lbhe Navy League on February 4, 1931, is offered for illustration of replacement costs:
Ships
Capital ships
Aircraft carriers
Large gun cruisers
Small gun cruisers
Destroyers
Submarines
~ron-combatant

Total
tons
453,500
79,800
150,000
70,500
150,000
52,700

Oost
:pr ton
$1,100
1,500
1,700
1,850
2,800
4,000

Replacement
Value
$498,850,000
l19,700,000
255,000,000
130,425,000
420,000,000
210, 80o,:ooo

aux11t!ar1es
563,228
175
98,546,900
Airplanes
Navy type
1159, with average replacement cost per
plane of ~~33, 000, average age 5 years, average
yearly replacement cost ~~7, 649,400.
Total combatant tonnage
956,500
Total replacement cost
~1,771,586,900
Annual average replacement cost ~~104, 256,131
It needs to be taken into consideration at this
point, that the United States did not have a modern cruiser
and quite a collection of old vessels at the time of the
Washington conference.

During the period of nine years,

1921 to 1930, the United States has built or is building,
fifteen cruisers included in the above totals.

The annual

program of replacement for the past few years has practically
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been $38,000,000.

This is about one-third the amount

estimated as necessary.

A deduction can be made that either

the estimate is too low or else there will be a tremendous
bill to face at some future day.
now we may look at replacement in another wa_y--deduot
from the replacement annual cost

(~1~104,

256, 131) the average

annual replacement costs of the vessels built since 1921,
namely $24,434,400, leaving a balance of

~79,821,731.

This

can be taken to mean that while there is some naval activity on replacement, the Navy is slipping backward about
$40,000,000 per

year,~

if deterioration can be thus guaged

in dollars.
One argument is, however, that thE;lre can be no replacement on capital ships during this period.

True cmd

we can thus out off $25,000,000 from what should have been
spent.

Nevertheless these will need replacing later,

fu~d

other ships could nmv be built to clear financial decks
for action when replacements begin in 1937.

This is when

eleven ships named in the Washington treaty are presumed by
that instrument to be replaced.
that expenditures of

~~297,

In 1931 it was estimated

000,000 would be necessary to

bring the Navy up to treaty strength, and $496,000,000 to
replace all the averaged vessels.
General Reflections.
The limit of 35,000 tons on battleships cannot be
defended on any military grounds.

Some naval authorities

---------..,·~'"-'-

'i
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in Europe say that the ideal battleship would have a displacement of 57,000 tons.

Great Britain was going toward

that size with the 'Hood' class of 43,000 tons displacement.
Admiral Sims stated that America's povrer and program
brought sanity to a war-sick world, but still in belligerent mood.

In connection he said:

If this nation continues great--! mean potentially great-w·e may turn the world from the ideals of war. If we sit
snugly by and are content to a.llow our power, e..ctual or
potential, to rust at the docks, we will soon become a
negligible factor as a world force, and will be so treated.
Senator Salisbury stated that our Navy must be as good
and as well prepared as a.n.y in the world.

Every gun must

be ready, and we must have an educated naval reserve officers
list to draw upon in an emergency.

We must show our deter-

mination to live in pea.ce, even though we must fight to do
eo.

Then, he prophesied, the world, ltnowing this stand

would see to it that naval holidays were long, and armaments
would be still lower.l
With the linli tation conferences laying down the basis
for policies, it was easy enough for Congress to formulate
a building· program for a balanced Havy.

It might be false

economy to fail to live up to these standards, is the consensus of opinions of many naval men and writers.

In March,

of this year, Admiral Frank Upham, Chief of the Bureau of
1

Salisbury, Willard, (former Senator from Delaware,)
American Naval Efficiency, Curent History, April
1922, XVI, 32-33.
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Navigation in the

~Tavy

Department, stated that a reduction

of naval personnel and strength was made after' the London
conference, at a time when our strength was not nearly up
to that allowed by the treaty.

He said "it is a serious

impairment to an arm of our national defense."
Upham was answered by President Hoover, who stated:
He had been informed by officers in the Navy Department
that our present fleet 11 is adequate for coast defense,
and that if it is brought up to treaty levels it would
be an economic injury to our people, and a threat a.gainst
our neighbors that would be a good ca.use for ill will."
In a short time following this statement of Hoover's,
Admiral Pratt, highest ranking officer of the Navy, testified in a Congressional hearing that the Navy "was falling
apart."

The Navy League, through its president, asked

President Hoover that if our neighbors had agreed that the
United States

~;:~hould

have a specified strength, and that

at present if had only about 70 percent of that strength,
where would there be reason for a righteous cause for ill
will in building up the deficiencies.

The organization

also asked if we had cause for ill will because they were
keeping their parts of the agreements.
In his

!~Tavy

Day speech, delivered October 27, 1931

President Hoover said:l
The first necessity of our government is the maintenance
of a Ua.vy so efficient and strong that, in conjunction with
our Army, no enemy may ever invade our country.
:::.· .. ·.

1

Navy League bulletins, Building Our Treaty Navy.
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The London Times in January 1929, stated that: 1
The United States is the judge of its own requirements,
and· the figures it has chosen to describe its cruiser deficiency will not, and cannot, act as a stimulus to. naval
construction here.
On Armistice Day, November 11, 1931, President Hoover
stat!d:
Peace is a product, first, of preparedness for defense;:
second, patient settlement of controversy; third, dynamic
development of forces of good will.
American commerce has grown greatly in the past fifteen
years, and that commerce should be given protection in time
of peace or war.

The actual danger of an attaclc on Ameri-

can shores is remote, but possible

This does not offer the

main reason for a Navy, quotes the Literary Digest.
traditional policy has been neutrality.

Our

The St. Paul

Pioneer Press said that "our need for a Navy is primarily
for defense of our rights as an innocent bystander.n2
In commenting upon his requests for a naval building
program, Secretary Wilbur said:
The country is not alarmed, it is simply insistent that the
Navy be kept up to its treaty ratio~
Comment on this by the Philadeluhia North American
was that "the truth is the ratio adopted does not prevail,
and the pretense that it does causes controversy."

The

Cincinnati· Post stated that "the ratio is just a fiction
of the most dangerous sort."
1

Op. Oi t.

2

Billions For A Uaval Program, hl terjr.z_pigest,
January 28, 1928, XCVI, 9-11.
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Then the New York Herald Tribune added that the capital
ship was not a fleet.

It remarked that "we would remain.

behind only if we elected to remain so, or did not bring
the other nations down on ratios of auxiliaries.nl
The Literary l2,i_g_est on January 24, 1925, comments in
substance, that was hard to understand why there was any
use to attend naval conferences to determine power of
navies, unless this nation proposed to keep up our end of t
the agreements.
War may come to this nation in the future, as it has in
the past, is as certain as that the nation endures. There
is only one way to assure ourselves of future peace or
safety or welfare. That is to be strong enough to command
for ourselves the peace that no other nation would command
for us, to command it by means of a naval defense which
would be such that the world v1ould find it impregnable.
Only those have rights that dare to defend them.Z'
The general policy enunciated by Secretary Denby and
corrobra ted by remarks of Senator Hef1 in in the United
States Senate, can still be quoted as a basis for building.
The Senator's remarks have already been gi v·en.

Upon these

various statements we may place some of the objectives of
the Navy.

1

z

Literary Digest, XCVI, 9-11.
Long or Short Range Navy,
24, 1925, LXXXIV, 7-9/

~erar¥.
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CHAPTER IV
DISARMAMEWr AND LIMITATIOn CONFERENCES

The first attempt, or suggestion, for any move
toward disarmament on the part of the United states
started with the suggestion by Alexander·Hrunilton, made
to President Washington on April 23, 1794, according to
Charles E. Hughes' discussion.

Hamil ton made the sug-

gestion that an agreement be made between the United States
and Great Britain regarding armament on the Great Lakes.
This idea did not materialize into a fact until the Rush
Bagot convention completed in 1817.
Movements that led up to the Washington conference
of 1921 might be based on the rescript issued by the Czar
of Russia in 1898, which document convened the first Hague
Conference.

\

.

The fondest hope that the Czar held was that

the growing weir;ht of armament, which was

i~poverishing

the

peoples of nations, might be lifted from their shoulders.
He did not, however, see that armaments were not so much
the cause of troubles as they were symptoms.
The conference that he thus called met in 1899 in the
Dutch capital.

It passed the following resolution:

The conference expresses the wish that the. governments take
into consideration the proposals made at this conference,
and examine the possibilities of an agreement as to the
li'mi t of armed forces, by land and by sea, and war budgets.
Between the first conference, 1899, and the second,
1907, the governments paid no attention to these suggestions,
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but went on increasing their armaments at unprecedented
rates.

The only utterances against this military activity

were made bJr the President of the United States and the
Prime Minister of Great Britain. 1
Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman said, in a speech in
London in December 1905, that "Britain should place herself at the head of a League of Peace to limit armament."
Roosevelt wrote in a letter, April 1907-, to the new
York Peace and Arbitration

Congres~,

that:

The most practical step in diminishing the burden of expense caused by increasing size of naval armament, would
I believe, be an agreem~nt limiting the si~e of naval
!hips hereafter built." Fourteen years later this idea
became a reality.
11

Great Britain and the United States were the only
cou~tries_reserving

the right to bring up the discussion

of armaments at the Second Hague Conterence.

Russia gave

up the championing of such a cause, and in the meeting
actually moved to bar it from discussion.

The conference

was in session eight weeks before the armament discussion
could be brought onto the floor, and at that time Great
Brtt_ain moved:
Great Britain will be ready to commnr..icate ench year, to
the powers that will do the same, its plans of construction
of new warships. Such an wxchange of information will
facilitate an exchange of views between the governments,
and the reductions, by which common agreements may be
reached.
1

2

Hc!t, Hamilton, What Has Been Done To Limit Armament,
Independent, Nov. 5, 1921, CVII, 123-124.
Ibid.

,
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Great Britain was given the support of the United
States.

Germany, Russia, Austria and Jnpan announced

that they would not take part in any such agreement.
Thereupon the delegation from the United States proposed
the following:·
The Second Hague Peace Conference confirms the resolution
of 1899, in regard to limitation of military expenditures,
and declares it is desirable that the governments resume
serious examination of th~ question.
This motion was lost and the movement laid on the
table by a majority vote of delegations present.l
Various moves were started in different countries,
but no headway was made.

Then on June 24, 1910; the

United States Congress passed the Bennet bill, which provided:

A committee of five appointed by the President of the
United States, to consider the expediency of utilizing
international agencies for the purpose of limiting armaments
of nations by international agreements, and to constitute
the existing navies of the world as a combined international force to preserve peace.
For some reason President Taft never appointed a
committee for this purpose.2 He did, however, ask Theodore
Roosevelt to find out from Great Britain and Germany
their i.deas on the limitation of armaments.

Roosevelt

was told, by the Kaiser, not to "meddle with affairs that
did not concern him."
1

Op. Oi t.

2

Ibid.
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After the Treaty of Versailles, follo,ving the World
War, the idea began to take definite shape for' a disarmament conference.

As a result of several possible •surveys'

of the situation, President Harding issued an invitation
for a meeting of the main topics, one of these being naval
limitations.
The main one of these surveys was made by the League
of nations.

On February 10, 1920 the League of Hations

had begun to operate.

A permanent armnmen•ts committee

was appointed by the Council, but before muGh action could
be obtained from the committee, the Assembly met on November
15, 1920.

Anticipated actions on armaments did not mater-

ialize, as the United States and Germany were not members
of the Leagtle.
Article Eight of the League covenant declares that:
The maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with nationaJ. safety, and the enforcement by common action, of
international obligations."

11

In this connection the proposal was passed in the Assembly
meeting, in 1920, that the armaments committee suggest to
the member states not to increase military strength for a
period of two years.

The Assembly also recommended that

a body of political, sociaJ. and economic experts 1be added
to the armament committee, which was done.
body now sent out its appeal to the

Lea~ue

This augmented
members.

Twenty-seven replies were received on the appeal.

10'7

T\vo -- Austria and Bulgaria -- said that the Versailles
treaty limited armaments sufficiently; three-- Sweden,
South Africa and Brazil -- were non-committal; fifteen
accepted the suggestion in some manner, all with reservations dep·ending upon the action of other members; seven
rejected the idea entirely.

Thus, when the Assembly met

in September, 1921, the Armaments Committee through its
chairman,

Vi~ani

of France, reported that it found the

world not ready for disarmament, and it did not trust
justice enough.

It stated

11

Disarmament and peace must

come, but not yet."
The committee praised the United States for issuing
the call to the disarmament conference to be held two
months later at Washington.

The United States was also

blamed for not having acted upon the St. Germain conference
of 1919, by which armaments were to have been controlled.
In discussing the coming conference at that time, Frank
H. Simond writing in the Review of Reviews said;
The idea seems that the reduction of armaxnente will not
affect the Pacific question. In consenting to reduce
armaments, no nation will consent to surrender interests
such as markets upon which it must depend to feed its
people.
The World's Work, issued just before the conference
opened, stated editorially that "there is not going to be
any

diear~mament,

unless the open domr policy is ratified

by Great Britain and accepted by Japan."

This statement

was answered by 0. M. Bishop, writing in the new Yorlc
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Evening Post, who said:
The open door policy, announced by the United States in

1901, and accepted by all powers, has had little attention

paid to it. The open door does not exist. The door has
'been closed in Manohurt.a for sixteen years since Japan
acquired control of the South Hanchurian railroad.

Archibald Hurd, writing a pre-conference article in
the Fortnightly Review, said: 1
If the conference is to be confined to a discussion of
standards of naval strength then its success will be seriously affected because this country's (England) Havy, in
addition to protecting sea communication, guards the oceanwashed frontiers of all various nations and dependencies
of the British Crown.
·
This same writer quoted from a recent speech of
Winston Churchill as follows:
OUr position is highly artificial. We are an unarmed
people. We are the only power in Europe which does not
possess a large army. We cnw.1.ot invade any continental
state, we have not the power, if we even wished to do so.
This English writer, in his articles, put forth the
following

ideas-~

it is an unhappy augury of the success

of the assembly that the public opinion in

the United

States, in all innocence we may 'believe, should have been
seiz·ed with a false conception of the naval situation;· 1 t
is suggested that the British fleet is responsible for the
large expenditures in the United States; it must be evident
that there is no excuse for the idea that the British naval
policies should be responsible for tax burdens in the
United States.
1

Hurd, Archibald, Washington Conference and Naval Issues,
Fortnightly Review, I1Tovember, 1921, 717-722.
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Continuing his dixcussion of the pending gathering,
Hurd stated:
It is essential, if the Washington conference is not to
fail, that all misconceptions be swept away and a clear
atmosphere created. The primary subject for discussion
is 'Pacific and the Far East' for armament depends upon
policy. As a second subject, armaments--but armaments
cannot be discussed as separate compartments of water,
land and air, but must be considered as a whole.
Washington Conference.
The Washington conference for the limitation of
armaments assembled in Washington in Uovember, 1921, in
response to the invitations sent out under auspices of the
United States government.

Charles E. Hughes, United States

Secretary of States presided, and he was the person who
voiced the proposals of the United States for naval disarmament.
As previously mentioned, there had been a great wave
of interest in shipbuilding sweep the United States in the
years immediately preceding.

Uow, · according to the state-

ments of observers, by 1921 this enthusiasm was on ·the wane.
OWing to inadequate apprbpriations from Congress,

l.~·Jst

of

the ships under construction were considerably behind
schedule, and it even began to look doubtful that some
would be completed at all.

To

c~~cel

a naval program, which

had been so expensive, without gaining anything, would have
been both unetatesmanlike and expensively wasteful.

The

lessons of the World War had caused a real building program,
based on a new doctrine.

~··
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As Captain Frothingham maintains, the United States
Navy had been addicted to the idea that e;uns won battles
and that the mobile

~ountings

needed strong protection.

for transporting those guns

Hence the Navy had heavily armed

ships and these were protected by extremely strong armor.
Great Eri tain, however, had been influenced more by etybes.
The result was that the British found themselves in
the poei ti.on o of having a fine assortment of body designs,
out with the United States actually having the strongest
fleet in the world.

Further, it did not seem that there

was a chance for Britain to catch up.l It is well known
that battleships are not just improvised, and the

~nerican

plane had actually been working.
The sudden realization, in Europe, that the United

States ha.d the superior! ty in naval forces was a dist1."1ct
shock.

Europeans decided that America had gone imperial•

istic.

All sorts of things now were credited to the

United States, because we, as a nation, had been indifferent to certain outside intereste. 2
Then more of a shoclc was given to Europe when

!.~r.

Hughes proposed to put this great fleet down to an eoual
with the British.

The whole question of naval limitati on

1

Turnbull, Commander A. D., The United States A Second
Class 1Taval Power, Current Historx:, March 1924,
XVIII, 969-983.

2

Frothingham, Capt. T. G., Power Behind Disarmament,
Independent, Ma.y 5, 1928, CXX, 422-23.
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was settled at once.

This meant that much of our modern

equipment was scrapped, while Great Britain, because of
presumed

inferiori~y,

and build new.

was allowed to scrap old material

Trouble between the two nations was in-

conceivable, so the comparisons were made simply on a basis
of defense.l
Great Britain, ruler of the seas for years, is credited
with having resigned her superiority in battleships.

Rear

Aruniral Fiske, of the United States Navy, denied that she
did it voluntarily.

He claims that it is not certain that

she could have maintained any supremacy had the United
States at this time contested it.

That the British re-

signed actual naval supremacy may be truthfully denied, because of the fact that they still p.ossess it.
wisely determined, also, to keep it.

They have

Civilians persist in

ranking ships in tonnages, in face of the fact that it is
men who wage war.

Ships and guns are only the tools with

which men make war.2
In developing this idea, Admiral Fiske said:

The British Navy is superior to the American Navy in numbers
of men and their training. The officers can be classed as
equals in skills, but the enlis.ted men are not, for the
reason that enlistments rw1·as high as 12 years in the
British Navy, and only as high as 4 years in ours. This
is obviously a. crushing handicap.
l

Op. Ott. 422-424.
Fislte, Admiral B•.. A.,., The Strongest Uavy,
Current Historz, June 1922, XVI, 557-562.
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If the battleship is the backbone of the fleet, we are
allowed equal strength with Britain. But of the necessary
auxiliaries we have :practically none but destroyers. The
British Havy is to be out to 98,500 men, the American NRVY
to 86,000. The British figure does not i:.1clude 8, 000 in
the naval air force, British Colonial Navy, Colonial reserve, Royal Indian Marines or the Coast Guard. Our 86,000
includes all enlistments.
Imagine the two nations at war, navies operating against
each other in waters equally distant from both countries.
We could cancel out the battleships, then all other factors
of equal strength. This being don.e, Britain would still
have left considerable numbers of battle cruisers, and
other armed. ships that could proceed to blockade new York,
or the other coast porte, without any particular opposition.l
In considering the American proposal, before it was
made, there were two

arr~ments

three-year building program.

in favor of cancelling the
It was evident that America

was taking certain risks, unless the other nations '"Tould
tal-ce the same action.

An international pact was necessary.

The plan was submitted at the psychological moment.

The

countries were fir: ding the building programs very heavy.
If the plan had not been successful, it is doubtful if the
Japanese government, for example, could have completed any
plan.

It is almost certain tha.t the ruinous competition

would have forced a strike at America, when Japan felt that
its power was sufficient, or bankruptcy and civil rebelli.on
in one or more· of the countries would have resulted, according to the l<:een naval observer, Hem:tor Byv~ater. 2
1 Op. Cit.

2 Bywater, Hector C., Limitation of Armament, Atlantic
Monthly, Feb. 1922, OXXXIV, 672-680
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Edwin L. James, writing in the !rev1 York Times said,
Ylhen this nation offered to g{:~re up its ne.val euperiori ty,
we were financially able to achieve, England and Japan
were agreed, France was forced into the agreement and
Italy- accepted, because it put her on an equality with
France, and did not interfere with her plans.
In mentioning France, we must bring her into the
agreement, because France represents the main land armament of Europe today, and to be successful in future discussions, P. W. Wi1H30n says, land armaments cannot be left
out of' considerations.

Wilson states that conscription

cannot, like shipbuilding, be con<realed.

It must be

em~

bodied in the public law:s to make it enforceable, and thus
becomes a subject for international discussions and pacts.l
It was asserted by AdrairaJ. Knapp, of' the United States
Navy, that the naval power was the main force of America,
and that she was reducing it without any return in kind
from the other nations.

In the conference land forces

were not affem:ted and, he held, land forces more than naval
forces, stirred up hostilities or carried them along.
The United States ga"e up her right to better her position,
w·i th no like return, and \'Vi th waning military prestige
comes waning political prestige, and this treaty marks the
decrease of influence in Asiatic or Oriental countries.
The United States was preeminently and pcitentially the
most powerful naval force in the world. The eleven capital ships that we scrapped. from the stocks gave us that
position. In sacrificing them, we sacrificed three to
one;·. in sea pov1er, for all the other nations combined.
~reoessi ty

for naval power still exists.

1 Wilson, P. W.,

We forget that the

~rext Step In Disarmament, Independent_,
Nov. 26, 1921, CVII, 199-201.
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power we are able to exert is the full extent of our in~
fluence in foreign affairs. The usefulness of. a Havy is
not limited to war times. · How often by a show of force
has the United States avoided a potential war? 1
In defense of the Washington conference treaty, Rear
Admiral \V. V. Pratt, of the navy, wrote,
The tfeaty cannot be considered by itself, apart from the
agreements of the conference. To a person viewing the
treaty as a whole, it appears satisfactory. To take it
out, piece by piece, and dissect it, it does not appear so
satisfactory.
Public opinion is divided i1:1to three parts: first, the
technical naval men, including those able to pass expert
opinions. This class might include those of strong national
leanings; second, the broadminded people within and without
the service, who view the naval poltcy not as an independent problem, but :ln connection with international affairs;.
third, the vvell-meaning class whose impulse, rather than
reason, leads it to advocate complete disarmament,2
A statement in the editorial section of the Atlantic
Monthly about the same time stated,
We have climbed to the throne of naval supremacy which,
from the Spanish Armada to the Battle of Jutland, was occupied by Great Britain. We have successfully asserted
our rights to have a Sub hea.d--Geneva conferences.
"The problem confronting the

conferenc~

at Geneva is

better a.ppreciated after one has taken more than a glance
at the naval line-up of today," is the idea of an editorial
in the Independent, July 9, 1927, commenting upon that
disarmament conference.

"It can be seen that, with the

exception of Italy, each of the members of the 1.:.rashL1gton
treaty had a preponderance in some type of

~ighting

craft.

1 Taken from a speech given by Admiral Knapp on April 27,

1922.
2 Pratt, Admiral W. V., Case For The lTnval Treaty,
Current Historz, April 1923, XVIII, 1-5.
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Great Britain had light cruisers, Japan heavy cruiser
submarines, France light submarines and the United States
destroyers.l
During the intervening space after the Washington conference there was a marked increase i::1. building programs
of craft not liW,ited by the

treat~r.

France for example, he.d

six submarines when her delec;ntes sic;ned the treaty.

At

the opening of the Geneva conference she had forty-six
built or building.

During these same six years between

conferences, Japan had increased her submarL1es 134~~. and
had nearly 100•% i~1crease in destroyers.

So from the line-

up of this construction, the move toward linli tat ion was undoubtedly wise, but failed because no one country could
make the proper proposals for the other countries to

..,

follow."{..>

The United States

at~md

at Geneva had been for eouali t y

with Great Bri tai:1 on all lines of ships, but the English
considered thnt the far--flung empire warranted a larger
number of ships, especially cruisers.
this, the Washington Post stated that

In connection with
11

the hour was at hc"l.nd

when it was necessary for Britain to decide to agree or
refuse to agree that the United States have equal power,
legally .n
l World Strength and Geneva Problen:1s, Independent, July 9,
1937. Vol. 119, PaGe 129.
2
Ibid.
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The day, this paper sta.ted., had passed when the United
States vvas ·willing to sit bHck and see a.nother power talcing commaY.J.d of the seas.

The UniteC! States, in its opinion,

could not tolerate such a cortdi tion as its requirements
demanded that it be an eoual poner.
Many editorial offices had the same opinion, according
to the L,i ter:,arY, Dir;est of August,

19~~7,

and held that the

failure of the Geneva conference would mean larger navies
for the world powers.
that

11

The Winston Salem

Journa~,

stated

England had challenged the rest of the world to match

her in naval building, and 'there was little doubt about
accepting the challenge. 11
P~oposals

of the Geneva conference were:

By the United States--Cruisers, England and the United
States to total of 250,000 to 300,000 tons; Japan
150,000 to 180,000.
Des~r tets, Great Bri ~ain and United Stateo total
~"'0(0
ons, Japan lr.. . O,OOO.
Submarines, Great Britain and United States 60,000 tons;
Japan 36,000.
Age limit for replacements, cruisers 20 years; destroyers
15 to 17 years , submarines 12 or 13 years.
By Great Britain-- Cruisers, acceptance of the 5-5-3
ratio for cruisers of 10,000 tons car:rying (3 inch
guns. Limitation of future cruisers to 7,500 and
6 inch guns; the latter to come after limit of
10,000 ton cruisers had been decided.
Destrolers, leaders to be limited to 1,750 tons;
destroiers to 1,400.
·
Submarines, fleet submarines lind ted to 1, 600 tons;
smaller ones to 600 tons, and not mounting over
5 inch gu..'1s.
Battleships, suggest cod that battleships be reduced
to 30,000 tons, guns to be reducecl to 13-} inch, a.:·.d
future airplane carriers to 25,000 tons.
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By Japan--- Powers to agree U~)Oll a :::>eriod
there would be no building.

i:1

Vlhich

Exclude from any agreement ships not exceedi::1g
700 tons, surface ships and rcC..uce future airplane car:ders to 25,000.
Replacements, Regulations on replacements to
, avoid sudden displacements of naval strength,
and equalizing naval construction.
Useful life, Life of surface craft c.bove 3,000
~one ~o be 16 years; under 3,000 tons to be 12
years, submarines to be 12 years.
The United States stated that, as Fra!"l.ce and Italy
were parties to the Washington conference treaty, and not
members of the Geneva conference, nothing could be done
that would affect the Washington treaty.
Of course, as the three nations could make no arrangements that affected the Five Power Treaty made at Washington,
nor reach any conclusions bet\veen themselves the conference
broke up.

Great Britain had insisted upon an increase in

cruiser tonnage, so it was evident there was no chance for
agreements.
Following this collapse of the conference, the Secretary
of the 1--Tavy proposed a new, enlarced naval building program
to Congress.

Great Britain soon heard of this and had a

revulsion of feeling concerning tonnages, and Lord Cecil,
had to resign from the British cabinet, with the statement
that he was out of sympathy with his instructions.

The

Congressional naval committee thereupon cut the naval pro-·
gram, and added a provision that

.i<.~

~

11

should there be a..'1
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international agreement made n.t any time concerning naval
armaments, the President should halt e.ll

worl~

under the

program. 11 1
In 1928 the British reaffirmed their proposals--cut
battleship sizes, reduce guns used to the 13.5 inch size
instead of our 16 inch maximum, extend battleship replacements from 20 to 26 years.
In other words, Great Britain had. completed two of the
largest battleships ever made, and wished to

mru~e

others

smaller so that theirs would stand out more preeminently.
They were perfectly willing also, to aba.YJ.don, u g1m which
due to the style of manufacture could not prove so satisfactory as the same size in the neighbor's navy.

It

appeared, that although the trend of the time was toward
limitation, there was great possibility that with the end of
the Washington treaty in 1931, the1·e \vould be increased
competitive building.n2
According to the Literary Digest, the Japanese looked
upon the Geneva conference with suspic:ton.

They claimed

that England had been building more ships, that the naval
base at Singapore, and the United States naval practices
in the Pacific were such that neither nation was .in position
rz

to call conferences.v
1 Frothingham, Capt. T. G., Indenendent, Vol. 120, Page 426.

2 Ibid. 42~8

3 Japan Views of Second Disarmament Conferences,
Literary Digest, Jan. 24, 1925.
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In this connection the

Uewarl~

lTews stated that there

should be a real conference in the United St<?.tes first to
get the sentiment of the people on the topic, not the loud
claims of a few, but sentiments of the masses, and then let
the leaders call conferences.

The paper stated, "The naval

officers say that disarmament is the bunk, the air forces
that the Navy is all wrong, other spec:tal interests and
politicians say one

thi~1g

and another, and the general

public, which is to be either benefitted or harmed, saved
money or taxed more, has little or no reo.l op:portuhi t~r to
voice ~n opinion.nl
London Conference
The failure of the Geneva conference, not attributed
to any one cause, put a lull on disarmament procieedi:c.r;s,
as far as conferences were concerned for two yenrs.

Then

after a conference \'IJ'i th Premier MacDonald, of Great Britain,
and President Hoover, of the United States, a naval conference was called for London in 1930.
The naval powers gathered and viewed the conditions.
I

England and the United Sta.tes were agreed upon the principle of parity, Japan fnvored the same side due to better
ratios obtainable, but France and Italy were holding

bad~.

In a preview of the conference, Frank H. Simonds wrote in
the Review of Reviews that "it seems m:iomatic that the
closer Great Britain and the United States worked together
1 \Vhat Another Disammament Confe1·ence Could Do, Li terarr

Digest, March 7, 1925.

·.i

i

.
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on the question, the less likely any agreement could
be.nl

France had announced, he clr.irtlGd, had 'already an-

nounced the fp.ct that she looked upon the conference as a
relatively unin:portant prelude to the meeting in Geneva,
:i.nsisting that no question of further armaments could be
decided except by the League of 1-!ations.
To face these :Problems Secretary Stimson, heading
the American delegation had one of two possible solutions.
If be desired to carry out the Hoover policy, it was
necessary to persuade either Britain or a combination of
Fra.nce and Italy.

To obtain British

su~)port

would mean, in

the minds of the British, a compromise of British security.
Obtaining support of France and Italy meant oondenming
those powers for all time to helplessness in the face of
British sea power.
If he triect to get France and Italy, he would be, in
eyes of the Latins, an agent of an Anglo-American alliance.
If he got the aid of Great Britain, the British could

fig~e

that he was trying to sacrifice British security to obtain

.,

parity, and 'parity of the cheap.ttto

Following the Washington conference the American people
felt that the British had won a victory more complete than
either Trafalgar or Jutland.

Congress took up this cry, and

1 Simonds, Franlt H., London, Review of Reviews, Vol. 81,
63-64.

2 Simonds, Frank H., What Can We Expect At London,
Review of Reviews, Feb. 1930, Vol. 81, 71-73.
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was confronted by President Coolidge with the statement
that it was possible to arrive at parity ivith·Britain by
conference and not by

construct~~n.

Hie hopes were

dashed at Geneva.
Then Congress passed the naval building bill, providing

for doubltng c!'uieer tonnage, and Coolidge etgned the bill.
The President announced in an Armistice Day speech (1928)
that this countrY' could have parity only <3.t enormous programs of construction.l
The London conference was set for fa.ilure.

Hopes were

held for a five power treaty, but on the eve of the meeting
France revolted.
•two power• navy.

Britain was faced with the need of a
America hoped for parity and reduction.

Leaders in the United States Senate were OPl:>Osecl to the conference, eo that meant that American delegatee faced a
hostile group when they returned.
Before the Americans landed in England, a. radio report
was received that UacDonald had proposed abolition of

battleships in an interview.

Here the Americans were go-

ing to the conference and standing upon the battleship as
the core of the fleet.

Later, it was found the interview

was mi souot ed.
When the meeting opened in London the Tory press
carried out extensive programs demand.ing retention of English current programs.
1 Op. Cit.

•
:;JJ

Their argument ·was that England

-·

..
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could not risk pa:r.i ty as sugp.:ested by Hoover and MacDonald.
PUrported messages were also being :published as coming
from Washington signifying different stands by Hoover.
America stood for these things at London:
lro discussion on battleship reduction;
As long as the United States held the Phillipines
we needed battleships;·
We have only a process of parity, but no parity;
Oapital ships must be retained;
Some sort of equalizing strengths must be provided;
All delegations were to be affected by failure of. the
conference;
No signing of any Mediterranean pact concerning
French-Italian plans;
Firm stand for a 60 percent ratio for Japanese cruisere. 1
France held out for rights to fix her own limits, and
that Britain did not have to lteep agreements with America.
Thus the American fleet would be dependent upon the French
fleet, in the opinibn of some correspondents.
The main task of reductions was post])oned until 1935.
As Mr. Simonds put it, to keep paritt with Britain America
must build, · to keep pace with America Japan must build; to
guard against German and Italian dangers France must build
and to be equal to France Italy must build, and in the face
of all this construction how could Great Britain stand still?
As nothing could be done the American delegation left,
as their instructions were for reduction.

After sailing,

Premier Tardieu of France put French figures to the meeting.
British delegates notified American delegatee by radio that
Hoover MacDonald agreement was off.
1 Simonds, Frank H. Initial Skirmish At London, Review of
Review~, March 1930, Vol. 81, Pages 80-81.

1

!
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Ta:rdeiu returned to Frrmce
feated.

~.nd

hie ministry \"1as de-

Tbe conference awaited the Frc?nch election and

a :return of a French clel ega tion,

Tardi eu was returned

to office with strong publ:l.c optnion with him.
When news was received, Hoover c.eclared to representatives of peace societies,

II

catagorically a consultative

pact was out of the question."

At the same time Stimson

announced, back in London, that the American delegation
would consider any pact with an open mind.
ered that politics were of no importance.

Hoover considHe had done as

Wilson had done, gone to :rnurope with ideals, and forced
back by European eituatione. 1
A treaty was finally signed.

In it the greatest

power of history agreed to American pari-ty.

nave~

This sho,ved to

Europe that England had no intention of fighting America.
This table will show total tonnages of United States
fleet in 1930 and presumed tonnages in 1936.
Ships
Capital ships
Aircraft carriers
Cruisers
Destroyers
Submarines
Tata.le

1930

1936

533,000
90,000
200,000
227,000
74,000

462,000
135,000
325,000.
150,000
52,000

1,124,000

1,124,000

In discussing the treaty, objectors in the Seanat tried
to work on the idea of II a billion dollar parity" as an
1

Simonds, Frank H., What Was Wrong At London, Review
of Revi ewe, May 1930, Vol. 81 no. 5, 40 -45.
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appeal to the "small Navy" people.
They are, according to the Hew York World, more interested in

public opinion than in forming it.

prej~dicing

The question as to whether it was a good or bad bargain
could only be answered by comparing agreements of the treaty
with actual positions of navies involved.l Tru~e one item,
8 incl! gun cruisers-Great Britain had 186,000 tons, United States
130,000, Japan 108,400.
The next question could be 'What are the ratios of
these figures?'

They are 10 to 7 for Great Britain and the

United States, 10 to 8.3 for America. and Japan.

The

treaty laid dmvn building limits for a period of six years,
and authorized:
Great Britain to scrap, without
tons of big guns that would
1936.
Japan WP.s not authorized to lay
United States authorized to lay
cru.i sers. 2

replacement, 40,000
not be obsolete in
--down an~r new cruisers.
down five new

Our statesmen entered the meet with an inferior bigcruiser fleet, and came out with right to have superiority.
W'hat was the price?

It was to all0\"1 Great Britain. to have

superiority in small cruisers,
ratio than the 5-5-3.

and

Japan to have a better

In small cruise1 s 1 t provided a
1

working ratio of Great Britain 10, United States 7.5 and
Japan 5.3.

The charge that it was a bad bargain centers on

1 That Naval Treaty, Review of Reviews, August 1930,

Vol. 82, 83.
2 Ibid, 89.
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the fact that America must build 70,000 tons of cruisers,
armed with 6 inch guns instead of 8 as our Admirals
wanted. 1
We are entitled to build 3 tons of aircraft carriers
to 1 for Great Britain, and 5 to 1 with Japan; we are entitled to build 50,000 tons of l:>:ig gun cruisers to none
for Great Britain and Japan; we are entitled to build 13t
tons of destroyers to Bri tains 11 and Japan's 2.

In other

words, we are entitled to build more than it is probable
that Congress Will appropriate for, so we do not see where
it is a bad bargain.2
Melvin Talbot said in the Review of Reviews, "We now
have a treaty.

It vindicates our claim to a fleet equal to

the British, but that fleet we do l!DOt possess.
to partially consummate that

progre~,

If we are

we must enter into

a policy program of building, steady, consistent building,'
for six. years." 3
Battleships and airplane carriers are by no means the
fleet.

Destroyers and submarines make

force.

The modern cruiser is a torpedo

up a

fifth of our

car:r~ier.

The cruiser

is a ship of many uses.
From a small frigate of Nelson's day to the heavy
Constitution of 1812 ;· from a small non-descript steam boat
1

·Op. Cit. 89.

2 Ibid

3 Talbot, Lieut. Melvin F., Building Our ~reaty navy,
Review of Reviews, Dec. 1930, Vol. 82, Ho. 12, 50-53.
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of the Oivil War into the heavily armored cruiser of today,
the cruiser has come into prominence in naval plans.
Lieut. Talbot takes the view thnt compared to what it
will protect, the program is not too much.

In a land tha:b

is able to spend nearly a billion dollars a year for cigar1

ettes, and over a quarter billion a year for hats, the a- ·mount ne4ded for a new navy is not much.

Security is worth

more than wealth, and without one the other might be use1 ess.l

The London treaty gave preparedness for all, preponderance to none.

The historic balance. of power was rea.ffirmed

in stronger form than ever, by navies that could attaclc in
limited spheres only, if at all, but could be used for defence.

Such balances tend .for peace rather than war.2

President Hoover connnissioned Ambassador Hugh Gibson3
for a special mission of
Italy into the fold.

atten~ting

It was claimed that the need of Italy

for a foreign loan was a stretigic
ous part to play.

to bring France and

c~rd.

That was a danger-

That it could smack of coersion on one

hand, or that United S.tatee was backing Italy against Fra.nce
on the other.
Mussolini in hie talk in November 1930, put Italy on
l

Op. Oi t.

2 Talbot, Lieut Melvin F., Building Our London Treaty Uavy,
Review of Reviews, Vol. 82, Pages 53-54.
3 Ambassador Gibson at that time Ambassador to Belgium.
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the side of treaty revisions.

Andre llaurois, writing for

the New York Times Magazin.e,, October 26, 193o', said that
the conference instead of proving for France an instrument
of peace, would lead to dru1gerous controversies with Italy.
In spite of testimony of twenty-three Admirals, testifying before the Senate on the treaty, it was approved,
Admiral Pratt commented thus:
"I have a very defintte reason that has ocbme up lately,
to make me see a greater advantage in 6 inch gun cruisers
than ever before. You build up our navy under this
treaty, and I would not swap it. It suits ·me. I say
this as one who would have to do the fighting." 1
Secretary Stimson was of the opinion thaT the United
States had done well.

Secretary of the Navy Adams siad the

nation had gone as far as it could to get 21

e

inch gun

cruisers without breaking off negotiations.
While our delegates were being assailed on all sides

b

those claiming they gave too much to others, the new York
World stated:
It would be most helpful if Mr. Winston Ohurchill
could be imported to Washington to show the Senate
how Mr. Stimson waylaid Mr. MacDonald and if the GenerriJ.
Board could be sent to London to show how those wily
Britons had seduced innocent American statesmen; if
Senator Johnson could be wafted to Japan to show them
how America had been bamboozled, and a few of the Japanese Admirals could be brought over here to show what
a terrible bargain the Yanl~ees had forced Japan to
accept. For, by testimony of the 'big navy parties' in
each country, the three-power treaty was a triangular
disaster. Everybody defeated everybody else; we are
11

lJ The United States, a review, Current ·History, July 1930,

Vol. 32, 763.

y
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R.ll ruined and defenseless. rrl

In a· special session of the Senate President Hoover
spoke of the opposition group as a c;roup

11

which believed

in unrestrictive military strength as an objective of the
American Dation."

He stated that the only alternative

would be competitive building with consequent flow of
suspicion.

That the controversy of 6 gun or 8 gun ships

revolved around "less than three percent of the fleet."
11

It is not a. question, 11 he said, "of reducing tonnage, it

is a question of whether we have this treaty or no treaty,
a period of larger reduction, or competitive armament.n2

1 Op • 0 it . , 7 64.
2 Ibid. 984.
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'GHAPTEH V
lllOVEl·i.ENTS BEHINP THE HAVY

It is presumed that, fron1 the foregoing pages, the
reader has formeo. some opinion that there exists in the
United States a 'Big Uavy Party.'

We have had presented

many arguments, and facts, concerning our condition on th·e
sea, the growths and declines of the Navy, and some of the
facts outlined and. laid down by the limitations conferences.
There must be some well-groundeC. reasons for the demand on one side for continual attention being paid to our
Navy;- likewise there must be some reason that many people ·
discount much of this agitation.

It is a tenable argument

that if a nation enters a treaty with other nations, it is
presumed that the nation desires the goals of the treaty
and will abide by it.

It is also possible that treaties

may be forced upon any nation by circumstances that may not
be clearly understood or explained.
If there be undue agitation fo1· a Big Havy, then we
must recognize the fact that there is a Big Navy Party.
Naturally the ouestion

must arise-- what sort of an

organiz·ation is this, who composes it and what are its obj ects'fr

In partial answer we might divide it into
Professional naval'men~ in active, service; or retired, who
write or speak for the salce of public opinion;:
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Technical pe!"sons who desire to see naval construction because of its glorifica.tion of mechanical skill~;:
Nationalists who wish to see their nation actually supreme
in power;:
Munition and steel manufacturers who see increased business
in a big Uavy;
newspapers and journalists who support the big navy because of financial interests in their own business;:
Preparedness advocates;
Individuals, whether in public or private life, who sincerely
believe in such course of e..ction.
These may be classed in this so called 'party.'
Organized effort behind the Btg Havy must have direction.

This direction-is furnished, to a great extent,

by the lil'avy League of the United States.

By this I do not

imply that the navy League is an organization in existence
to spread questionable propagan.da.

Its purposes, as stated

in its constitution, are to obtain and ·sl')rea.d information
concerning the naval service and
States.

~quipment

of the United

If there be over-enthusiastic operation by members

of this organization, it is not necessarily a fault of the
whole League.

Condition for membership in the League,also

from its constitution and by-laws, is that the man or
woman be a citizen of the United States and in sympathy
with the objects of the organization.
According to infor:mation on the membership of the
organization, there are several thousand members, both men

;~

Iii

and women.

:Memberships are classified as active and

associate.

The active members are those who take a real

.,
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active part in the work, and many are men in the naval
service of this nation.

However, there are many more

civilian members than service members.
Oharles A. Beard, writing in the new Republic, says
there is a definite challenge in the activities of the
League.l

Its actions, he claims, raise two major issues.

The first of these is, 'Who is to control the armament
development of the United States?.'

The other could be,

'Exactly what is to be defended, and by what use of diplomacy and a:m1 s?'
p·ersona:ti ties do not enter into this discussion, the
challenge is throvrn down, according to Beard, as to whether
the civil branches of the government or,

·l:l.@

he terms it, a

•naval bureaucracy' will dictate the polio~es.

His first

article infers tha.t the latter statement is in direct
reference to the General Board of the Havy Department,
which is supported by an array of office-·seekers, arms
manufacturers, merchant marine promoters, navy yard operators,
special interest representatives and others who expect to
reap a benefit directly from the action.s of this body.

He

claims that real estate boomers, like Brrtten and the
jingo press owners, were working for seifish gains, or personal interests.

This article,

theref~~e,

carries a wide

accusation against the support of the General Board, which
1 Beard, Oharles A., Big ltavy Boys, Hew Republic,
January 20, 1932, LXIX, 258.

has the control of the naval operations and setting up of
naval policies.l
There are, he avers, two general policies possible.
One is to interpret the rights of citizens in all parts of
the world, and have ready a large Army and Uavy to enforce
decisions against any combination of nations on earth.

This

is the real issue of the lTavy League :propaganda, he cla:ims.
The second policy is a consideration of adequate defenses
of interests in the United States, a 9olicy embodied in the
Kellogg Pact, in an agreement to limit armaments. 2
There is apparently a great amount of misinformation
upon all subjects of world defenses.

The time is at hand

when. the whole -question must be exr(.mined very closely by

this country as well as other countries.

A demand to this

effect has been made by this nation on European nations.
¥any naval base plans have beeri made in the past, most of
them having gone no further in development.

Possibly it

might be that men in control have been following British
leads.

A big play has been made also upon 'national sense

of honor.'
Scores of times, in our national history, there have
been feelings that this 'national honor' has been injured,
with resu.l ting clamors for war.

Preparations have been

made in cont?equence to these demands.

Often the

prep~n.tions

1 Beard, Charles A., Big Mavy Boys, New Renublic,
January 20,1932, LXIX, 259.
2

Ibid.
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have involved many additional expenditures, perhaps without genuine

provoc~tio~.

Often events have 'educated' the nation to give support to our

nav~u

bureaUCl'Hcy, claims Mr. Beard.

A few

of these 'educational' events might be cited.
In 18'72 Aomirnl Meade dtscoverecl a strategic point
for future sea power in the island of Tutuila, and pereuad.ed the native chief to malce a treaty .to cede a naveJ.
base at PagomPago.

The Senate rejected the treaty.

Presi-

dent Grant, an ardent annexationist, sent an agent,
Colonel A. B. Steinberger, a gentleman with a dubious
diplomatic post, to the island.
This diplomatic agent of our altruistic government
fomented a local revolution, elected himself Prime Minister
and placed the island under American protection.
Senate still refused to agree to any such action.

Our
The

general public probably knew little of the activities, but
our naval politicians were keenly avrare of the significance
and potential values. 1
In this connection England, Germany and the United
States prepared for emergency action.
was held in readiness.

The Pacific fleet

According to Harry T. Peck, a

wave of excitement swept this country and an extremely
'"I

hostile tone toward Germany ap11eared in our papers. t:>
1 Op. Oi t.
2 Ibid.
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The event did serve the purpose of increasing the
naval n.ppropriations.

Soon events in tbe Ven'ezuelcm

disput,e with Great Britain proved to our people that if the
authority of our government was to be exercised, provisions
must be made for possible war Rctlvi ties.
Hilary A. Herbert, Secretary of the navy under Cleveland, took. office in 1893.
Congress a naval program.

He continually urged upon
He cle.imed:

If our government is to have a naval strength in the future
to command peace, and to enforce the to~'rEs dicte,ted by its
sense o:f' justice, it must have more be.ttleships.l
I

'

The Congress at the time was under influence of the
agricultural interests and refused to act.

W'i th the re-

turn of the Republican party to power in 1895, Herbert again asked for two battleships and twelve torpedo boats.
Congress answered his request with three battleships and
ten torpedo boats.

This was encouraged by the appeare.nce

on the diplomatic horizon of the Cuban troubles.
A rigid thesis that this conflict came because of capitalists in America, moved by a oonsciousmess of identical
interests, forced the government to wage war on Spain, end
annex her possessiQns would be in variance 'vi th the known
facts of the case.2
Many of the financiers of this country opposed the
war with Spain,.but did support the action when it actually
came.

The background for this naval expansion of the

p-eriod was laid on foundations placed by Theodore Roosevelt.
1 Op. Cit., 259-260.
2 Ibid., 260.
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He, more than nny other individual, sold e1avalism to our
nation.

He believed that an occasional war would be good

for the moral fiber of the nation, and that projects of
internationa.l peace might be looked upon with misgivings.
Roosevelt is credited with a remark to Lodge at the
time of the Venezuela affair that, "Personally I hope the
fight will come soon.

The clamor of the peace fRction has

convinced me that the country needs the war." l

He was

perhaps one of the outstanding exponents of a large Navy.
He fostered

pr~paration

of the force from the time he first

became connected with the navy Department.

In most of the

cases he was probRbly very sincere in his stand.

He did

have some private views on pre:Paration and fomenting u7r:-tr,
expressed freely in confidential letters, but not in public at which times he, in the words of Beard, "extolled
peace and national honor, apparently without discerning
....
the dichotomy explicitly involved.Q
In a speech at the Jifaval College, June 1897, Roosevelt
placed both sides, in this wise:
In all our.history there never has been a time when prepar~
tions for war were any menace to peace. Arbitration is ~n
excellent thing. But those who wish to see this country
a.t peace will be wise to place reliance upon a firstclass fleet of battlesl1ips, rather the.n on any arbitration
treaty \Vhich the wit of man can devise. A really grea.t
people would fnce the disasters of war rather than pur~
chase base prosperity bought at the price of national honor.""
l

Op.

Cit.

2 Ibid.
3

Ibid., 261.
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It might be a significant thing to note, in passing,
that navr"1.l eat:pendi tures increased pre.ctically' one hundred
percent during the time that Roosevelt was in office as
President.

After this period naval

eA~enditures

steadily

increased until President Wilson, with probable foresight
of the coming conflict, committed this country to the
second-to-none policy.

This policy held sway until the

Washtngton conference, and then was brought do\7n to 'normal
levels' which, by the way, were five times above the levels
of 1900.

Now there is insistence, by the Navy League and

others, that our Navy be brought up to the levels of the
Lo~don treaty.l

As mentioned, the Navy and the Merchant 11arine are
parts of sea power.

Provisions on .the statute books of

our nation promote development of the Merchant Marine.
Shipbuilding corporations, building warships, also build
merchantmen.

It would seem perfectly obvious t'hat, the

more building promoted, the more profits to accruing to the
builders.

This might put a different angle on. the matter,

more than if our ships were made in government-owned and
operated yards.
Analysis of parte of our discussion could not be made
without possibly much more material being available than
the portions accentuated by • interest propagation.

1

On

page 653 of the publication Hearings of the Subcommittee of
1

Op. Oit.
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the Committee of naval Affairs of the Seventy-ftrst
Congress, pursuant to Senate Resolution 144, 1 there appears
a letter, labelled as exhibit 82, written by C. L. Bardo,
Vice President of the American Brown Boveri Electrical
Oompany, addressed to E. M. Herr, President of the Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing Company.
This letter requested

:;~s,

000 as the Westinghouse con-

tribution toward the expense of promotion of merchant marine
legislation in Congress.

In part the letter stated:

The Jones-White Merchant Marine bill passed by the last
Congress is the most helpful and constructive nationo.l
shipping legislation ever presented to the American shiPping public. The legislation was made possible only by the
help of Mr. \nlder2, and with the help of other shi:pning
and shipbuilding interests.
Several months were spent by Mr. Wilder, and his associa.ted,
in explaini·:1g and educating Congress to the needs of an
adequate Merchant Marine.3
This. education of Congress cost
closed,
ington.

1~25,

~~150,

000, it was dis-

000 being credited to hotel expenses in Wash-

The Boveri Company raised ~~41, 500 from the Newport

1\Tews Shipbuilding and Drydock Company, Bethlehem Steel
Corporation, Sun Shipbuilding and Drydock Company, Worthington Pump and Machinery Company, General Electric Company,
1 By the Government Printing Office, 1930.
2 Mr. Wilder was formerly president of the American Brown

Boveri Company, holding company of
Co.

n. Y.

Shipbuilding

3 Extracted from government reports, used by Mr. Beard
in his article, II Big Navy Bo~rs, II page 261.
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Babcoclt and vVilcox Company and the Westi::1ghouse Electric
and Manufacturing Company • 1
From this lineup of companies, it would be deduced
that certain phases of education were given to Congress
that would affect the interests o:f the shipbuilders.

An

education as expensive as this seemed to be must have. been
paid for with an eye to the potential profits that would
accrue to the organizations at government expense.
This activity must be deplored.

It ts true that a

contingency would arise wherein expert advice might be desired. by Congressional committees discussing a measure,
but it would not be likely·that such a fommidible array would
be necessary.

Such 'lobbying' is apparently carried on

by other interests.
Home

Compani,o~.

A recent ec.i to rial in the Woman t s

stated it very aptly:

As in almo~t every nbuse of public :funds, it is an organiaed
.
minority wna_ bully-__C!__V'ote... seeking__ congress-to-d-1-ve~-t--publ-ie-------· ---~
funds~

In commenting upon such situations recently, President
Hoover remarked, "I refuse to believe that the country is
unable to reflect its will in iegislation. 11
Reference was just made to expert assistance for
)

committee discussions.

In these naval affairs there comes

to the front the expert, either by trainL.lg and experience,
or by his won esteem.

He often has help from the Havy

Department bureaus that should be able, in themselves, to
1 Hearin~ of the Subcommittee of the Committee on naval

Affairs of the 71 Congress, Senate Reso}ution 144,
page 682.
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give all the information directly to Congressmen.

Assistance

is proffered, often through the expert, by the' Uavy League,
Legion posts, Daughters of the Ar\lel'ican Revolution and
other similar patl'iotic organizations.

Journalists, vari-

ous classifications of newspapers and scores of individuals
spurred on by various motives also
to help mold public opinion. 1
The thesis held to by these

t

ap~ear

to give advice

experts', Beard contends,

is that the destructive efficiency of a ship is a known,
or discoverable,

factor--regardles~

of the commander's ability,

or the men who may be handling the units of the fleet under
combat conditione.

The

solutio~

hand as soon as determined.
howeve!r, with such ease.

should, therefore, be at

The problem cannot be handled,

Scientific treatment of the sub-

j ect will disclose that perfect results can be obtained to

a high degree ohly when all factors are under control, &'1d
the action of those responsible for the operation will be
just exactly correct.
Beard reprints, one section of a release by the Navy
League, dated September 4, 1931, as follows::
It will be recalled that for years there has been a campaign against capital ships, emanating originally from
England, and carried on in the United States, principally
by anti-navalists. In this the principal alleged purpose is to relieve the world of the 'colossal cost' of
about $39,000,000 for each of these monst~r ships, by
reducing their size, or eliminating them.~
l Op. Cit., 287-'
2 Ibid.
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He contends that this is a typical statement by the
:navy League.

The statement of the origin of the propa-

ganda may be true, or may not, it cannot be proved.

It

may be a tenable argument that England did fear the rising
tide of navalism in the United States.

There may be found

many people in this land -who were genuinely afraid of unrestricted competition with England in naval construction.l
The author states that his statements are not made to
determine the soundness of proposi tiona of the Navy League,
but to simply point out their formation, the loose statements made often without scientific precision.

He accuse

thaT often the Navy League does not have enough history of
warfare, nor does it express its ideas vri th

eno~gh

efficient

language to be correct criteria for leacl.ership in ·the field.
He would imply that this could be applied to others of the
same category.
Many times this country has been covered with propaganda concerning the neciessi ty of naval incre:-Jses, but the
sources of the information have not always been clear.

VTi th

the hearings in the Senate, already cited, the activities
of W. E. Shearer at Geneva in 1927 were disclosed.

The

"Shearer type" consisted of four parts.
The first type was that which llr. Shearer testified
as laid down by contracts he held, in general, "fo use my
best efforts in interest of the three-cruiser bill pendL1g
in Congress."
1

This refers to the activity in the autumn

Op. Oit., 289.
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of 1926.

The second type was that used in Geneva in 1927,

at the time of the Geneva Conference.

The employers were

not exactly clear in their testimony as to what they had
required, except that he was to be an 'unofficial observer',
and to report the •trends' of the conference.

They denied

he had been sent there with the intention o of s:preading
propaganda to injure the conference, w1 th a big Navy in the
United States as the ultimate view.l
The testimony, of course, branded the entire procedure
as that of intense 'lobbying.'
interests of shipbuilders.

This must have been for the

In the fn.ce o;f this, he

'"~as

en-

gaged by a few of his former employers to talce part in the
merchant marine propaganda for Congressional legislation.
The third "'type of acti.vi ty was answering peace advocates who criticised, for instance, Hoover's speech at
acceptance of the Presidential nomination in touching on
naval conci.i tiona.

Shearer sent out material in the nc>JIJ.e of

the Republican lTational Conuni ttee Publicity Bureau, funds
for which were supplied by the

n

shipbuilders.~

1

His last, or fourth type of activity, was carried out
principally under the direction of William Randolph Hearst.
Shearer was hired to write articles, mru:e speeches and send
out material to patriotic organizations, many of which he
1

Op. Oi t.

2 Ibid.

14-:~

was instrumental in organizing.

This material was made up

principally of arguments against joining the L'eague of
~rations or the World Oourt.l

In this connection Shearer said, in his testimony,
"I started to send out my bulletins to these societies,
a11d they sent in their resolutions against joining the
World Court."

The testimony of the officers of the vari-

ous employing companies, given in the Senate hearing would
tend to show that these big corporations did business in
a very loose manner, as the officials testifying
seem to remember the condi tiona surrounding Mr.
employment.•

1

did not

She~.rer 1

s

An official would agree to put up a large

sum of money, to pay for services which, according to
testimony, he was not sure about, a.nd then later his board
of directors would approve these expenditures apparently
without adequate explanation being given.2
In passing it might be consistent to observe that
these srune

blunderin~

actions on the part of highly-paid

officials won apparent approval by directors who would
probably dismiss ordine.ry employees for such lack of attention to duties.

Although it may be a bit strange, yet

this is the condition according to sworn testimony recorded
1 Op. Oit.

2 Hearings· of the Subcommittee, United States Senate,
1930, page 174.
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in the Senate hearings.l
Mr. Beard comments upon the kind of person needed
for this propaganda work, with probably the Shearer type
in mind.

He says that it ·would require a m.an having fluent

use of tongue

ru1d

pen, a detnched person and used to casual

employment, one capable to easy adaptation to varying
opportunities.

He claims that devotion to any one line of

endeavor, settled habits of life, a specinlist on any one
line, or a person of poor digestion which might prevent
activity, all of this ty}Je would be handicapped in this
business of lobbying, or as Hr. Ber=1rd calls it 'clandestine
negotiation.'

In this connection, he says further, that

any association of citizens that might try to influence
public policy is within the rights of democracy, until it
advocates measures which would rebound to the benefit of
special interes-ts.--- Then,- he claims, its structure and
economic support must be open to pitiless public scrutiny.
On December 15, 1915 Congressman Clyde H. Travenner
attacked the Havy League, claiming that it was composed of
eighteen men and one corporation at the time of its foundation.2
1 Ibid,, · 211.

Men whose testimony appears are Bardo of
the New Yorlt Shipbuilding Company, Ferguson of the
Newport lrews Company, Schwab of the Bethlehem Steel
Corporation.

g: The corporation was the Midvale Steel Corporation, which
had furnished the government with over $20,000,000
worth of armor plate; among the individual members
were C. M. Schwab of Bethlehem Steel; J. P. Morgan of ·
United States Steel; E. M. Thompson of International
Nickel; B. F.Tracy attorney for Carnegie Steel, and others.
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The same man dug down into government records and found
information on suits against steel companies for breaches
of con tracts on armor plate.

He shovred from the House

Report 1468, of the Fifty-third Congress, that testimony of
C. M. Schwab proved that evasions of specifications had
been made with his knowledge.

Presid.en t Cleveland finally

assessed large damages against the company .in question-Carnegie Steel--which \lV'ere promptly paid.l
Both the 1'-Tavy League of the United States and the
British Na.vy League fought ratification of the London treatyof 1930.

After its acceptance they turned their attention

to proposals to build to the treaty strength.

That su.ch

treaties might prove to been against their life, F. M.
Thompson, President of the American Havy League said, after
the Washington conference of 1921, there was no longer any
use for the Navy League.

Such recognition of the stand of

the organization, by one of its wwn officers, might make
the propaganda activities highly questionable.2
Some activities of a few of the organizations apparently
did not meet the approval of the United States gove1·nment,

for it gave warning that

an~

anti-disarmament agencies

attempting to interfere ''i th the London conference would
be ruthlessly investigated by the Department of Justice,
and if necessary shipbuilding contracts would be withheld
1

Op. Cit., February 3, 1932, LXIX, 315.

g: Ibid, 316.

from any private yards. that might engage in su.ch ctuestionalne
agitation.l It is open to reasonable doubt e.s to the effectiveness of such

W<:~:rn.ings,

but the fact remains that there was

little propagandist activity in London during the conference.
In the latter :pl'lrt of 1931 an attack was mad.e, by the
!!Tavy League, on the :p(!)lictes of President
personal attack on the President.

Hoover and a

The statements made were

very strong, and could not be ignored.

Hoover took the

issue up, a:ppointed an investigation committee to h:.quire
into the facts.

The committee was composed of Admiral

Hugh Rodman, retired; John Hays Hammond, mining engineer;·
Eliot Wadsworth, fonner Assistant Secretary of the Treasury;
W. R. Castle, Jr., Under Secretary of State; E. L. Jahncke,
Assistant Secretary of the Navy; and some unnamed members
of tb.e Navy League.
The conuni ttee reported on Hovember 6, 1931, to the effect
that remarks made by the President of the Uavy League contained many false statements, and that the uttack on Pres:tdent
Hoover was entirely unwarranted.

At the same time the boa.rd

of directors of the Navy Le<?cgue voted almost unaminously to
uphold the assertions of its President.

As a reeul t many

Congressmen made statemelnts, in and out of Congress, denouncing .the l:Ta.vy League.

The f:iiscussion also brought out me.ny

rema.rks in the newspapers on both sides of the investigation.
1 New York Evening Post, November 22, 1929.

1LJ:6

Chail'l11an Eri tten, of the Committee on HavD.l Affairs of the
House, partially upheld the Navy League. 1
:Mr. Beard summarizes his d:i.scussions in stating.

tlu.~.t

nobody is infa.llib-le, but thr:.t determination of a naval
program cannot be 1 eft to one person or one body.

There

must be sufficient leadership on policy lines in Oongress,
and

tha~

fair, open education by disinterested persons--

presuming those not connected with special interests-must be carried on to acquaint the people and Congressmen
of the conditions and needs.
Here are a few scraps of remarks, made dul·ing the
Hoover-Navy League controversy, and prL1ted in the issues of
the frmy: and Navy Journal:
The Administration is not favorable to building up the
~Tavy.--W. B. Howe, chairman of board of directors, liavy League.
The Navy is strong enough to defend American interests. It
is unwise to go into more construction.--President Hoover.
Following the Washington conference a vote was recorded
in the House on a naval bill, April 8, 1922, which aligned
the members in two named classes, Big Hr>..vy and Li tt.le Navy,
as follows:
Little Navy-Idaho
Utah
Colorado
South Dakota
Kansas
Texas

Iowa

1 Op. Oit., 317-318.

Nevada
VVyoming
North Dakota
Hebraska
·Oklahoma
Minnesota
Wisconsin
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Illinois
Kentucky
Arka.nsB.s
Mississippi
Georgia
north Carolina
Big Navy--

Wahington
California
Hew Mexico
Missouri
Ohio
Virginia
Delaware
New York
Connecti.cut
Rhode Island
Maine
Florida

l!ichir;an
West Vir?:inia
Tennessee ·
Alabama
South Carolina

Oregon
Arizona
l.!ontana
Indi:.:1na
Pennsylvania
Maryland
New Jersey
Vermont
Massachusetts
New Hampshire
Louisiana

no recorded vote is available on the totals of 287 for
and 58 against the Fifteen-cruiser bill passed in the House
on March 17,1928.

The Senate did record ita vote however

as folloY:s:
For the bill-- (both Senators)
Oregon
Nevada
Colorado
Texas
Missouri
Louisiana
Tennessee
Indiana
Kentucky
Florida
north Oal'Olina
Pennsylvania
Delaware
Connecticut
r.r ew Yo rl~
Vermont
Maine

California
Wyoming
new Mexico
l{a.nsas
Arkansas
Lii ssi ssi~ppi
Illinois
1.:1 e: hi gan
Geore;ia
South Carolina
West Virginia
Maryland
New Jersey
Rhode Island
Massachusetts
New Hampshire

Against the bill--(both Senators)
Utah

1.-!ontana

148

JITebraska
Wisconsin

Horth Dakota

Divided--(one ·senator for)
\Vashington
South Dal~ota
Io1lJa
Al2.bama
Virginia
The votes may be
cal, economic, social.

Idaho
Minnesota
Oklahoma
Ohio
interp~eted

in several ways, politi-

In the Senate vote, it might be

inferred that a few votes ·~were cast on personal :prejudices.
There may be something

refl~g,ted

in the later vote of the

feeling over the failure of the Geneva conference of 1927.
In 1922 the people received with enthusiasm the Washington conference proposals.

In 1927 the delegates went

to Geneva with national backing for certain proposals,
Which did not become acc}3pted.

The feeling of the nation

was reflected next year in the Congressional vote.

As

already mentioned, the bill was signed by President Coolidce.
Sec·retary C. E. Hughes, in 1922, stated thH.t it was
necessary for this cotmtry to mainta:!.n its relative strene;th.
By relative I presume that he meant the one set up in the
treaty.

This did not seem to be so

acc~pted

by the nation

until 1929, when a great change of feeling toward naval
bills was easily apparent.
t

It is also possible that the word

comparative' in discussions had been changed to 'competitive'

which put new light on the ratio desires. 1
As stated in the introduction to this work, I can dra\'7
1 Uavy League publication, February 7, 1929.
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no conclusions for the reader.

If

this cr;mbi:1ation of ideas, you have
clusions, it were better that
impose upon them.

no

du:-i~1g

the

fol~med

readh~g

of

your 0\7n con-:-

'!)resumption of mine should

If you huve not formed an opinion, then

any attempt to form one for you here might not be in :;lace.
It is earnestly hoped that fr'. cts, figures, or statements herein presented might have proved of
you.

i~terest

to

I will say, in conclusion, that· more material may be

found that will pro\re of interest in a detailed way, in the
following Appendix.
so

wish~~

This may help you to decide, if you

if the Big Navy Idea In the United States is justi-

fied.

-a-
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Tl~e abot-c 1uap .shotl's 1tow tlt..::

i:

llttljl .~710IN by .stares Jww. &nat on voted (68 lo :u) 011 February 1• 19:19.
10 mahoYi::;:;.;! rh..: building of fifteen more: cntiser.s. The House h ..1J so voted (187 to
s8 1 01\ M.m·ch 17, r9~s. but wilhout an individual!, r.:conlcl'l "Loote..

1J»c a have

of Rcpt·c.scnfati:vcs f,·om eada state \.'()fed
the finr illdividut~Hy 't'cconkJ 1.:otc (Ap,·il 8, 19u) in the Hous!! O)l the }\atl)' afur
the WMhi,ngron Copf!!t·cucc.

'

•

"·-:·

~ -"'!.-: ~ .t.~-A·,• J n~ccnt

k~B'~:-f·::,:;~l!IJERE arc far deeper cco~o1nic •nd social
·fi:_\",,1 :·.::.~ :v.-··: .,.J.uscs th~n some rccognu.c .har:k of the
'J·-,':.'. '.-;.'!,/I
,
•
.
vote of6.. to 12111 thr UnJtcd States
~f~It1\)'f~t.·;.ft·_~i: Senate to ~-uthcwh~ the laYing do\Vll of.
i~t-~<;_._tf:S:~ five Jo,ooo-ton, 8-inch.-g:un c•·uiscrs a year
during the next three yc:lrs-a \'Ote that v..·as p1·omptly
confintH'tl by the house of Representatives, as \VUS to
have been expected from the House's vote of 287 to 58
last year in favo1· of these cruisers.
The first of the above n1aps sho'\VS ho,v the House
voted on. ihc navy in .April of 1922, immc~li.1tcly alter
the \Vashington C'..onf~rcnct", the d;u·k states hcihg .. little
navy." Dy contrast, the .scconJ map sho,vs the recent
vote in the Senate to authorh,c the ftftccn crui~rs.
In 1922 thc'l"c \vere t\.vcnty .. fivc '"1ittlc navy"" sta.tcs
out of the fony~cight. No'v thcr~ arc only five st:..u.s;
from ·which no votes ,,,.c1·e expressed in support of ~he
naval program and only nine states ·:whose .Senators
indiviUually took oppositr. siJcs on .fhr qucsfion. In
other \\'on.l.s, ·whereas ther'c '\VCrc (,.'\t>,l.ly twcnty .. three
pro~uavy slates in 1922, 110'\V there ..arc ·t-hirty.. four
wholly so and nine equally tlividc.J, ~with merely ftve
-inste:\J of the formct· t\Vcnty.-{jye- -opposed to a
greater navy.
Much cnuhl be said a~ t.o how pt·o .. navy sentiment has
Jcvclopctl throu~hout the southcnt anJ midland states
;tnd has Lacked anti.-n:a,;otl fcdin!; up into mcr·cly fout·
of the rather nu.tical ''~'nl~ ccntral states anJ Utah, in
\Vhkh bttcJ' Scn"\?.r Ki.nJ(~. inveterate arHI virulent
anti .. navalism rn;•y 1,\\,t. he ~r:.uly n:p1·cscntativc. Like..wisc, simibt· ptr·sonal1 \.'~C.'\\'S on the part of Senator Dill
of \Va~;hington, and t1.f '·the life~lonr, padn~~l, Scnatot·
But·ton of Ohio, arc kno\\'ll to be unJ·cprc.,;cnliHive of
the stJ·ont; pl'o..-navy ~cntimcnt in thcit· l'l'spcctive {;tates.
Such pcn;on;~l pr~ju\liccs make it t"afc to fiay that, in
{a-:t, the pru.-navy. C.l'ntit~H. . nt of such tltatc.·!i, :tnd <'f the
C'lHII\try as a \Vhn1c, is even stroqr,er than \Va); sho,vn
hr .thc.vot1 ~,in<>t'lh: Senate.
Som~ 1 ~'Y!H· ·t~~dh.·. this ;,Jnwr.t nation.-,vi~h· ,h:vclop ..
mt·nt uf t.upport of mit' navy to it·l"it.Hion at tiH.• pro~o:L· ..
t1un· the Hdii·;h Go\'CJ'IlllH'IIt ch01;c to :Hiopt i\t t.hc
~~t'IH"\'a Conft•J'l'llt'c.' of l~P-7, an\1 to \vldd1 it ·PL"I"'ii':il\·d
111 ;ulhcrin~~. in !->pitt of tiH'n L'>.:pn.·~~;\•d Anll·rkan oppo ..
f'il j,ll, iu t lw :1hurt iv&: Ft·an('I)··BI'il j..,h N;,v.d A,~rcL·un·nt
of J!)lH, It ,;houhl lw l'l.'Calh·d, ho\\'l'V~'I' 1 th;lt whcn·au
tl11dn~ the \\'a:;hillglon Confcn:ncc of ry21, Amcric:m
[tUIJiic opinion lh:n:ph·d \Vith cnthu':ii:~t.m Jli"I'J'~~'>~,;~I!I for

~

.

'the reduction of annamcnts, irrespective of othes:- Amer•
ican itttC!'rcSts, during the Geneva Co(tfcren~.e of '291.7 11 •
the ,Ainedtan Naval Delegation had the «"~holc.-he.1rtcd
suppot·.t of t~\c Amet·ic:~n Government, pr..:ss anJ ptople ..
Sueit a complete change in pu hlk opinion, beyond ques-tion, haJ mu~h deeper c:tuses than momentary irrituion ..
9thcrs v:ill ascribe the present virtually unJnimOus
.';upport of our naval buihling p1~og1·am to a some'\\·ha.~
~l3tcd rcalh:ation that l!x.-Sccrctary Hughes \VJ.S right
\VhC'n he. s:dd in the autumn of 1922. that "it,is .esse:ntiaJ
.that. '\\'C should nuintain the ,·datit:e naval strength of
the United Statcs.n Relative naval strength •m!!an.s,
c:ompat·ativc naval strength and, of necessity, involv·cs
comparisons 'vith the navies of other l>t'"',..ers to see
·whether the 5--5--3 ratio of comparative strength ,v·as
being maintained.
"!'his $itnple statistical procedure was tnuch beclouded
by the deliberate or inadvertent substitution Of the
\Vord "competitive" \vhcTC mer.cly comparisons \ ...·ere
made; and it '\Vas alleged that any comp.1risons in accord ..
ance \Vith the 5.. 5..3 ratio implied cotrlpetition 3lttl an
effort to excel othe1·s instl'ad of merely catching up to
them, But the fact that in moden1 CJ-uiscn, for in..stance, the relative strength Of the United Stat.:s has
been held under 2 1 instcad of up to 5, and that the prc~nt
building prograrn of eight 8--inch~gun cruisers untlcr
constl·Uction :tnd fifteen more just approved by ~mg:rcs.s
Jocs not yet give par·ity merely in ~~ig gun cruisers h.ts
gr·"du:dly ovc1·comc the specious allcsation of "comp~ti...
tivc" building.
At th-is point it is worth recalling that ever sinc4!
192.2 the Navy Lcaguc of the United States has conc.en.tratcd on pcn)istcntly athl cousistentl>• :u.lvoc<ttin~ the
con~tructiott of t'\\'Cnty or nwrc such cn.1iscrs. Thif
policy \\~as tleriv~,l f1·om con~t:-tnt :~nd can•Jul study 'o{
the situation an"J of i(s un~cdying f.t<;ton;i anJ an und.cr...
.stanllint; o( th&:!>l' :,c;~un:d and convinced u.~ th.H ~vhcn
the puhlic hccilmC aliv..: to it, in "l'ite of domc,.rk anJ
nlicn :mti .. naval mist:uidancc 1 the pressure u( puhli(
opinion \Vouhl cvc11tu.1tc itt such :tction a~~> Ccmsr.:ss
has ju<t tal<cll t•> t;ive the Unile<l :;t;lt<s 3 total of
t w,·uty.-t hnt: 1o,ooo·ton, H~inch.-t:nn cruist•r·~.
\VhiJ,. tHil:h ohj ..·clivt• Hlatistic;lt' con·;idt:rati•Jn:S un.,louiHl'\lly 'oncl'i),ut"·~t to pn,..lucl" thi" 1'1!!\ult, it w;u tlh.'
\IIHkdying fo•C>onl of J;l''JI:r.iphy, f:t)(ioln,:y ouhl ccorllliJti-:•
th;ll gav~o.• t!·H' ~>ti'OI\1~'-'M lll·nu\i~:c of irs uhimacc in~vif.l'"'
J>jJ~t}'j {nl' whitt: &:OIUJ'ill',tlivc)y (C\\.' kn,>\V if, tJH."rt." i•

a s.ci..:ncc of sea pO\Vcr quite as broad and as basic' as tJ'Iat.
of roliti..:al. economy. Nearly forty year~~:igo .~ts d·~~· :'
}..Jah:tn,saul:
···-·l·~

"Th~

pri 11.:ipal conJitio~ns :llf..::.:ting the: sc;a ~w..::r of nations may
b:: cnumcrat.:d :as fotlo'\n: I. Gcogr;,rhk position.. 11.' Physi.:al
~on(onnation, induJing, as connected therewith, n.1.tur.1l proJue-lion :ud dimate. Ill. ExteJH of territory. IV. Number of popu ..
btion. \'. CharJ.ctcr of the reople. VI. Chaz;!1ctc.r of the govern ..
m.:1lt, in.:luJing thcl'cin the n;\tional institutiol\s,"

Studv of these elements of s:ea power bdngs a rcali"t.a ....
tion tl;~lt the midoccanic position of America, \.vith all of
.out· r~bcinns '\Vith other pat·ts of the '~·odd immutably
nycr:;..:a~ a.ffain;;, is by fa1· the best {rom \\•hich to carry
on .......·odd~v..·i,l~ seafaring. For no,vherc else is there a
sin~;l~ country '"ith the conjunction of sucl! a ccntl·:tl
maritin1c position, such natural rc:..ourccs, s~ch extent
of ten·itory, arnt ~o nume1·ous a population:.~ Ant.l fur.thennon:1 with 1·csp1!ct to the character of a people.,
~f.,han said:
"The h·ndcncy to tr;utc, iTn·olving of necessity the production
f<~rn.:thing to tr:1dc with, is rh~ natioual,ch:lracteri~tic most im ..
I'<'Jrtant to the ~t.:.,·dupmcut of sea power.

n(

\\'h~·n \VC reali:c that our economic. productivity
,tbuut ~~1uals th=lt of all the nations of Europe \\'CSt of
l~u~"i.l nn the one haml. arhl th;tt of all the othc1· p•trts
of tho..:. \vorhl, on the other, '\.ve 1;c.t Bc>me sense of the
.;olo.:o.:;.t1 c'onotnic forCe here pressin!~ to cxpn:::s~ itself
in ovc 1"::;(.~;\S trade. 'rhere is nothing surp•·.bint~~ tl'l~~·c ...
fiJr~. in the faCt thi\t o~t.!· cxtcl·nal •. tl'adc is alr·call_y :IS
worlJ '\Vhll! and ;t:; gn.'::\t as that of ;1ny othct· SU'I!~Ic
countl·y. I1H1cl~d, o;tr exports arc. all·c;u1y ovc1· twenty
pc•· ~-.,:nc ~n.·atc1· than those from any other vnc nation
and thdt· ·production is said to suppo1·t dirc~tly about
a t~.:r1th <>f ou1· popul;ttiml.
Sc;t J~,H·nc c.xportr. and impor·ts to and fJ'l)ll\ all parts
of tlh· ":odd amo1111ting to ovct· ci1;ht hillioll dol1ara a
year, atHl ;t coao;t\Vi~c tt·adc car-ryint{ r.omc six. billinn
umn·, J;i vc u:; a "ca hofnC commcn·c that :\ lt·c:ul y ex ...
(t:cd-. ftnlt"tccn billion ,)ollars and i:-4 vitally imJ'OI'tant
Ill t'\'Cr)' indu•;tJ'Y and humc and pt:I'HOI\ in th'! br11l.
Saturally, :;ud'l an \lllpr&:~edcntct1 t.:a1t \Vah'f fl·alfl.; n:.qttin:~ ~no1t ... hippin!~ (adlitit·."· AnJ with rnmpt•tition
fol' m.tdH·ts otl'ld f11r ~upplic!i bt:l'(JJllil'll~ cv..:r l<L't.:llcJ·, th~
tr,, 11 •.pnl·f o( nwrcly a third o( wu· tl'an.·•n~~c;tni..: tr·.111ic
1!. 11 1"'·,1 to l'c~uJ.,,. Jinc!l (If Aun:rkonl JihippinJ: n.:.t\.·hin,.;
Jn,m our· rnid<h~C.ll\k h:H~ to al1 pan'i u( th~~\\vodll o\'t'l'
o(tl!~l"t'IIC L!tH':i th.tt (Oii\1 UIOI'C th;ln i\ hundl'l'lJ .tHd fl(ty

thousand miles in length an<l that require nav3l cn1iser
·protection;
.

1:n short:, thP. ,::rq\:.~.1)"~ in .c:l?'a 1'10'\.vi'"r it: prnno~ic._{.r,......:

du.:tion ashore,. then overs ~as trading, the.n more and
1nore ships to c~rry it, and finally naval po\YC:l" support.-·
cd by the internal ccot'l.omic interests that are expressing
themselves externally in overseas tr:tde and by a f1·ac.-.
tion of the profit o( that trade to the country. :
Under the c.conomie nnd social conditi9ns notv exist.idg in our g1·c:tt midoceanic, fnsulat· .America, it was
natur3l that the undc;-stan\1ing editor of the. New York
Hcrald.-Tribunc should conclude his comment on the
action of Congress for the naval building progr;:un by
saying:
The most gr;atifying thing·about the di:;.:ussion in the Senate
\\.':!.& the wiJe :~p ~reciation tht:re that our economic interest-the
1
expansion of our ovcn~as trade anJ oversea<; invc:stmcnta--rcquirel
the m.aintca'\an..:c of a. navy equal to th:\t of any other na.val power.
We arc simply yicl11ing to economic forces in crc:ttin~ such a navy.
Our n. 1 ti~m;\l rsychology ha& not yet: aJaptt'd i1sclC fully to the
change. But economic force& control in the end, \Ve are g:oing to
Juve a t 1·caty n:IVy whctht:r we consdo}ll'i1y wish to or not. \Vc
arc s;oing to h:ave a grc.lt merchant marine whether \ve con~iously
wi~h to or not. Those thing' arc written in our :;tan, {or: the
Unitl'd St;ltt'S 2-.p:s b.::comc an ouut:-ndin~ ·insular and traJins: na.tion, with its futur-'e more ancl more on the !'.e;u.
Ten or twcnt)' yo:Ms hence the he.,it:-tioll shown by Congrul
to t:urport our tJ'C;It)' navy will he h:.rJiy cornprchcusihle, It it
a. timorous inhcrit;tnce from the past, Dut it is vanir.hing. Piftcen
mnre cnli:.crs will nut rc:stQre. Arncrkan nav,\1 p.uity. Yet' they
will make it c:I'>Y to attain C'V('ntu;l) parity. The nuin thing it
that ConE;rc~~ anJ public opinion arc now di~ountin&: the inevf ... ..,/
table and beginning to repair the errora o( nav,\1 policy committed
1

GiJl.:e 1911.,

Thus the tn:nJ of the fundamental ceonotnie anll r.ocial
conditions within the country that some,vhat gropingly
01rc ~eckin,.; comm('nsuratc expres~;ion on the r.c.as is be ..
f~innin1~ tu make it:-.clf dcf1nitely (dt. Thnt \vithin so
(1!\V ycar:J after the illuc;ions of the \Vashington Con ..
(crcn..:e r;o many of the JH:opl·~'~ t'ctu·c~ntativcs have
rcco 1 ~ni.:cll .Inti an; ahling thio; vit;tl traltl, giw~.s promise
that virtually all \vi11·soon cca~:c Ol'l"l::>ing the mct·c.:tn ..
tile and nav;al expansion r.o incrl'a.'iillJ~Iy important to
the prmpcrity "'"' security n( the pcopl< of the United
StHc•.
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